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Abstract
Developments in information and communications technologies, the increasing sophistica-
tion and deepening of financial markets and the ineluctable process of globalisation have
profound implications for the conduct of monetary policy. This thesis identifies three
areas in which the impact of such developments may be felt most acutely by modern cen-
tral banks: the electronification of retail payments systems, the increasing frequency and
severity of asset market cycles and the continuing integration of the global economy.
The high profile debate concerning the threat of e–money to the efficacy of monetary
policy has been largely resolved. It has, nevertheless, diverted attention away from other
important concerns, including the potential for runs on service providers and systemic
risks arising from unregulated offshore issuers. The importance of these issues can only be
evaluated with reference to the importance of e–money as a payment instrument. However,
e–money usage remains marginal at present and forecasts of its development indicate
limited growth potential. This raises a number of regulatory issues. Firstly, regulators
must ensure systemic security. Secondly, is existing regulation stifling innovation? Finally,
can regulation be designed to promote innovation, and would this be desirable? This thesis
argues that regulation must balance systemic security with the incentives for innovation,
and proposes a general regulatory framework to this end.
Since the onset of global financial crisis in mid 2007, it has become clear that central
banks underestimate the macroeconomic influence of financial markets at their peril. The
Minskyan financial fragility hypothesis asserts that inflation targeting monetary policy
may contribute to financial fragility. The estimation of a small macroeconomic model
lends substantial support to this view, suggesting that central banks should manipulate
the interest rate with great care. However, it is within the power of the central bank to set
differential reserve requirements by asset class, providing an additional policy instrument.
This thesis proposes a simple approach in which interest rates and reserve requirements
are used in a complementary manner.
The majority of monetary policy research is conducted assuming either a closed, or
small open economy. However, the exclusion of feedback effects renders these approaches
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inappropriate in many economically interesting cases. This thesis develops a simple stock–
flow consistent model comprised of two mutually dependent economies with financial and
real linkages. The performance of various stabilisation policies is analysed using this
framework. The results call into question the ability of simple inflation–targeting rules to
achieve price stability in an open economy and stress that a combined monetary and fiscal
regime is necessary for effective stabilisation.
The conclusion of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, regulators are rightly concerned with
financial innovation but they must leave room for innovation and technological progress.
Secondly, central banks must pursue interest rate policy with great care to avoid exacer-
bating financial fragility. Thirdly, the interest rate is not the sole instrument of monetary
policy and, indeed, the central bank is not the sole institution capable of undertaking
stabilisation policy.
Keywords: Monetary policy, electronic money, regulation of financial institutions, finan-
cial fragility, asset–based reserve requirements, stock–flow consistency, monetary and fiscal
policy interaction.
JEL Codes: C51, E27, E52, E63, F41, F47.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The design and implementation of active policies aimed at smoothing macroeconomic
fluctuations across the cycle is a relatively new phenomenon, attributable to Keynes and
his revolution in economic thought. Prior to this Keynesian revolution, the principle role
of most central banks was to act as the banker to their government and to ensure the
stability of the financial system (c.f. Tymoigne, 2006). While few modern economists
would advocate Hellerian fine–tuning (Heller, 1966), most in the New Keynesian school
would agree that monetary policy can, and should, be used to target inflation through
aggregate demand management.
The emergence of a ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics has resulted in a degree of
convergence of the operating procedures of central banks around the world, in both devel-
oped and developing economies. The adoption of inflation targeting (IT) regimes, whether
formal or informal, in which the central bank manipulates the short–term interest rate in
order to achieve a desired level of inflation, has been one of the defining characteristics of
the last decade and a half. Chapter 2 critically reviews the role and nature of monetary
policy in this currently dominant school of thought and provides the backdrop against
which the remaining chapters are set.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the suitability of this dominant position in
the twenty–first century. The increasing integration of information and communications
technologies (ICT) into our everyday lives and the relentless process of globalisation have
fundamentally altered the economic landscape. The world is now smaller than it has
ever been and the pace of life faster. This process of change presents many challenges
to policymakers, three of which are discussed here: the electronification of the payments
system, the increasing frequency and amplitude of asset market cycles, and the increasing
openness of the global economy.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Electronification of the Payments System
The increasing electronification of retail payments systems and the development of elec-
tronic money received a great deal of attention at the turn of the millennium. A number
of authors, most notably Benjamin Friedman and Mervyn King, suggested that the sub-
stitution away from central bank issued money toward privately issued e–money would
undermine the ability of the monetary authority to stabilise the macroeconomy (Fried-
man, 1999, 2000; King, 1999). However, this remained a minority position and was largely
defeated in the literature by a number of papers which argued that the operation of mon-
etary policy per se does not require that households and commercial banks hold large
quantities of high powered money (c.f. Freedman, 2000; Palley, 2001b; Woodford, 2000,
2001a). The general consensus which emerged was that central banks could simply impose
reserve requirements on e–money issuers or that they could adopt Lombard systems, such
as that used in Canada, which would be almost totally unaffected by the introduction of
e–money.
It is the contention of Chapter 3 that the high profile debate over the monetary policy
ramifications of e–money issuance diverted attention from a number of important, and less
fanciful, issues with which its adoption is associated. Concerns that have been raised in
the literature include the possibility of runs on e–money providers (Meyer, 2001b; Palley,
2001a), the appearance of loopholes that may be exploited through circumventive inno-
vation (Friedman, 1999), the inaccuracy of monetary statistics (EMI, 1994), risks arising
from offshore issuers (Krueger, 2002b), social exclusion (Van Hove, 2003) and the invasion
of privacy coupled with a relative increase in the criminal demand for the anonymity as-
sociated with traditional currency (Goodhart, 2000). These issues have received relatively
little attention from regulators and policymakers. This chapter aims to bring attention
back to these concerns, and is rather timely given the current heightened state of awareness
of regulatory issues in the financial sector.
Much of the theoretical work on e–money is based on the assumption that it will come
to achieve a significant market share, or even total dominance of the retail payments sector.
Chapter 3 challenges this assumption in three ways. Firstly, by careful consideration
of the nature of money, it is possible to identify a number of conditions necessary for
the complete substitution of private e–money for central bank money. These include
perfect interoperability of e–money schemes, full transferability of e–monetary value, the
acceptance of e–money in the payment of tax obligations, and the payment of wages in
e–money in an environment in which e–money is not redeemable for currency. When
presented in this way, it is clear that the widespread substitution of e–money for more
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conventional forms of money is highly unlikely to arise in practice, at least in the foreseeable
future.
Secondly, detailed analysis of the historical performance of e–money services at the
macroeconomic level in the Euro Area and Singapore reveals that the degree of market
penetration has been relatively modest, certainly when one considers the entire retail
payments industry as opposed to the market for cashless instruments. Furthermore, the
fact that each individual in Singapore holds an average of three e–money cards can be
interpreted as evidence of a failure to coordinate between e–money service providers,
merchants and consumers. The lack of interoperability of existing schemes coupled with
a shortage of installed e–money loading terminals is clearly evident in the data, and
represents a significant obstacle to the continuing growth of the new technology. It must
be noted, however, that e–money products account for a substantial majority of cashless
payments in Singapore and that the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s announcement
that it intends to issue electronic legal tender in the near future has provided a substantial
impetus to the industry. This suggests that the regulatory stance of the Government is
likely to be a significant determinant of the commercial success of e–money schemes.
Finally, a range of forecasting exercises are carried out on a hitherto unused European
dataset. The dataset is unique within the field in the sense that it spans ten years at
monthly frequency while most countries report data annually at most. The richness of the
data provides scope for the development of sophisticated forecasting models. Three such
models are employed here: a simple geometric random walk model to act as a benchmark;
a Bayesian average model employing a non-informative prior in which equal weight is
attached to each of twenty–eight candidate models; and a nonlinear Gompertz function.
The adoption of innovative products (particularly those where network effects are likely to
be strong) is widely believed to follow a sigmoid process. The Gompertz curve is among
the class of sigmoid functions and is used to investigate this sigmoid adoption hypothesis.
Pseudo out–of–sample forecast testing reveals that the benchmark model and the Gom-
pertz specifications yield similar results while the Bayesian forecast significantly outper-
forms both. In general, the results indicate that the medium–term growth prospects of
the e–money industry in Europe are relatively modest over a five year horizon. More-
over, forecast intervals derived from non–parametric bootstrapping reveal that the degree
of uncertainty surrounding the forecasts is relatively limited, indicating that a drastic
surge in e–money usage in very unlikely1. Indeed, if e–money adoption can be accurately
1Note that the computation of intervals for the average model is not undertaken in this thesis due to
the uncertainty surrounding the choice of computational approach. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 3.6.
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described by the sigmoid hypothesis, the results suggest that it is approaching its up-
per asymptote, indicating limited potential for existing e–money technologies to achieve
significant increases in their market share.
Once one accepts that the probability of e–money gaining significant market share in
the medium–term is low, the foundation on which much of the existing theoretical work
rests becomes rather weak. The most pressing issue is the question of how regulators
should handle the development of e–money2. This issue is addressed by Chapter 4.
A comparison of the regulatory frameworks in place in the USA, Europe and Singapore
reveals substantial differences in their respective approaches to e–money. Regulators in the
USA have taken a market–oriented, laissez–faire stance which has resulted in substantial
heterogeneity between states. European regulation, by contrast, is extensive and has a
thorough legal basis, while the Singaporean system occupies the middle ground. Each of
these approaches has its associated advantages and disadvantages and, by identifying these
and drawing on the positives, Chapter 4 attempts to outline the general characteristics
of an optimal (or at least preferable) regulatory scheme. The more fundamental of these
characteristics may be crudely summarised as follows:
i. regulators must carefully weigh the benefits of making e–money legal tender against
the potential loss of competitive forces in the market;
ii. the deployment of a unified technological architecture is essential, both for systemic
security and to promote interoperability (the latter reflecting liquidity);
iii. similarly, unified regulation is of fundamental importance;
iv. regulators must strictly enforce robust asset–backing, net worth and ongoing capital
requirements to protect systemic security;
v. regulation should explicitly prevent e–money issuers from engaging in deposit–taking
activities and credit extension to avoid the blurring of boundaries between banks and
other financial institutions;
vi. various waivers could be used to promote innovation;
vii. e–money must be redeemable at par for central bank money in order to protect
issuers from what may be thought of as exchange rate risk; and
2E–money regulation is the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK but in
most countries it remains closely linked to the central bank. The desirability of divesting this role from
the central bank is unclear, particularly to the extent that it may result in serious coordination failures
and may introduce an element of moral hazard between the two organs of state. However, such issues are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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viii. the payment of interest on small e–money balances may be desirable as long as
e–money schemes do not offer depository services.
One feature is particularly evident from simple analysis of the raw data: the Sin-
gaporean Government’s decision to issue electronic legal tender and its development of
common technological standards for e–money systems have driven progress in the indus-
try. While the desirability of the state–issuance of e–money remains unclear, the adoption
of common standards is surely a positive development. The world should closely mon-
itor the Singaporean e–money experiment and should not hesitate to move in a similar
direction if it proves successful.
1.2 Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility
In the last three decades, both the frequency and amplitude of asset market cycles have
increased markedly. This effect has been attributed to a number of phenomena, perhaps
the most credible of which is the proliferation of ‘managed money’, where fund managers
invest vast quantities of money in a foot–loose manner, potentially driving or contributing
to the observed cyclicality (Wray, 2008a; 2008b).
Mainstream modelling during this period has been dominated by the tenets of the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), albeit with some insights gleaned from behavioural
models (see Ritter, 2003, for a concise survey of the latter). An important implication of
the EMH is that the price of an asset is closely related to its fundamental value, defined
as the discounted present value of the dividend stream, optimally forecast. This implies
that speculative bubbles are not possible per se but that market fluctuations are caused
by movements in underlying fundamentals. In this setting, booms and busts seemingly
unrelated to fundamental values indicate that the market is not efficient: prices either fail
to reflect all relevant information, or do so with a significant lag.
By weakening various assumptions of the EMH, two types of bubbles can be envisaged:
deterministic and stochastic3. The first is largely an academic curiosity and can only arise
rationally if prices rise ad infinitum. By contrast, stochastic rational bubbles of the type
described by Blanchard and Watson (1982) may be propagated by the actions of rational
arbitrageurs (c.f. Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002; 2003)4. Consider a situation in which
3A further broad category of bubbles is associated with the behavioural finance literature. Considerable
research effort has been dedicated to the development of models in which a proportion of investors act
according to the EMH while the remainder operate other strategies. A notable example of this approach
is Shiller (1989).
4Intuitively, bubbles cannot be propagated in a setting of perfect arbitrage in which rational arbitrageurs
act in a coordinated fashion. In this way, Abreu and Brunnermeier’s work is reminiscent of the ‘limits to
arbitrage’ approach of Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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investors estimate the probability of the continuation of a stochastic bubble into the next
period and will invest if the expected excess return is sufficient to compensate for the
inherent riskiness of the investment. In layman’s terms, it may be preferable to ‘ride the
wave’ in order to realise risky excess returns rather than to exit the market. Such trading
of risk against return in the setting of a nascent bubble may be particularly prevalent in
the case of managed money, where funds attract investors on the strength of their prior
returns.
Drawing on the Keynesian tradition, one can raise a fundamental objection to the
EMH. In an uncertain world in which time is an irreversible continuum, the principal
of invariance central to mainstream notions of rationality is rendered largely unworkable.
Mainstream rationality is dependent on the existence of an invariant ordering of preferences
such that if A is preferred to B (A > B) and B > C then A > C. However, in an uncertain
world, the fact that A > B at time t and B > C at time t+ 1 does not necessarily imply
that A > C either in period t or t + 1, nor even that A > B at time t + 1 or B > C
at time t. Once future uncertainty is introduced, the principal of invariance cannot be
generalised across time periods. In such a setting, an optimally forecast return cannot
be defined without reference to an individual’s expectations and, therefore, cannot be
generalised. The implication is that different investors are likely to attach different values
to the same asset. The concept of a fundamental value which exists based on factors
which are strictly independent of investors’ expectations would require exact knowledge
of the discount rate and income stream into the future. This simple process of reductio ad
absurdum convincingly discredits the EMH5.
Mark Hayes (2006) presents a simple framework based on Keynes’ argument that, in
practice, the ability of economic agents to assess the future value of a good in an unpre-
dictable market situation is limited if not negligible over anything but a short timeframe
(Keynes, 1936, ch. 12; 1937, pp. 214-215; Erturk, 2006, §3). Hence, it is rational for
investors to pay more attention to the expected price of an asset in the near future than
to relatively more weakly held beliefs about its price in distant periods. Thus, Hayes
proposes a relation of the form:
(qt+1 ≥ qt (1 + rt+1)) |Ωt = (qt+1 ≤ qt (1 + rt+1)) |Ωt
which states that the Keynesian probabilities of an asset price appreciating and depreciat-
ing are equal. The implication is that in a world characterised by Keynesian uncertainty,
5While criticism of the EMH was once the preserve of a marginalised group of non–conformist
economists, there is evidence that such views are slowly permeating into policymaking circles (e.g. Buiter,
2007).
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a rational arbitrageur should be concerned not with the basis of a particular pricing con-
vention but rather with its expected duration.
This simple framework bears a striking similarity to the financial Keynesianism of
Hyman Minsky (1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1986a, 1986b). In stylised fashion, the critical
elements of the Financial Fragility Hypothesis (FFH) may be summarised as follows: (i.)
debt–funded asset acquisition is widespread; (ii.) investment behaviour is significantly
affected by conventional valuation and so asset booms tend to gain momentum; (iii.)
price level inflation is met by rising interest rates which may cause safe hedge financing
units to become either potentially unstable speculative units or demonstrably fragile Ponzi
units6; (iv.) thinly capitalised financial institutions are vulnerable to bankruptcies among
their clients; and (v.) failures of individual financial institutions are unlikely to remain
isolated due to the inter–relationships typifying financial contracting (financial contagion).
Two general points characterise the Minskyan scheme. Firstly, no exogenous spur is
required to start this chain of events. Minsky views financial fragility as arising endoge-
nously as the natural product of a capitalist economy under passive governance. Secondly,
inflation–targeting interest rate policy may be destabilising in a Minskyan model as it
alters the cash commitments of firms after they have made their borrowing decisions in
an ex ante unforeseeable manner. This last point is highly controversial as it cautions
against the current practice of manipulating the interest rate in an attempt to achieve
price stability. Given the earlier observation that asset market cycles are becoming both
more frequent and more severe, the importance of developing a proper understanding of
the relationship between monetary policy and financial fragility is apparent. Indeed, in
the present economic climate, this must be considered the single most important challenge
facing central banks around the World. Motivated by these concerns, Chapter 5 attempts
to contribute to the analysis of the proposed linkage between interest rates and financial
fragility.
Despite the recent surge of interest in Minskyan economics, very little formal modelling
has been undertaken in the Minskyan tradition. Notable examples of model–based simula-
tions include Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; Delli Gatti, Gallegati, and Gardini, 1993; and
Fazzari, Ferri, and Greenberg, 2008. However, at present there is a distinct lack of em-
pirical evidence in direct support of Minsky’s core propositions7. This lack of empirical
6Minsky (1986b, pp. 335-341) rigorously defines these three financial structures. For an example of his
view of the transition between financial structures see Minsky (1982, p. 66-8).
7Fazzari (1999) argues that recent micro–founded modelling at the interface between finance and eco-
nomics complements Minsky’s work and that the associated empirical research provides indirect support
for the FFH. However, these models are not inherently Minskyan and financial fragility does not generally
arise endogenously. Moreover, Fazzari notes that Minsky’s advocacy of a ‘Big Government’ and a ‘Big
(Central) Bank’ remains largely unknown to mainstream academics and practitioners alike.
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support is one of the principle reasons that the FFH, and particularly the link between
interest rates and financial fragility, remains so controversial.
Chapter 5 attempts to address this lacuna by developing a small macroeconomic model
which displays many of the key features of a Minskyan economy. The model is comprised
of four equations: an aggregate demand curve, a central bank reaction function, an invest-
ment function, and a price inflation equation. The equations will be mostly familiar to stu-
dents of monetary economics with the exception of the investment function, which draws
inspiration from Fazzari and Mott (1986-7), Ndikumana (1999) and Godley and Lavoie
(2001-2). Real investment is modelled as a function of real internal funds, the real cost of
servicing existing debt, the valuation ratio and the output gap, which proxies the rate of
capacity utilisation. The cash–flow and debt–service terms reflect the ability of the firm
to finance new investments through retained earnings and borrowing, while the inclusion
of Tobin’s q allows stock market sentiment to enter the investment decision.
The system of equations is imposed as the over–identified long–run structure in a coin-
tegrating VAR model estimated on US data covering 1967Q1 to 2007Q4. The use of CVAR
methodology provides for a thorough analysis of the dynamic relationships between the
variables in the model, while the imposition of a theory–based over–identifying structure
provides a means by which various core principles of the FFH can be incorporated as
long–run relationships. It is for these reasons that CVAR models are so popular in the
analysis of monetary and fiscal policies. Furthermore, in order to account for the profound
volatility of the price of oil during the sample period, and the effect that this has exerted
on the US business cycle, an oil price index is included as an I(1) forcing variable in the
sense of Granger and Lin (1995). The resulting CVARX model is estimated following the
long–run structural method of Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin (2006).
The results derived from the model suggest that inflation–targeting monetary policy
may be destabilising to the extent that interest rate rises impair the ability of firms to meet
their debt–servicing obligations. An interest rate hike results in a substantial increase
in the real cost of debt–service accompanied by a real fall in internal funds. There is,
thus, substantial support for Minsky’s proposition that interest rate innovations may be
destabilising.
The model is also used to analyse the effect of a shock to the valuation ratio, which
may be interpreted as an episode of ‘irrational exuberance’. It is typically assumed by
proponents of the New Consensus approach to monetary policy that the inflation and out-
put gaps are sufficient summary statistics for the state of the economy. If this proposition
holds, one would expect that a positive shock to the valuation ratio would be reflected
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in increased inflationary pressure. The results reveal that the shock has no significant
effect on inflation, indicating that monetary policy formulated using a Taylor–type rule
will not react to such pressure. With this in mind, one could argue that monetary policy
decisions should be made with regard to a wider range of indicators (see Svensson, 2000,
for a similar view).
There is a general (although by no means universal) consensus that monetary policy
should neither target nor respond to asset price misalignments. Four reasons are typically
advanced in support of this position: (i.) a belief that price level stability cultivates
financial stability (Schwartz, 1988; 1998); (ii.) the contention that bubbles cannot be
reliably identified (Bernanke, 2002; 2003); (iii.) policy cannot operate meaningfully with
more targets than instruments (Tinbergen, 1952); and (iv.) the interest rate implement is
too unwieldy to target specific markets (Bernanke, 2006).
Recent economic events have convincingly demonstrated that the first of these propo-
sitions is profoundly flawed. Similarly, with regard to the second point, monetary policy
already relies on tentative estimates of unobservable concepts including potential output
and the equilibrium real interest rate: it is not clear why identifying bubbles should be
any more difficult (Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani, 2000)8.
Points (iii.) and (iv.) are of more interest, although their validity rests fundamentally
on the assumption that the central bank has just one instrument of policy: the short–term
interest rate. Following Schwartz (2002) and Palley (2004; 2006), the chapter argues that
the central bank has the power to manipulate the reserve requirement by asset class. In an
economy with n asset classes, the exploitation of these heterogeneous reserve requirements
would grant the monetary authority an additional n− 1 policy instruments. In this way,
monetary policy can be meaningfully conducted with respect to multiple targets or goals.
Similarly, the interest rate need not be changed in order to cool (or indeed stimulate) a
specific market. Hence, the chapter concludes in favour of the use of asset–based reserve
requirements (ABRR) in conjunction with traditional interest rate policy as appropriate
but with a distinct emphasis on minimising interest rate volatility.
1.3 Monetary Policymaking in an Open Economy
The vast majority of economic modelling is conducted in the setting of a closed econ-
omy, with external shocks either altogether absent or otherwise introduced in an ad hoc
8Much of the existing bubble–testing literature is flawed to the extent that it identifies bubbles with
deviations from fundamental value (see Gurkaynak, 2005, for a thorough survey). A more pragmatic
approach may be required, an interesting and simple example of which is proposed by Holz (2008).
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fashion, with little attempt to model their transmission (see also Svensson, 2000). With
the widespread liberalisation of financial flows and the deepening of international finan-
cial markets, the degree of simplification introduced in this manner is rapidly becoming
untenable and the results thus achieved increasingly unreliable. Simply put, there is a
pressing need for further research into open economy modelling. Chapter 6 attempts to il-
luminate the conduct of monetary policy in an open economy setting and demonstrate the
important interaction between monetary and fiscal approaches to economic stabilisation.
Closed economy models are especially poorly suited to the analysis of monetary policy
for at least two reasons. Firstly, they omit the exchange rate channel of monetary trans-
mission which, the House of Lords (1999) estimates, accounts for more than 60% of the
anti–inflationary influence in the first year of a 100 basis point interest rate hike main-
tained for 12 months. Secondly, closed economy models cannot illuminate the interaction
between the interest rate, the current and capital accounts and the budget deficit. The
importance of such linkages is apparent in the UK, which currently operates its largest
recorded budget deficit and is experiencing unprecedented growth of government debt (c.f.
Prince and Swaine, 2008). This observation underscores the fundamental linkage between
monetary and fiscal policy decisions.
It is possible to identify two main strands of literature attempting open economy
monetary policy analyses: empirical models, and simulations employing the Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework9. Many studies in both traditions
have employed the ubiquitous Taylor rule, defined as follows:
it = r
∗ + πt + γ1 (πt − π
∗) + γ2 (Yt − Y
∗)
where it is the short–term nominal interest rate, r
∗ is the Wicksellian natural rate of
interest, πt is the rate of price level inflation
10, π∗ is the targeted rate of inflation, Yt
denotes the level of economic activity and Y ∗ is potential output. For internal consistency,
and to ensure that the number of targets does not exceed the number of implements (c.f.
Tinbergen, 1952), it is usually assumed that Y ∗ is the level of output obtained when
unemployment is at the NAIRU and when inflation is at the targeted level. Furthermore,
the so–called Taylor principle states that γ1 > 1 is required for the active stabilisation
9An increasing amount of research covers both areas, a recent example being Ratto, Roeger, and in’t
Veld (2008).
10The appropriate inflation measure is not entirely clear. Pragmatism tends to favour the use of con-
sumer price inflation as this (or some variant thereof) is the most commonly targeted metric in prac-
tice. This approach has also found a good deal of support in the theoretical and empirical literature
(see Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler, 1998, and Svensson, 2000, for example). However, Leith and Wren–Lewis
(2002) argue that the use of CPI inflation may be chronically destabilising in open economy models,
favouring the use of an output price index.
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of inflation, while it is typically assumed that 0 ≤ γ2 < 1. A number of authors have
suggested that the weight attached to the output gap should in fact be precisely zero
(Christiano and Gust, 1999) or otherwise that uncertainty over the measurement of the
output gap may result in a smaller optimal value of the parameter γ2 than would otherwise
be the case (Smets, 1998)11.
The estimation of empirical exchange rate models has proved remarkably challenging,
providing results which are often contradictory, seemingly counter–intuitive or statistically
weak (see Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual, 2005, and Engel, 2006). Given this foundation, it
is not surprising that the scope of empirical open economy macroeconomic policy models
is typically relatively limited.
Vector autoregression (VAR) is undoubtedly the most popular econometric method for
use in counterfactual policy analysis, largely due to the ease with which dynamic analysis
may be undertaken. While simple VAR models are very much data–driven, it is well estab-
lished that an identifying structure must be imposed on the matrix of contemporaneous
coefficients in order to identify economically meaningful shocks to the system (including
monetary and fiscal policy shocks). Unfortunately, the resulting structural VAR (SVAR)
models are often highly dependent on the nature of these restrictions.
Two papers which have informed a great deal of the SVAR literature on monetary
policy are Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). The first deploys
a semi–structural VAR in the measurement of monetary policy innovations and devel-
ops a measure of the policy stance of the central bank based on an exactly–identified
model of the reserve market. The second develops a New Keynesian small open economy
model which has been widely used to define identifying restrictions in SVAR models. A
particularly common practice in the SVAR literature is the imposition of the Ricardian
Equivalence proposition, which renders fiscal policy ineffective (Fontana, 2008, provides
a critical discussion). The prevalence of fiscal stimulus packages aimed at reducing the
severity of the contemporary credit crisis underscore the fact that policymakers evidently
do not share this view. For this reason, the majority of the SVAR literature may be
considered flawed, certainly in a recessionary environment. In a recent contribution,
Gal´ı, Lo´pez–Salido, and Valle´s (2007) deploy an SVAR model in which a proportion of
consumers are non–Ricardian. They find substantial support for the idea that increased
government spending is expansionary. Similarly, Dungey and Fry (2007) develop a sophis-
ticated SVAR model for New Zealand in which the effects of monetary and fiscal policy are
11A growing body of authors including Kara and Nelson (2002) and Bask and Selander (2007) have
argued in favour of including the exchange rate or other open economy series in the central bank reaction
function, with Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) arguing explicitly that monetary policy conducted with regard
to the inflation and output gaps alone may induce unnecessary exchange rate volatility.
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jointly identified. Their analysis reveals that the economic consequences of fiscal shocks
have been more pronounced than those of monetary shocks between 1983q2-2006q4. There
is evidently considerable scope for further work in this area.
DSGE models have become commonplace in the analysis of optimal monetary (and,
to a lesser degree, fiscal) policy rules. Proponents of the approach stress its rigorously
micro–founded nature and its emphasis on rational, optimising, representative agents (c.f.
Kremer, Lombardo, von Thadden, and Werner, 2006). However, the extent to which com-
plex real world economies can be meaningfully modelled using the representative agent
framework is unclear. Moreover, the strong assumptions underlying many DSGE mod-
els including rational expectations equilibria and linear or logarithmic separability of the
utility function, as well as the implications of the transversality conditions, are open to
criticism12.
The DSGE literature does, however, have a considerably broader scope than the SVAR
literature, an effect largely attributable to the freedom from dimensionality constraints de-
rived from the paucity of data. Indeed, there is a modest but growing literature deploying
DSGE models in the simultaneous analysis of monetary and fiscal policy in an encom-
passing manner. Recent examples of this approach in a closed economy setting include
Chadha and Nolan (2004; 2007), which stress the fundamental interdependence of mone-
tary and fiscal policy decisions. Similarly, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000; 2006) discuss the
interaction of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU, demonstrating that there is an
important role for a combined approach to economic stabilisation. In a subsequent paper
(Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2008), the authors conclude that such interactions are similarly
important in a two–country system with flexible exchange rates.
Much of the modelling of monetary and fiscal stabilisation regimes relies on the concept
of a ‘small open economy’ as one which is too small to influence global events but which
is affected by them. This construct has a number of appealing features, not least of
which is the theoretical support that it provides for the assumed weak exogeneity of many
variables in empirical analyses. However, in many cases, the assumption that an economy
is too small to affect world markets may be unreasonable and the modelling of a system
of interdependent economies may provide superior economic insights13. This is one of
the key advantages of the model developed in Chapter 6, which revolves around a stock–
flow consistent (SFC) system of accounts describing a world consisting of two mutually
12Note that, like the SVAR literature, many DSGE models also assume Ricardian households.
13Recent developments in Global VAR and Panel VAR modelling have the potential to open new frontiers
in multi–country macroeconomic modelling (c.f. Ballabriga, Sebastian, and Valles, 1999; Dees, di Mauro,
Pesaran, and Smith, 2007; and Greenwood–Nimmo, Hoang, and Shin, 2008). However, such approaches
are yet to achieve widespread utilisation due to their computational intensity.
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dependent economies. This represents the first serious attempt at developing an SFC
model with which to analyse open economy stabilisation policy.
The SFC approach to macroeconomic modelling does not depend on strong assump-
tions to the same degree as either the SVAR or DSGE paradigms. Rather, SFC models
are built upon a foundation of rigorous double entry accountancy. This simple structure
ensures that the balance sheet constraints of all sectors are simultaneously satisfied, while
also providing a simple means of tracking economic transactions, thereby ensuring the log-
ical coherence of the model. A simple system of behavioural relations is then constructed
upon this inviolable basis. For example, the consumption function and the determinants
of export prices and quantities must be specified and parameterised.
The model employed in Chapter 6 is a modified and extended version of the advanced
open economy model presented by Godley and Lavoie (2006, ch. 12). The model consists
of two economies which are identical in most respects and which are linked by financial
transactions and trade relations. US bills act as the international asset and households
invest their wealth in the form of domestic and foreign bills and in domestic cash. Their
portfolio choices are modelled according to the vertical adding up constraints advanced
by Brainard and Tobin (1968) and the symmetry restrictions associated with Friedman
(1978).
This basic framework is extended in three ways. Firstly, a cost–push inflationary
mechanism is added to the model to introduce nominal growth into the model and provide
the inflationary forces targeted by the central bank. Secondly, the marginal propensities to
consume out of disposable income and wealth are determined endogenously as decreasing
functions of the real interest rate. This modification introduces a simple interest rate
channel into the model and also results in endogenous cyclical fluctuations following a
disturbance, motivating the use of stabilisation policy. Finally, the model is closed with
the following stabilisation policies:
i. Procyclical inflation–targeting interest rate policy (IT);
ii. US interest rate leadership (LF);
iii. Anti–inflationary countercyclical fiscal policy combined with IT (CFPIT); and
iv. Anti–inflationary countercyclical fiscal policy and US leadership (CFPLF).
The performance of each of these stabilisation policies is evaluated in light of three
economic shocks: a step decrease in UK real exports; an increase the autonomous com-
ponent of the UK target real wage; and an expansionary US income tax cut. The first
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shock is explicitly an open economy shock and could not be meaningfully simulated in
a closed economy model. The other experiments represent a cost (supply) shock and a
demand shock, respectively. In contrast to models of small open economies, it is in the
nature of the model developed in Chapter 6 that a country–specific shock will typically
pass through to the other country through a series of financial and real linkages. Each of
the three shocks works its way through the model in a different way, providing a thorough
test of the various policy regimes.
The simulation exercises reveal a number of interesting effects. Firstly, monetary policy
in isolation is incapable of stabilising the economy and results in an explosive trajectory
in all cases. Similarly, inflation–targeting fiscal policy fails to stabilise the cyclicality of
output and inflation following a shock. The combination of inflation targeting monetary
and fiscal policies (i.e. CFPIT and CFPLF) results in good stabilisation in most cases,
with the combination of fiscal policy and US leadership yielding the best performance in
general.
The inability of procyclical monetary policy to stabilise the model is certainly contro-
versial and may seem counter–intuitive. However, this result is potentially consistent the
work of Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Angeriz and Arestis (2006) on the ineffectiveness
of IT policies. Alternatively, this result may be viewed as evidence of a fundamental in-
terdependence of monetary and fiscal policies of the type discussed by Chadha and Nolan
(2004) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000; 2006; 2008), among others. This result may be
reconciled with the existing empirical literature supporting the efficacy of IT policies if
one believes that much of this research has failed to adequately control for the influence
of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal interventions. In order to properly ac-
count for these influences, empirical analyses would, at a minimum, have to include terms
capturing changes in the average and marginal tax rates faced by economic agents, the
composition of the tax and benefit systems, the level and composition of net government
transfers, and public expectations of future fiscal policy interventions. I am not aware of
any studies that have attempted such an analysis.
In addition to lending support to a combined fiscal and monetary approach to economic
stabilisation, the results adduced in Chapter 6 suggest that the exchange rate channel of
monetary policy may be rather complex. In the current version of the model, in which the
government is assumed to fund its budget deficit through the issuance of bills, an increase
in the domestic interest rate can induce depreciation in the medium- to long–term. This
result is consistent with the observation of Arestis and Sawyer (2004) that the interaction
of monetary policy with the exchange rate may be more complex than is often assumed.
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Finally, the results also demonstrate an effect that is often overlooked: by increasing
the interest rate to combat inflation, the central bank increases the interest income of those
agents holding financial assets (c.f. Lavoie, 1995). In the current model, this channel is
rather strong and is only reinforced by the government’s choice to fund its deficit through
increased bill issuance. In fact, when considered together, these effects tend to dominate
the interest rate channel of monetary policy operating through the endogeneity of the
savings propensities (given the choice of model parameters).
When considered as a whole, the model presents a strong case for a combined fiscal
and monetary approach to stabilisation policy. This result stands in stark contrast to the
New Consensus in macroeconomics which affords monetary policy an elevated position.
The chapter concludes that this currently dominant position is unhelpful and, by invoking
the famous ‘cat theory’ of Deng Xiaoping, argues in favour of a combined policy regime.
1.4 Policy Implications
Three general conclusions arise from this thesis. Firstly, if one considers that the central
bank’s stewardship of the financial system extends beyond systemic stability to the main-
tenance of a well–functioning system, then it follows that it should consider efficiency and
convenience as well as security issues. Hence, the central bank should engage in active
regulation of innovations in the payments system in order both to protect the financial
system and its consumers from potentially dangerous practices and also to foster those
developments that have the potential to improve systemic performance in a variety of
ways.
Secondly, the central bank must acknowledge that it possesses a range of tools with
which to conduct stabilisation policy, of which the short–term interest rate is just one. In
particular, central banks should be ready to manipulate the reserve requirements associ-
ated with different asset classes in order to cool or stimulate specific markets as necessary.
In this way, the volatility of the short–term interest rate may be minimised and the often
undesirable distributional consequences of interest rate policy reduced.
Thirdly, there is strong evidence that closed economy models are of limited use for
policy analysis as they fail to properly account for the interaction of the interest rate, the
exchange rate, and the current and capital accounts. Furthermore, the interaction of mon-
etary and fiscal policy highlights the need for a mutually consistent approach to economic
stabilisation, and stresses the need for the development of an encompassing economic
framework capable of simultaneously addressing monetary and fiscal policy issues.
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Finally, it should be noted that the work undertaken in this thesis is not intended as
an attack on the New Consensus in macroeconomics. Rather, it should be interpreted
as a call for reform of a theory which has served the profession well during the “non–
inflationary consistently expansionary decade” (King 2003, ¶6) but which is struggling in
the current turbulent climate.
Chapter 2
Monetary Theory and Policy
2.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a remarkable convergence of the theory and practice of central
banking around the notion of inflation–targeting interest rate policy. In such a system,
the short–term interest rate is used to manipulate the level of aggregate demand in relation
to a given level of aggregate supply in order to achieve a desirable rate of inflation. This
inflation target is usually associated with an unemployment rate equal to the NAIRU and
output at its potential level.
The policy prescriptions of the New Keynesian model that has developed around this
framework may be crudely summarised as the belief that low and stable inflation is a
prerequisite condition for a healthy economy and that the most appropriate means of
achieving this goal is by way of inflation–targeting interest rate policy. The purpose of
this chapter is to review this New Keynesian literature and demonstrate that it presents
an excessively narrow view of stabilisation policy. Insodoing, this chapter provides a
backdrop to the four chapters forming the body of the thesis, each of which addresses
various contemporary issues facing policymakers and the dominant academic model.
The chapter proceeds in six sections. Section 2.2 introduces the simple New Keynesian
monetary policy model and elaborates on a number of its basic features. Among these
features is a fundamental linkage between the interest rate and output (via aggregate
demand) which underlies the modern view of monetary policy. Six channels of monetary
transmission are regularly identified in the literature and these are discussed in Section 2.3.
Particular attention is paid to the credit channels and the exchange rate channel as these
will be especially relevant in Chapters 5 and 6. Section 2.4 identifies a number of lacunae
in the standard New Keynesian model, including the strong assumptions underlying the
transmission mechanism at a general level, the assumed long–run neutrality of money and
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the neglect of supply side influences on the time path of inflation and economic growth.
Perhaps one of the more significant features of the New Keynesian model is the assumption
that agents act in a Ricardian fashion and, therefore, that fiscal policy is largely impotent.
This is the focus of Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the key points of this
chapter and discusses their relevance to the work undertaken in the remainder of the thesis.
2.2 The New Consensus Macroeconomic Model
Neoclassical theories of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy stress that the
central bank sets the amount of money in circulation and that the effects on the macroe-
conomy derive from either a relative shortage or excess of money in the economy. The
gradual realisation that monetary policy can no longer be conducted by the targeting and
manipulation of the level, or rate of growth, of various monetary aggregates has led to
the general acceptance that money is endogenous and that the interest rate is determined
exogenously as the policy implement of the central bank. This observation is embodied in
the so–called New Consensus in Macroeconomics (NCM) or New Neo–Classical Synthesis
(see Meyer, 2001a, for example)1.
In its simplest form, the NCM is typically described by a system of three equations
(examples include Meyer, 2001a, p. 2; Monvoisin and Rochon, 2006, p. 65; and Arestis
and Sawyer, 2006, p. 848). Monvoison and Rochon present the system as follows:
(Y − Y ∗) = α0 − α1 (r − r
∗) + ε1 (2.1)
(π − π∗) = β1 (Y − Y
∗) + ε2 (2.2)
(r − r∗) = γ1 (π − π
∗) + γ2 (Y − Y
∗) (2.3)
where (Y − Y ∗) represents the output gap (defined as the difference between the realised
level of output and the maximum achievable level given existing quantities of capital and
labour and without creating sustained inflationary pressure), r is the real interest rate, r∗
is the Wicksellian natural rate of interest, (π − π∗) is the deviation between the realised
rate of inflation and its target level and Greek letters are coefficients, with the exception
1The degree to which the endogeneity of the money supply is viewed as systematic is a point of divergence
between Post Keynesian and New Keynesian scholars. Post Keynesians stress that money is brought into
existence in the process of credit creation and that the money thus created is extinguished when loans are
repaid (Kaldor, 1970; 1982; Moore, 1988). By contrast, New Keynesian theory holds that the money supply
is endogenous because the central bank chooses to make it so following Poole’s (1970) work on the relative
volatility of the IS and LM curves. See Monvoisin and Rochon (2006) and Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2002;
2006) for a more detailed analysis.
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of the ǫi which represent stochastic shocks.
Equation 2.1 is a simple IS curve, which is typically augmented with expected future
output to represent the forward–looking decision making stressed by the NCM. Equation
2.2 is a Phillips curve and equation 2.3 is a monetary policy reaction function. The
specification of equation 2.3 results from a simple re–arrangement of the Taylor rule but it
should be clear that the policy instrument of the central bank is the short–term nominal
interest rate (Borio, 1997) and that monetary policy only exerts an indirect influence over
the real interest rate. It is generally believed that γ1 > 1 and 0 ≤ γ2 < 1.
Of course, monetary policy interventions are typically not conducted in a one–off man-
ner and so it is common practice to augment the system of equations in a manner intended
to account for various feedback effects, policy inertia and for the forward–looking nature
of the policy decisions (a good example of the latter is Clarida et al., 1998; 1999; 2000).
Indeed, the role of expectations in linking nominal and real interest rates is fundamental
to the NCM approach (see Woodford, 2003, for example). If monetary policy is to succeed
in stabilising macroeconomic fluctuations, it must first guide public expectations in the
desired manner, a task in which the credibility of the central bank is of paramount im-
portance. It is for this reason that New Keynesian economists typically advocate central
bank independence, the transparency of operating procedures and the use of policy rules
or constrained discretion.
The omission of monetary aggregates from the system reflects the endogeneity of
the money supply, leaving it as a residual quantity (McCallum, 2001, p. 146). Indeed,
Woodford (2003, pp. 9-10) argues that the replacement of the LM with a Taylor–type
interest rate rule demonstrates that the New Consensus is not concerned with “the con-
sequences of monetary targeting”2. Similarly, the deterministic specification of equation
2.3 (there is no stochastic error term) reflects the assumption that the operation of mon-
etary policy is not subject to random errors and that the central bank can exert fine and
accurate control over its administered interest rate (Arestis and Sawyer, 2004). However
this statement does not by any means imply that monetary policy and the actions of the
monetary authority are not subject to uncertainty. The estimation of the natural rate of
interest, the model parameters, potential output and even the rate of inflation and GDP
2McCallum (2001) specifies a four equation model which incorporates money supply terms which, he
stresses, reflect the notion that the power of the central bank to influence short–term nominal interest
rates derives from its ability to manipulate the supply of base money (see also Meyer, 2001a). However
the underlying structure of the model is similar to that outlined in equations 2.1 to 2.3. In an interesting
contribution, Laidler (2002) interprets the observation that the money stock leads output and inflation as
evidence that a monetary aggregate may enter the IS curve. Hence, he argues that there may be a ‘money
channel’ whereby agents use excess liquidity to purchase goods rather than to extinguish debt, thereby
propagating the disequilibrium and providing a role for the money stock in monetary policy.
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growth are all subject to varying degrees of uncertainty (see Dow, 2004, on monetary
policymaking under model uncertainty).
Mishkin (2001) identifies a generic desirable range of inflation of between zero and three
percent. Setterfield (2006) and Pollin and Zhu (2006) argue that this range is considerably
lower than the level consistent with maximum growth, although the results of their cross–
country analyses must be interpreted with care. In practice, the institutional arrangements
vary by country and the targeted rate of inflation is often considerably higher in developing
countries (South Africa is a good example). It is an interesting feature of the NCM that
there is little formal basis for the choice of inflation target3. The use of various targets
in practice leads Lavoie (2004) to the conclusion that there is a hidden equation linking
the targeted rate of inflation to the perceived maximum rate of economic growth. The
fact remains, however, that the choice is essentially arbitrary. The principle constraint
governing this choice is the necessity that the output and inflation gaps provide mutually
consistent signals such that there is no conflict between the two goals when the interest
rate is set (Tinbergen, 1952).
2.2.1 The Open Economy Extension of the NCM
The New Consensus model has been extended to the setting of an open economy with
flexible exchange rates by Age´nor (2002) and Angeriz and Arestis (2007). The latter
present an extended system of equations as follows4:
(Yt − Y
∗



















+ α4rxt + ǫ1
πt = β1 (Yt − Y
∗
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+ γ0it−1 + ǫ3












+ δ2ct + δ3rx
e
t+1 + ǫ4 (2.7)
3The choice of two percent CPI inflation instead of zero inflation as a target for UK monetary policy
is rooted in the inadequacy of common inflation measures (liquidity trap arguments are also to be found
in the literature - an example is Fontana, 2006, p. 442). The figure takes account of both the persistent
over–estimation of true inflation by the CPI measure (the Bank of England, 2006, finds over–estimation
of 1% while the 1996 US Boskin Commission identifies a range of 0.8-1.6%) and also of improvements in
quality which are not reflected by the CPI, estimated as a further 1% (Bank of England, 2006).
4Note that, in contrast to the simple model outlined above, the authors include an error term in the
monetary policy reaction function.
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ct = η0 + η1rxt + η2 (Yt − Y
∗
t ) + η3
(





xt = rxt + p
W
t − pt (2.9)
where Y , Y ∗, r∗, π and π∗ are defined as before, i denotes the short–term nominal interest
rate, rx the real exchange rate, x the nominal exchange rate (both defined as the number
of units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency), c the current account and p
the natural logarithm of the price level. The superscripts ‘e’ and ‘W ’ indicate expected
and World values, respectively.
In this generalised form of the model, the IS curve represented by equation 2.4 is ex-
plicitly forward–looking, accounting appropriately for the expectations of economic agents.
Furthermore, the real exchange rate enters the IS curve, reflecting its influence over net
export activity and, thereby, aggregate demand. The inclusion of expected future inflation
in the Phillips curve (equation 2.5) reflects the aforementioned emphasis on expectations
in forward–looking New Keynesian models. Angeriz and Arestis note that the inclusion of
lagged terms in equations 2.4 and 2.5 allows for short–run price stickiness while maintain-
ing the assumption of long–run price flexibility. Equation 2.6 is a Taylor rule augmented to
include policy inertia, where the degree of smoothing is determined by the parameter γ0.
Equation 2.7 embodies the received wisdom that the real exchange rate is determined by
international interest rate differentials, the current account balance and the expectations
of market participants. Equation 2.8 notes that the current account position is determined
by the real exchange rate and the levels of domestic and global output. Finally, equation
2.9 defines the nominal exchange rate in the usual manner.
The earlier discussion of the three equation system remains valid in this more general
case. The main purpose of introducing the open economy framework here is to illuminate
the role of the exchange rate in the New Consensus model. A policy–induced nominal
interest rate innovation will feed through to the real interest rate due to the stickiness of
prices in the short–run. By changing the differential between domestic and foreign real
interest rates, the initial monetary policy decision will affect the real exchange rate. This,
in turn, will affect aggregate demand through its influence on the current account balance.
Furthermore, exchange rate fluctuations are associated with fluctuations in the price of
imported goods, thereby exerting a direct influence over inflation.
Based on the New Keynesian models outlined above, it follows that inflation results
from the excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply. Given that supply shocks are
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assumed to be limited to the short–run and to follow a random walk with zero mean and
finite variance, aggregate supply is simply equal to the natural level of output in the long–
run. Hence inflation is viewed strictly as a demand phenomenon in the New Consensus
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2003a; Blanchard, 2005). In this setting, monetary policy essentially
reduces to an exercise in demand–management. Manipulation of the short–term rate of
interest on reserves (or settlement balances), is undertaken by the central bank in order
to exert an influence over aggregate demand and thereby inflation. The mechanism by
which these effects come about is, however, highly complex.
2.3 The Channels of Monetary Transmission
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy consists of a number of channels, each
of which isolates one particular route by which the effects of a central bank induced
shock become manifest. Due to the complexity of the transmission process, there is little
agreement over the interaction of these channels, their relative strength or the timescale
over which they are likely operate. Any consensus in the field is limited to the general
recognition of six major channels: the cost–of–capital channel, the two credit channels,
the wealth channel, the asset (monetarist) channel and the exchange rate channel (see, for
example, Mishkin, 1995). These are identified in schematic form in Figure 2.1, which is
a slightly modified version of that presented by Arestis and Sawyer (2004)5. The theory
underlying each channel and the degree to which it is supported by empirical evidence is
now reviewed, with an emphasis on the credit and exchange rate channels, as these will
be of particular relevance to the remainder of this thesis.
2.3.1 The Cost–of–Capital Channel
The cost–of–capital channel is common to both the endogenous and exogenous money
approaches and is in the spirit of the traditional Keynesian mechanisms found in macroe-
conomics textbooks (Mankiw, 2003, is a typical example). The mechanism may be sum-
marised as follows: an exogenous increase in the central bank’s base rate causes an increase
in short–term nominal interest rates due to the commercial banks’ practice of setting their
lending rate as a mark up over the base rate. This change in short–term interest rates is
transmitted to longer–term rates by investors who act to close out the arbitrage position.
The New Keynesian proposition of sticky prices causes real interest rates to rise. The
implication of an increase in the real interest rate across all time horizons is that the real
5Further examples are provided by Kuttner and Mosser (2002, p. 434) and the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee (1999, p. 3).
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Figure 2.1: The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy
required rate of return on investment rises. This leads households to cut back on their
consumption of durable goods and firms to reduce their investment expenditure, as those
projects which were marginally worthwhile prior to the change are no longer financially
viable. This decline in investment is associated with a concomitant decline in aggregate
demand, output and employment6. This may be summarised schematically as:
i ↑−→ r ↑−→ I & C ↓−→ Y ↓
where i represents the short–term nominal interest rate, r the required real rate of return
on investment, I investment, C spending on consumer durables and Y output. It is note-
worthy that this channel provides scope for quantity effects in the sense that commercial
banks may decide to institute credit rationing in response to a change in the central bank
rate rather than (or in addition to) changing their lending rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Arestis and Sawyer, 2004).
6Cecchetti (1995, p. 85) asserts that such a result is necessarily socially efficient but its simplicity may
be criticised for its abstraction from the distributional issues associated with any decline in equilibrium
investment.
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Empirical Evidence
In order for monetary policy to significantly affect investment, the user–cost elasticity of
the capital stock (UCE) must be non–zero, with larger values associated with a stronger
cost–of–capital channel7. However, neoclassical cost–of–capital variables are often found to
be statistically insignificant in explaining the investment behaviour of firms (see especially
Chirinko and Eisner, 1983, and Chirinko, 1993).
Many studies have attempted to overcome the empirical weakness of the UCE. Until
recently, most resorted to the use of specifications which exogenously fixed the UCE at
a given level, typically unity under a Cobb–Douglas framework (Blanchard, 1986). The
use of such techniques led to the belief in the early 1990’s that the true value of the
UCE was approximately unity. This assumption has subsequently informed a great deal
of fiscal and monetary policymaking. However, the imposition of a unit elasticity lacks
a proper rigorous basis, and once it is relaxed many of the familiar results no longer
hold (Rowthorn, 1999). Moreover, the cost–of–capital may not be a particularly major
determinant of investment as many projects are funded largely by retained earnings (c.f.
Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001, and Hannsgen, 2006)8.
In recent years, the notion that 0 ≤ UCE ≤ 1 has gained traction and the Cobb–
Douglas function is often replaced with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) pro-
duction function which typically generates lower and more plausible figures for the interest
rate elasticity of investment (Harrison et al., 2005, p. 34). Major studies in the last decade
include Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999, 2004), Chatelain, Generale, Hernando, Ver-
meulen and von Kalckreuth (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Mojon, Smets and Ver-
meulen (2001), Harhoff and Ramb (2001), the Deutsche Bundesbank (2002) and Ellis and
Price (2004). The resulting estimates are mostly in the range -0.2 to -0.5, suggesting that
a policy–induced increase of 1% in the user–cost–of–capital will lead to a reduction of
approximately 0.2% to 0.5% in the demand for capital as opposed to the one–to–one ratio
associated with the neoclassical literature9. Furthermore, there is evidence of considerable
cross–country heterogeneity and that the UCE may be larger in the long–run than in the
short–run, indicating that the cost–of–capital channel may operate with a significant lag.
7Much of the empirical literature is concerned with the estimation not of the UCE directly but rather
of the capital–labour substitution elasticity in a constant elasticities framework (see Ellis and Price, 2004,
for example).
8There is, of course, an opportunity cost associated with the investment of retained earnings and, to the
extent that the rental cost–of–capital is related systematically to this opportunity cost, a cost–of–capital
channel will still operate even when investment is not debt–financed.
9Chirinko et al. (1999) stress that the popular contention that a sub–unit UCE invalidates the neo-
classical theory of the firm is misled on the grounds that a lower elasticity may derive from a production
function which constrains in some way the firm’s ability to substitute between factors of production.
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2.3.2 The Broad Credit Channel
The broad credit (balance sheet) channel stresses the importance of a firm’s balance sheet
in determining its access to, and terms of, credit and the potential for monetary policy to
affect the balance sheet and, thus, the relative cost of different sources of capital.
Gertler (1988b) presents an exhaustive, if now dated, review of the literature concern-
ing the role of the credit market in the macroeconomy and discusses the sequence of events
which led to the revival of credit–based approaches to monetary policy transmission. In
their search for an explanation of the excess variation in business fixed investment and
consumer spending following monetary policy innovations, Bernanke and Gertler (1989,
1990) provided the basis of the broad lending approach10. At the core of this theory is
the proposition that uncollateralised external borrowing is more expensive than internal
sources of finance due to the joint problems of agency and monitoring costs arising from
informational asymmetries, resulting in an external financing premium (see Walsh, 2003,
pp. 326-40, for a summary of various informational imperfections characterising credit
markets). Such costs are mitigated as the borrower’s stake in the proposed project in-
creases and, therefore, the external financing premium varies inversely with the borrower’s
capitalisable net worth.
Changes in borrowers’ net worth arising endogenously are expected a priori to be
procyclical. This procyclicality implies that movements in borrowers’ balance sheets
act to reinforce monetary policy actions, an effect known as the financial accelerator
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996). Thus, an interest rate change engineered by the
monetary authority will change the external financing premium in the same direction,
thereby reinforcing the effect of the initial policy decision.
Contractionary monetary policy not only raises the repayments on existing debt (thus
weakening a firm’s balance sheet) but is also generally associated with reduced asset prices
and, thereby, a reduction in potential collateral. The second round effect of the tight
policy on consumer expenditure further reduces cash flows and net revenues, thereby
further weakening the firm’s financial position11. The resulting reduction in liquidity and
collateralisable net worth decreases the borrowers stake in any given investment project,
thereby increasing losses associated with adverse selection and moral hazard. In response,
10Bernanke and Gertler (1989) invoked costly state verification in the spirit of Townsend (1979) to
overcome the inevitability of the Modigliani-Miller (1958, 1963) theorem under Marshallian perfect com-
petition. However, it should be clear that more broadly defined market imperfections also invalidate the
Modigliani-Miller result without the restriction that investment projects are observationally identical ex
ante. Examples of more general models include Gertler (1988a) and Bernanke and Gertler (1990).
11Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that the mechanism of the broad credit channel is equally applicable
to households as to firms. An extension of the balance sheet approach to the household sector is provided by
Mishkin (1977, 1978) and Zeldes (1989) and, more recently, Li (2000) has developed a general equilibrium
model of the liquidity effect acting through the household sector.
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bank lending declines, reducing investment and output. Drawing on Mishkin (1995, p. 8),
these effects may be summarised as follows:
i ↑−→ Pe & CF ↓−→ AS & MH ↑−→ L ↓−→ I ↓−→ Y ↓
where Pe denotes equity prices, CF represents cash flows, AS &MH the losses associated
with adverse selection and moral hazard, and L is bank loans. This mechanism is closely
related to the Minskyan model of endogenous financial fragility at the heart of Chapter 5,
which can be discussed in terms of a strongly countercyclical external financing premium.
Empirical Evidence
The existence of a broad credit channel is relatively widely accepted and has received a
good deal of empirical support. In particular, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) use firm
size to proxy for access to credit and identify significant differences between the behaviour
of small and large firms. In the wake of an unanticipated decline in their cash flows, large
firms engage in short–term borrowing to smooth production and employment, resulting in
the accumulation of inventories (i.e. investment increases). By contrast, small firms are ap-
parently unable to borrow short–term and respond with inventory divestment and reduced
production. Similarly, using flow–of–funds data, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996)
find that the borrowing of firms’ as a whole increases following a monetary tightening,
suggesting that they are unable to reduce their nominal expenditure in the short–term.
Moreover the authors find that households do not change their borrowing behaviour for a
significant period after a monetary tightening.
The use of aggregate credit data cannot resolve the question of whether or not a credit
channel is at work. Gertler and Gilchrist propose the use of firm–level data to resolve this
indeterminacy, citing the earlier work of Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Whited (1992)
on investment spending and inventory investment, both of which are suggestive of broad
credit effects. However, such studies do not specify a unique role for monetary policy
in explaining the observed investment behaviour. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) address
this issue and find a strong association between internal funds and investment spending for
small firms following a monetary tightening which does not hold for large firms. Further-
more, in another paper (1996b) the authors find evidence that contractionary monetary
policy diverts credit from small to large firms. Given the relatively high frequency of the
dataset used and its sample length, these results provide strong support for the existence
of a broad credit channel.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) demonstrate the importance of the financial
2.3. THE CHANNELS OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION 27
accelerator in monetary policy transmission. In their model, entrepreneurial investment
varies inversely with net worth due to the assumption of costly state verification and, while
wholesale prices are fully flexible, retail prices are sticky in the sense of Calvo (1983). The
authors show that under such a framework, the financial accelerator amplifies the real
effect of a monetary policy shock.
2.3.3 The Narrow Credit Channel
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) emphasise that, beyond the distinction between internal
and external finance, the source of finance is unimportant in the broad lending view.
However, the narrow credit or bank–lending channel has at its core the proposition that
some borrowers are bank–dependent, in that they cannot readily secure finance from alter-
nate sources. In a departure from his famous 1980 paper in which he stresses that financial
intermediaries are merely a veil, Fama (1985) argues that they may have a comparative
advantage in gathering information about and assessing the risks associated with bor-
rowers, which could explain why the interest rate on bank loans is typically significantly
higher than that on directly issued securities. If monetary policy can affect the supply
of bank loans, then any policy which reduces lending activity will lead to a concomitant
reduction in investment and durable consumption by this class of constrained borrowers
and, thereby, a reduction in aggregate demand.
In the textbook exposition of monetary policy, the central bank manipulates the stock
of high–powered money which, through the base–multiplier relationship, affects the money
supply and causes banks to adjust their interest rates and balance sheets. While traditional
accounts of monetary policy transmission focus on the effect of such interest rate manipu-
lations on the economic activity of households and firms, proponents of the bank–lending
channel stress the importance of the asset side of bank balance sheets in the absence of
perfect and costless substitutes for reserves and loans. Thus any reduction in the stock of
base money is reflected in reduced lending, lower investment and lower output.
However, central banks are increasingly acknowledging that they cannot exercise fine
control over the money supply and that the relationship between the nominal money supply
and nominal GDP may be unstable. For the narrow credit channel to be effective, it must
be the case that changes in the base rate affect the lending activity of banks. Such a result
follows from the fact that a tightening of monetary policy increases the costs associated
with short overnight positions, reducing interbank lending. Moreover, while some banks
may secure alternate funds with which to maintain their lending activity, to the extent that
the informational imperfections characterising financial markets hinder the valuation of the
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loan portfolios of banks dealing predominantly with bank–dependent borrowers, some of
these banks will be unable to insulate their loan portfolios from the monetary tightening
and will have to reduce their lending activity (c.f. Alfara, Garcia, Jara, and Franken,
2005). The mechanism can be summarised as follows:
i ↑−→ LIB ↓
∗
−→ L ↓−→ I ↓−→ Y ↓
where * denotes imperfect substitutability of alternate sources of finance in the aftermath
of a monetary tightening and LIB represents lending in the interbank market.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch
(1995) summarise the conditions necessary for the existence of a distinct bank lending
channel as12:
i. bank credit is ‘special’ in that borrowers cannot freely substitute away from bank
loans to an alternate source of finance in the aftermath of a decrease in the extension
of loans (c.f. James, 1987);
ii. an increase in the central bank base rate is associated with decreased interbank
lending in a situation where at least some banks cannot costlessly find alternative
sources of funds with which to insulate their loan portfolios; and
iii. price–stickiness is required for the policy shock to have real effects.
Note that the second assumption has been modified for consistency with the endoge-
nous money view. The first and third assumptions are relatively uncontroversial although
it is not clear that bank credit will remain ‘special’ as equity and other financial markets
grow deeper and falling transactions costs widen participation in these markets. Indeed,
future developments in e–money technologies may further undermine the privileged posi-
tion of bank credit.
Romer and Romer (1990) argue that the second condition as originally defined (with
regard to exogenous money) is violated when banks can fund lending at the margin by
increasing their holdings of time deposits (e.g. certificates of deposit, CDs) which are not
subject to reserve requirements. However, in an endogenous money model, the second
condition is only invalidated if all banks can costlessly substitute between reserves and
12Walsh (2003) stresses that credit rationing (in the sense of Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Keeton, 1979;
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
existence of a credit channel of monetary policy, a contention supported by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)
among others. For a Post Keynesian perspective on credit rationing which stresses the role of asymmet-
ric expectations and endogenous financial fragility in addition to the traditional asymmetric information
assumption, see Wolfson (1996).
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alternative sources of funds (Hubbard, 1995). Such a situation is not plausible, particularly
because large–denomination CDs are not eligible for Federal Deposit Insurance. Hence,
potential lenders would have to incur investigative and monitoring costs in order to limit
their exposure to default risk (Moore, 1988, pp. 32-37). Thus, the supply schedule of such
liabilities may be imperfectly elastic, with the implication that a tightening of monetary
policy associated with reduced interbank lending would increase banks’ reliance on non–
deposit sources of funds, thereby increasing the marginal cost of funds and shifting the
loan supply inward (Kashyap and Stein, 1994).
The Post Keynesian literature can make a valuable contribution here. The bank–
lending channel stresses the role of the supply of bank lending as a constraint to the level
of investment (Rochon, 1999, p. 248). By contrast, the horizontalist position (Moore, 1988)
holds that the supply of bank loans passively accommodates demand at any particular rate
of interest. Under such a framework, money is credit–driven and demand–determined and
the supply of loans is never a constraint to creditworthy investors. However, this is not
to deny the existence of an ‘unsatisfied fringe’ (in the words of Keynes) of insufficiently
creditworthy agents. This represents a form of credit constraint which emanates strictly
from the demand–side (Rochon, 1999, p. 269). A policy–induced interest rate impulse may
cause the definition of creditworthiness to change in line with the severity of the problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection. Hence, monetary policy may change the size and
membership of the unsatisfied fringe13.
Empirical Evidence
The existence of a distinct bank–lending channel is highly controversial. Empirical at-
tempts to positively identify narrow credit effects have been largely inconclusive. Early
attempts can be divided into two categories: those employing time series methodology
to show that monetary policy causes changes in lending activity and those using cross–
sectional techniques to identify the effects of monetary policy on liquidity–constrained
borrowers. More recently, some innovative contributions have been made using panel
data.
Bernanke (1983) provides one of the earliest time series studies into bank lending in
his analysis of the Great Depression. He finds that the supply of bank loans is important
in explaining the severity and persistence of the depression, an effect which he attributes
to the reduction in lending brought about by the fear of bank runs.
13A second school of thought, referred to by Rochon as ‘neo–post–Keynesian’, assumes imperfect accom-
modation of reserve demand by the central bank, with the implication of non–accommodation of private
loan demand by commercial banks. This amounts to an explicit recognition of the role of supply–side
constraints on investment in the Post Keynesian tradition (Rochon, 1999, p. 263).
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King (1986) estimates an unrestricted VAR and finds that changes in monetary aggre-
gates lead changes in GDP, while changes in lending occur contemporaneously. He inter-
prets this as evidence that loans cannot be important in transmitting the effect of monetary
policy to GDP. King’s finding that monetary aggregates have more predictive power for
future output than bank lending in the US is supported by the work of Romer and Romer
(1990) and Ramey (1993). However, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) criticise King for draw-
ing structural inferences from a reduced–form model. Using a semi–structural VAR, they
find that bank lending responds strongly but in lagged fashion to monetary policy. More-
over, they find that the response of loans coincides with that of unemployment in a manner
“strikingly consistent with the credit view” (p. 903).
These early approaches using aggregate data suffer from an identification problem:
it is unclear whether a change in the aggregate data derives from the supply–side in a
manner consistent with a credit channel, or from the demand–side reflecting a cost–of–
capital effect. To overcome this indeterminacy, much of the modern literature follows the
approach of Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), which considers the impact of monetary
policy on the composition of borrowing and lending. The authors assess the impact of
monetary policy14 on the mix of bank lending and commercial paper on firms’ balance
sheets. A demand–side response should reduce demand for all types of borrowing while
a supply–side effect will manifest itself as a reduction in the proportion of bank lending
in the mix. Their results indicate that an increase in the base rate raises the proportion
of commercial paper in the mix. Furthermore, the debt mix is found to have explanatory
power for investment, indicating that some borrowers may be bank–dependent. Finally,
they find that the prime lending rate increases more than the rate on commercial paper
during periods of contractionary monetary policy. Taken together, these results provide
strong support for the operation of a bank–lending channel15.
Using similar intuition, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find evidence of a bank–lending
channel while Nilsen (2002) focuses on trade credit rather than commercial paper and
finds that both small and large firms increasingly rely on this means of finance following
a monetary tightening. Nilsen speculates that the critical issue is whether or not a firm
14In this case, tight policy episodes are identified firstly by the Romer dates (Romer and Romer, 1989)
and also by the statistical method of Bernanke and Blinder (1992).
15Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996b) contest the results adduced by Kashyap et al., arguing that once
trade credit is included in the analysis and firm size effects are appropriately controlled for, then the
mix remains unaffected by interest rate innovations. However, in a damning response to this criticism,
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1996) argue that these results derive from the introduction of a new mix vari-
able. Moreover they argue that Oliner and Rudebusch’s empirical results are not necessarily inconsistent
with the existence of a credit channel because the observed increase in the issuance of commercial paper
by large firms is consistent with an increased level of trade credit brought about by the reduced availability
of bank loans to smaller firms.
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has a bond rating rather than its size as traditionally defined, implying that the group of
credit–constrained firms may be larger than previously thought.
If the existence of a bank–lending channel in the US alone is contentious, the inter-
national picture is equally varied. Alfara et al. (2005) obtain results strongly suggestive
of the operation of a bank lending channel in Chile, while Hernando and Mart´ınez-Page´s
(2001) find little evidence of such effects in Spain. Similarly, Huang (2003) finds evidence
of a bank lending channel operating in the UK while Ludi and Ground (2006) find no
evidence of its operation in South Africa.
The general conclusion arising from the empirical work is that the bank–lending chan-
nel is considerably more controversial than its broad credit counterpart. In addition to this,
it seems likely to become gradually less important as innovation changes the financial land-
scape and reduces the transaction and informational costs associated with financial mar-
kets, diminishing the role of conventional banks (Thornton, 1994; Edwards and Mishkin,
1995).
2.3.4 The Wealth Channel
The wealth effect on consumption, associated particularly with Ando and Modigliani (1963),
has become a cornerstone of modern macroeconomic theory. In a subsequent paper,
Modigliani (1971) estimates that a dollar increase in household wealth causes an increase
in consumption of five cents, an estimate which has subsequently received a good deal of
empirical support (as discussed in the next section).
Starr–McCluer (1998, pp. 2-3) presents an excellent discussion of the wealth effect











where rS is the rate of return on saving, Ct is consumption, A0 is the initial asset endow-
ment and Y Lt denotes wage income. It is assumed that the household dies at time T with
no wealth. Starr–McCluer assumes a logarithmic utility function and shows that the sum
of utility, discounted at the rate δ, is equal to
∑T
t=0 δ
tlog(Ct). By simple maximisation of














where mt is the marginal propensity to consume and V is the sum of the initial wealth
endowment and the discounted value of future labour income. An unexpected exogenous
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increase in the value of assets leads to an increase in consumption at time t of mt∆A0.
The wealth channel relies on the joint propositions that consumer wealth enters the
consumption function and that at least some of the elements comprising consumer wealth
are interest sensitive (e.g. financial assets and real estate). If these conditions are met, then
an exogenous change in the interest rate will affect consumption and aggregate demand
directly:
i ↑−→ PI , Ph ↓−→W ↓−→ C ↓−→ Y ↓
where PI denotes the price of investment assets, Ph the price of real estate, W wealth and
C consumption.
Empirical Evidence
There is some debate concerning the impact that exogenous changes in the various compo-
nents of consumer wealth will have on consumption spending. Case, Quigley, and Shiller
(2005, p. 5), for example, demonstrate that there is no reason to think that the effect of
changes in real estate wealth are of comparable magnitude (or even direction) to those
associated with changes in stock prices. Furthermore, in the case of real estate, the ef-
fects of higher prices on owner–occupiers, tenants and those who derive an income from
property will differ. Given these difficulties in modelling broadly defined wealth effects,
the literature focuses almost exclusively on stock market wealth effects.
The existence of a wealth effect is generally accepted but its strength, its timing and
the role of monetary policy are unclear. Loosely following Poterba (2000), the key points
raised in the literature may be summarised as follows:
i. the empirical evidence generally supports the existence of a direct stock–market
wealth effect (Poterba, 2000; Dynan and Maki, 2001);
ii. estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of stock market wealth generally
lie between 0.01-0.05 (c.f. Brayton and Tinsley, 1996) although some studies suggest
higher figures (examples include Parker, 1999 and Dynan and Maki, 2001);
iii. stock ownership is concentrated among high net–worth households, which explains
the modest impact of equity shocks on aggregate consumption (c.f. Mankiw and
Zeldes, 1991; Starr–McCluer, 1998; Parker, 1999; Dynan and Maki, 2001);
iv. there is little reason to believe that the wealth effect acts symmetrically, although
the direction of asymmetry is unclear. Zandi (1999) finds a more pronounced effect
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of negative stock market shocks while Apergis and Miller (2005) find the opposite.
Two recent papers which deserve special attention are those of Ludvigson, Stein-
del, and Lettau (2002) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004). Ludvigson et al. (pp. 118-120)
demonstrate that the consumption–wealth effect is important in the transmission of mon-
etary policy in some major American macroeconometric models, although estimation of
their own SVAR indicates only a weak wealth effect and, moreover, suggests that as-
set prices may react more strongly to price signals than to interest rates. More recently
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) separate the permanent and transitory elements of household
wealth and show that while there is a relationship between consumption and permanent
wealth shocks, transitory wealth shocks exert no influence over consumption. Their result
has intuitive appeal, although their approach has been criticised on the grounds of model
uncertainty by Koop, Potter, and Strachan (2005).
The focus of the empirical work on wealth effects arising from the stock market has
been to the detriment of research into real–estate wealth effects. The impact of the
housing market on consumption and thereby aggregate demand is particularly relevant
at the present time given the spectacular real estate bubbles that have recently started to
burst in many Western economies. However, the theoretical literature does not offer any
strong, unambiguous insights into the real–estate wealth effect. Case et al. (2005) find
little consensus in the literature and, while their own modelling supports the real–estate
wealth channel, their results are sensitive to the choice of specification.
2.3.5 The Asset (Monetarist) Channel
The wealth and broad credit channels provide an avenue whereby the level of asset prices
can influence aggregate demand. The asset channel, by contrast, stresses the role of relative
prices. An asset channel operates when money and a range of real assets are readily
substitutable. This view critically underpins the Monetarist approach to monetary policy,
which emphasises a range of relative prices (Meltzer, 1995). This, in effect, downgrades
the interest rate as this represents just one price among many.
Due to the increasingly wide rejection of the assumption of money supply exogeneity
(c.f. Woodford, 2003), no discussion of the formalities of Monetarist modelling is offered
here16. Instead, the main points of the Monetarist theory of monetary transmission are
highlighted from an endogenous money perspective. Furthermore, the empirical work test-
ing the Monetarist hypothesis is framed in terms of an exogenous money supply and, as
16See Meltzer (1995) for a thorough discussion of the Monetarist view of the monetary transmission
mechanism.
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such, it is not discussed here. The emphasis of this section is on discussing the observa-
tion that a range of relative prices is important in monetary transmission and on briefly
summarising the key asset price effects identified in the Monetarist literature.
Meltzer (1995, pp. 53-59) stresses that Monetarist models include at least three asset
classes: (i) money; (ii) bonds and securities and (iii) real capital assets. The inclusion
of the real capital stock allows for the consideration of complex optimising behaviour:
rational economic agents now have the choice to hold their wealth (in various proportions)
not just in money and bonds but also in real assets. The three asset classes are typically
treated as imperfect substitutes, at least in the short–run.
The wealth channels outlined in the previous section represent integral components of
the Monetarist view of monetary transmission. It is typically also argued that the effect of
stock market fluctuations on firms are an important determinant of the effect of monetary
policy in the Monetarist tradition. This may be most clearly expressed in relation to
Tobin’s (1969) q theory. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm
to the replacement cost of its capital. A firm will invest in new capital as long as it is
cheaper to do so than to acquire the assets through takeover activity. This is the case
when q > 117. If q < 1 then it is preferable for firms to engage in takeover activity in
order to expand, while firms are indifferent between either course of action when q = 1.
To the extent that stock prices are sensitive to monetary policy changes, then q is
also sensitive to such changes. It is widely accepted that monetary policy can affect
stock prices by changing the risk–free rate of interest and also various risk–premia. It is
generally the case that an unexpected change in the central bank base rate results in a
stock price movement in the opposite direction subject to a multiplier of between three and
six (Bernanke, 2003). Thus the mechanism associated with q–theory may be summarised
as:
i ↑−→ Pe ↓−→ q ↓−→ I ↓−→ Y ↓
where Pe is the price of equity. While the simplicity and observability of q is appealing, it
is not without its flaws. The most fundamental problem with q is that it is not the absolute
level of q which should be used for investment decisions but the marginal value, which can-
17Hannsgen (2006, p. 210) shows that this condition is analogous to NPV > 0, highlighting the sim-
ilarities between this approach and the cost–of–capital channel. The principal difference arises due to
the emphasis on the value of the firm in Monetarist theory as opposed to the role of the interest rate in
directly affecting the cost–of–capital in the Keynesian model. However, the Monetarist approach based on
q–theory may have some advantages over standard cost–of–capital explanations, especially with regard to
Hannsgen’s observation that changes in the estimated profits of firms may override the effect on investment
of a change in the rate of interest arising through the cost–of–capital channel. It is precisely such effects
that the q–theory captures.
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not be satisfactorily measured. Moreover, the theory is reliant on the strong assumptions
of perfect and symmetrical information in a world without agency problems (see Crotty,
1990, 1992, Palley, 2001b, and Hannsgen, 2006, for a more thorough discussion).
2.3.6 The Exchange Rate Channel
The exchange rate channel is often discussed last among the group of monetary transmis-
sion channels, if it is mentioned at all. Indeed, a substantial majority of the research effort
devoted to the analysis of monetary policy is conducted in a closed economy setting where
the exchange rate channel is explicitly omitted.
Arestis and Sawyer (2004) identify two independent routes by which the effects of
monetary policy arise through the exchange rate channel. The first may be summarised
as follows:
i ↑−→ e ↑−→ NX ↓−→ Y ↓
where e represents the exchange rate (in terms of units of foreign currency per unit of
domestic currency) and NX represents net exports. Arestis and Sawyer argue that a
policy–induced increase in the interest rate makes financial assets denominated in the
domestic currency more attractive, leading to a relative appreciation of the currency.
This, in turn, reduces the competitiveness of exported goods, lowering net exports and
thereby aggregate demand, output and inflation.
The second route works through the change in import prices arising due to a change
in the exchange rate, which directly affects aggregate demand and price level inflation:
i ↑−→ e ↑−→ PM ↓−→ Y ↑
where PM denotes import prices. The divergence of the two mechanisms reflects the dif-
ferential effect of an exchange rate change on the domestic and foreign components of
aggregate demand. There is little firm basis upon which to form an informed expectation
about which effect will dominate ex ante, leaving the direction and magnitude of the eco-
nomic response to monetary policy arising through the exchange rate channel ambiguous.
Moreover, to the extent that banks and non–financial firms and even households hold
assets denominated in foreign currencies, a change in the exchange rate may affect their
balance sheets, causing additional effects through the broad credit, wealth and Monetarist
channels (and potentially the bank–lending channel in the event of a significant effect on
banks’ balance sheets).
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Arestis and Sawyer (2006) use the term ‘spillover effects’ to identify the effect of in-
terest rate policy on exchange rates. Such a term invokes visions of a system in which
monetary policy is set without consideration for the exchange rate and its impact on the
latter is accidental. While this may be an unreasonably harsh characterisation of some
monetary regimes (e.g. those of the European countries during the Exchange Rate Mech-
anism - Smets, 1997), it is in keeping with the majority of the literature on interest rate
rules, which seldom mentions a role for the exchange rate in the formulation of monetary
policy.
Empirical Evidence
In their conclusions, Kuttner and Mosser (2002, p. 441) contend that:
the absence of attention to an open economy channel running through the
exchange rate is an important lacuna. There are two reasons for this. The
first is that despite the growth of trade in recent years, the external sector has
remained a relatively small part of the US economy...[a]nd the second is that a
firm connection between economic fundamentals and short–run exchange rate
movements continues to elude researchers, frustrating efforts to pin down the
exchange rate channel empirically.
The first point is somewhat specific to the US economy and is not relevant in the case
of smaller open economies. However, their second point highlights the critical reason for
the absence of a rigorous empirical literature assessing the exchange rate channel. In the






here ∆i represents a change in the rate of interest brought about by the central bank
and ∆π the resulting change in the rate of inflation. In the diagram, (1) represents the
linkage between interest rates and exchange rates which, the theoretical literature informs
us, depends critically on the UIP relationship. However, it has been found repeatedly that
this is not robust to empirical testing (see Froot and Thaler, 1990, for example). Secondly,
as discussed above, the linkage between the exchange rate and inflation denoted (2) is not
as trivial as the simple ‘exchange rates up ergo prices down’ relationship found in many
textbooks.
A great deal of research effort has focused on either (1) or (2) but, due to the general
finding that the UIP does not hold and the complexity of the pass–through effects, little
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progress has been made on the nature of the entire mechanism. These difficulties under-
lie Kuttner and Mosser’s observation that much of the empirical literature on monetary
transmission focuses on the US and assumes that it is a closed economy. Even where
an exchange rate channel is modelled, it is typically the case that the UIP (or a similar
condition) is imposed rather than estimated. The Bank of England Macroeconomic Model
is a good example of this: the equation listing provides a model of the effective exchange
rate based on the UIP but augmented with a risk adjustment and a measure of the rate
of change of inflation of GDP and exports (Bank of England, 1999, pp. 28-29 and 41-42).
Arestis and Sawyer (2006, pp. 852) stress that regardless of whether the UIP holds in
practice, it is likely that unexpected monetary policy innovations will exert some influence
over the exchange rate and that, therefore, there is a case for the consideration of the
impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate in its formulation and implementation. In
support of this they cite the comparative approach of Church, Mitchel, Sault, and Wallis
(1997) which reveals a potentially highly significant, if somewhat model–dependent, role
for an exchange rate channel in the UK. Moreover, the importance of the exchange rate
channel is highlighted by the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England, which estimates that more than
60% of the anti–inflationary effect in the first year after a 1% rate hike maintained for
twelve months is attributable to the exchange rate channel (House of Lords, 1999, ¶4.34
and Table A). The need for further research in this area is clear and forms the motivation
for Chapter 6.
2.4 Lacunae in the New Consensus Model
In the simplest case, the impulse resulting from a monetary tightening can be traced
through the system in the following three stages:
(i.) excessive aggregate demand reflected in positive inflation and/or output gaps leads
the central bank to raise the interest rate according to equation 2.3;
(ii.) the increase in the interest rate relative to the natural rate reduces investment and
consumption spending, reigning in aggregate demand (equation 2.1); and
(iii.) with the excess demand neutralised, equation 2.2 shows that inflation will fall back
toward the targeted level.
Each stage in this process relies on a number of assumptions. In the case that γ2 6= 0,
the logical consistency of the policy rule requires that the inflation and output gaps are
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mutually consistent (Tinbergen, 1952). This rests critically on the notion that inflation
is predominantly a demand–pull phenomenon, an assumption that is clearly evident in
equation 2.2. However, this assumption has been powerfully challenged by Setterfield
(2004), who emphasises the contribution of factor costs and institutional factors in the
determination of the rate of inflation. Where cost–push factors and conflicting claims are
important sources of inflationary pressure, it is not clear that monetary policy conducted
in this way can succeed in slowing the rate of price level inflation. Indeed, to the extent
that the interest rate affects the debt–servicing costs of firms, rate hikes may actually
prove inflationary, certainly in the short–run before firms can economise on their use of
credit (c.f. Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2002; Monvoisin and Rochon, 2006; Palley, 2006;
Arestis and Sawyer, 2006).
Implicit in the transition from stage (i.) to stage (ii.) is the notion that the short–term
nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank is related systematically to the longer–
term real rates which are thought to influence investment and consumption decisions. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, the role of expectations in tying nominal and real interest rates
together is fundamental to the NCM approach. While this may explain how the central
bank can affect short–term real rates, it does not explain how it can manipulate the yield
curve at longer horizons. There is little reason to believe that the influence of short–term
interbank rates over longer–term market rates is particularly strong, direct, immediate
or predictable. Furthermore, it is highly probable that the degree to which longer–term
rates track the central bank rate varies with time (due to financial innovation, changes in
economic sentiment etc.) and may be discontinuous and/or state–contingent. Monetary
policymaking is far from an exact science.
Stage (ii.) of the process relies on the idea that investment and consumption are
dependent on the interest rate in a simple, systematic manner. The discussion of the
interest rate and credit channels revealed that the empirical evidence is inconclusive with
regard to this assertion. In general, the empirical evidence lends no more support to a
simple relationship than to one characterised by pronounced non–linearities.
Finally, stage (iii.) relies on the validity of the Phillips curve specified by equation 2.2.
This has been fundamentally questioned by Freedman, Harcourt and Kriesler (2004), in
which the authors hypothesise the existence of a flat region in which the familiar trade–
off is non–existent. Should one accept the existence of a flat section in the short–run
Phillips curve, it follows that a similar feature will be present in the long–run Phillips
curve. This raises the possibility of a long–run trade–off between capacity utilisation
and inflation, and suggests that monetary policy may be non–neutral in the long–run
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(see Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007)18. In such a setting, there may be substantial scope for
opportunistic monetary policy of the type discussed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and
Palacio-Vera (2005).
A number of more general concerns can also be raised against the NCM view of mon-
etary policy. Firstly, and most importantly, it is not clear that inflation–targeting is
necessarily consistent with the maximisation of the level and rate of growth of output (at
a sustainable level) and the maintenance of full employment which, most economists would
agree, are to be held as the ultimate goals of monetary policy (c.f. Monvoisin and Rochon,
2006). To the extent that price stability facilitates the attainment of these goals it may
be useful but it is rather restrictive and distinctly non–Keynesian to consider it an end in
itself.
Similarly, the adoption of a Wicksellian equilibrium rate of interest may be questioned.
Once one acknowledges the fundamental endogeneity of the money supply, it is clear that
the interest rate is simply a quantity administered by the central bank to affect its policy
goals. In this context, any equilibrium interest rate depends on the prevailing economic
conditions (i.e. the parameterisation of the model) including the budget position, the state
of expectations and the ‘animal spirits’ influencing investment decisions. When viewed
in this way, there is little reason to believe that the rate of interest compatible with
zero inflation and output gaps will remain constant between periods (see, for example,
Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2002; Monvoisin and Rochon, 2006).
Lastly, the narrow focus of the New Consensus on interest rate operating procedures
to the exclusion of all other forms of stabilisation policy is excessively restrictive. Even
if one accepts the proposition that the interest rate should be used to target demand–
pull inflation, it does not follow that there is no role for other policy instruments. This
argument is developed in Chapters 5 and 6.
2.5 The Role of Fiscal Policy
The assumption of Ricardian agents embodied in much of the New Consensus literature
renders fiscal policy largely irrelevant. It is clear that the New Keynesian school has
strayed considerably from its apparent Keynesian roots. The assumption that agents act
in a manner consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence even in the long–run is rather ten-
uous (Fontana, 2008). Recent empirical work by Gal´ı et al. (2007) supports the efficacy of
expansionary government spending by introducing a proportion of non–Ricardian house-
holds into an otherwise standard SVAR model. Similarly, using a simple reformulated
18See also Arestis and Sawyer, 2004, and Setterfield, 2006, on the non–neutrality of money.
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NCM model, Setterfield (2007) finds that the combination of active fiscal policy and pas-
sive monetary policy is at least as effective at combating inflation as the NCM approach
of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy.
Influenced by Arestis and Sawyer (especially 2003b), Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2006)
stress the need for a combined monetary and fiscal approach to stabilisation policy for at
least four reasons. First, they note the ambiguity of the interest rate channel of monetary
policy (see Section 2.3.1). Second, they dispute the long–run neutrality of monetary policy
due to potential labour market hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1989) and the possi-
bility that the natural rate of growth may be endogenous (Cornwall and Cornwall, 1997;
Leo´n-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002). Third, they stress the potentially undesirable distri-
butional effects of interest rate changes (c.f. Argitis and Pitelis, 2001; Rochon and Rossi,
2006) and, finally, they note that higher interest rates may contribute to cost–push infla-
tion by raising the debt–servicing expenditures of firms.
At the core of these issues is the untargeted nature of interest rate policy. References
to the ‘blunt tool’ (Bernanke, 2006) or ‘blunderbuss’ (Palley, 2006) of the interest rate
are not uncommon. The advocacy of inflation targeting interest rate policy in the NCM
is fundamentally based on a value judgment that the costs of high and volatile inflation
exceed those associated with the indiscriminate ‘collateral damage’ associated with the
manipulation of the interest rate. There is little evidence on which to base this assertion.
Fontana and Palacio-Vera hold that the careful use of discretionary fiscal policy in an IT
regime could reduce these difficulties19.
In the extreme case, Arestis and Sawyer (2006) argue that, due to the real effects of
interest rate innovations on the exchange rate and fixed capital formation, and in light
of their earlier research indicating that monetary policy is of limited use in managing
aggregate demand (Arestis and Sawyer, 2004), monetary policy should be concerned with
the exchange rate and fiscal policy with inflation. Of course, the fundamental difficulty
associated with using fiscal policy to target inflation is that it is not clear which of the
many types of tax or government spending should be manipulated to achieve the desired
end. It is hoped that the work undertaken in Chapter 6 of this thesis may help to shed
some light on these issues.
19Of course, a raft of additional stabilisation policies can be identified, including incomes policy, for
example. The interested reader is referred to Pollin and Zhu (2006) and Setterfield (2006) for recent
examples.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided a thorough survey and critique of the New Consensus in macroe-
conomics, and has discussed in some detail the theoretical and empirical literature on the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This discussion forms the basis of the four
principle chapters of the thesis, which discuss the adoption of e–money and its regulation,
the implications of the increased frequency and severity of asset market cycles and the
nature of stabilisation policy in an open economy.
Chapter 3 revisits the literature on the implications of the electronification of the
payments system for monetary policy. The argument that the widespread adoption of
e–money could break the linkage between reserves and aggregate demand (c.f. Friedman,
1999; 2000) essentially revolves around the contention that e–money poses a threat to the
links between reserves, lending and market interest rates in Figure 2.1. Should these links
fail, the central bank would be unable to influence the time path of aggregate demand
and inflation. However, based on the structure presented above, Chapter 3 argues that
this could not happen. This does not, however, imply that e–money is not an important
innovation with potentially serious consequences for systemic stability. Hence, the key
issue is one of regulation and the maintenance of systemic stability. This is the focus of
Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 investigates the proposition that endogenous financial fragility in the sense
of Minsky (1982) may impose limits on the degree to which the interest rate may be used to
pursue macroeconomic stabilisation. The Minskyan proposition that an anti–inflationary
interest rate hike may hinder the ability of firms to service their debts and increase their
financial fragility effectively represents very strong interest rate, credit and, potentially,
wealth channels (Hannsgen, 2005, identifies an additional ‘Minskyan Accelerator Chan-
nel’). In a Minskyan model, monetary policy may be non–neutral in the long–run, carrying
the implication that inflation targeting interest rate policies may be ill–advised. Indeed,
Minskyan endogenous asset cycles may necessitate direct intervention in the activities of
financial intermediaries. Hence, there may be a role for alternative policy instruments
including prudential credit controls (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2002; Arestis and Sawyer,
2006), asset–based reserve requirements (Palley, 2006) and a range of fiscal measures.
Finally, the core contentions underlying the Chapter 6 model are neatly captured in
Arestis and Sawyer’s (2002) analysis of the Bank of England’s (1999, 2000) Macroecono-
metric Model. The authors show that it shares many of the features of Meyer’s (2001a)
NCM model but that it differs in three crucial respects: (i) the UK is an open economy
and thus the Bank’s discretion in setting the repo rate is constrained; (ii) the repo rate has
42 CHAPTER 2. MONETARY THEORY AND POLICY
long–run real effects; and (iii) fiscal policy enters the aggregate demand equation. The
model developed in Chapter 6 stresses these points, and finds evidence supporting the





The acceleration of the process of electronification of financial markets and payments sys-
tems has generated considerable interest among both academics and practitioners. Elec-
tronification has taken many forms, from the introduction of automated telling machines
and internet banking to the deployment of EFTPOS (electronic funds transfer at the point
of sale) terminals and, most recently, to the development of various forms of electronic
money (e–money). E–money involves the use of encrypted digital images stored either on
a hardware device (e.g. a card) or on a computer network. These images may then be
used in lieu of traditional means of payment at vendors equipped with the appropriate
technology. In many countries, e–money usage has flourished in certain markets, including
mass transport systems, parking meters and other high frequency low value transactions
(e.g. newsstand purchases).
While the substitution away from physical cash toward electronic alternatives provides
scope for potentially substantial efficiency gains and increased convenience, much of the
early academic work in the field viewed the development of e–money as a threat to the
efficacy of monetary policy. This threat, it was argued, derived from the diminution of the
central bank balance sheet and the potential for economic activity to take place in isola-
tion from the central bank (i.e. without recourse to its liabilities for payment purposes).
Moreover, it was suggested that e–money schemes may evolve to offer settlement services
in competition with those of the central bank. It was argued that, in such a situation,
the central bank would lose it’s influence over the economy, becoming unable to engage in
stabilising monetary policy and leaving the financial system vulnerable.
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This chapter argues that this extreme position relies on a flawed model of monetary
policy. Furthermore, its alarmist nature has generated more heat than light in the sense
that it has distracted attention from the potential efficiency gains associated with elec-
tronic payment media and has generated a general sense of mistrust. Furthermore, a
number of genuine concerns about the security of e–money schemes and privacy issues
have been obscured. The extent to which these concerns may be judged to be signifi-
cant depends on the degree of usage of the new technology, a subject which has received
relatively little attention to date.
The chapter proceeds in eight sections. Section 3.2 attempts to address the lack of
a consistent definition of e–money within the existing literature by updating Freedman’s
(2000) three–way typology. Section 3.3 discusses e–money in terms of the Mengerian
and Chartalist views of money, and attempts to ascertain the extent to which e–money
possesses the six properties of money. Section 3.4 discusses the provocative writings of
Friedman (1999; 2000) and King (1999) in which e–money is treated as a threat to the
efficacy of monetary policy. Having concluded that this threat is largely illusory, various
more immediate regulatory issues arising from the activities of e–money issuers are dis-
cussed. However, the importance of these issues can only be judged in relation to the
importance of e–money in general. Section 3.5 provides an overview of the degree of adop-
tion of e–money technologies to date in the Euro Area and in Singapore. The Singaporean
system is considerably more developed than those of the European countries which may be
attributable to the announcement by the Singaporean government in 2001 that e–money
will be granted the status of legal tender. A range of forecasting exercises are carried out
in Section 3.6, the results of which suggest that the growth of e–money in the medium–
term will be no more than moderate. Section 3.7 discusses the longer–term prospects for
e–money systems in terms of three key issues: the incentives for all parties concerned, the
security of the system and the development and deployment of new services. Section 3.8
offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 What is ‘E–Money’?
While the literature on electronic payment media is relatively recent, it has been fast
growing. An unfortunate consequence of this rapid expansion has been the lack of a unified
vision of the phenomena under scrutiny: simply put, the literature lacks a clear consensus
about what actually constitutes electronic payment media (c.f. Fullenkamp and Nsouli,
2004). For this reason, it seems prudent to start with some rigorous definitions.
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Probably the broadest term covering a wide spectrum of recent innovations in payment
systems that utilise electronic devices is ‘electronic payments’, or ‘e–payments’. The term
e–money has come to be used interchangeably with e–payments although, as Allen, 2003,
notes, this is somewhat misleading. Freedman (2000, p. 218) provides the following simple
typology of e–payments technologies:
i. access devices provide access to traditional banking services through electronic
means but do not represent any conceptual departure from traditional banking ar-
rangements. A good example is internet banking.
ii. stored value cards (SVCs), also known as hardware e–money, involve prepaid
‘smart–cards’ that employ a microchip upon which funds are stored. Freedman cites
Mondex, Visa Cash and Proton as examples of contemporary international schemes.
National examples include Moneo in France, Geldkarte in Germany and Edy in
Japan.
iii. network money, also referred to as software e–money, involves the use of electronic
communication networks in facilitating the transfer of funds between economic agents
where the funds are stored electronically, possibly on the hard-disk of one’s PC. An
example of a network money system is Netcash.
Such is the speed with which e–payments technology is developing that since Freedman
wrote his piece, a further category has emerged:
iv. mobile payments, or ‘m–payments’, involve the use of mobile phone technology
in the transference of funds, either to facilitate access to traditional transaction
facilities or, increasingly, by the addition of supplemental charges to the cost of
calls, SMS or WAP/GPRS services or by spending prepaid value (Allen, 2003, pp.
430-431). Collaboration between phone manufacturers and card issuers has already
resulted in the addition of credit card functionality to mobile phone handsets in
many countries (examples include PayPass in the US and NTT DoCoMo’s DCMX
and DCMX mini platforms in Japan).
The majority of the existing literature is concerned with the impact of SVCs and
network money systems on the efficacy of monetary policy and not with the use of access
devices which, as noted above, do not differ conceptually from traditional bank activities1.
1While such innovations may reduce shoeleather costs in a Baumol–Tobin framework (Baumol, 1952;
Tobin, 1956), and this may, in turn, increase both the velocity of circulation and the interest elasticity of
the demand for money, such effects are not the focus of the present chapter as they pose no significant
threat to the efficacy of monetary policy. For a discussion including access products, the reader is referred
to Fullenkamp and Nsouli (2004) in particular and also Bernkopf (1996).
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Moreover, recent innovations in m–payments are yet to receive much attention in the
literature because the use of the mobile phone in contemporary schemes does not represent
any significant departure from the three–way typology devised by Freedman (2000). In
general, the mobile phone acts either as an ‘e–money access device’ or as an the hardware
on which e–monetary value is stored (i.e. it acts as an SVC). This would no longer be
the case if contract phones were to provide non–prepaid e–money functionality. However,
such developments are not currently permitted, as this would amount to the extension of
a credit line by the service provider which is prohibited by law (see Sections 4.2.1 and
4.2.2 below).
Allen (2003, p. 431) highlights the evolution of the term ‘e–money’ which originally
referred to “pre–paid cards aimed at low–value transactions” but now identifies a much
broader range of electronic payments services. In light of this observation, and to avoid
confusion, the following terminological conventions are adopted here:
i. e–banking will refer to access devices;
ii. e–purse and SVC will refer interchangeably to hardware–based schemes;
iii. network money will refer to software–based schemes;
iv. e–payment will refer to all of the above; and
v. e–money will refer to e–purses and network money systems.
3.3 E–Money and the Theory of Money
3.3.1 Mengerian and Chartalist Theories of Money
Two dominant theories propose alternative reasons for the development of money. The
Mengerian view stresses that the evolution of monetary systems of exchange has, his-
torically, been motivated by the desire for increased convenience and efficiency, and for
reduced costs in transacting. An example is the removal of the famous ‘double coincidence
of wants’ when a barter economy evolves into a monetary system. Recent innovations in
ICT have the potential to provide the vehicle for great efficiency gains in the payments
system. To the extent that much of the resulting increase in efficiency is a public good,
there are social welfare gains to be reaped through the development and implementation
of the new technology. Moreover, there are substantial private costs involved in operating
the current payments system2: new technologies have the potential to dramatically re-
2For example, the cost of operating the cheque clearing system in the US is estimated at 0.25-1% of
GDP (Meyer, 2001b).
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duce these costs, which represent a substantial economic rent that the participants in the
new technology could hope to appropriate. Hence there are also strong private incentives
to develop new and ever more efficient payment systems. Thus, the Mengerian position
provides clear scope for the widespread development of e–money.
By contrast, the state–driven chartalist view of money emphasises the role of the state
in the development of money, arising particularly due to its position at the head of the
social relations involved in monetary transactions. Chartalist theory stresses the unit of
account feature of money above its role as a means of payment and medium of exchange
(Tcherneva, 2006). Moreover, the neo–chartalist revival considers that the role of the
state in deciding what constitutes money is defined by its ability to unilaterally determine
those assets which will be accepted to extinguish debts to the government (typically due to
taxation). Once a government has imposed a tax obligation upon every resident that can
only be discharged using a particular means of payment, then this becomes intrinsically
useful to every inhabitant. Hence, it will be accepted as a means of payment in any
transaction.
The state–driven view of money proposes a hierarchy of monies where a net imbalance
in any tier may be settled by using only monies from higher tiers. The standing of central
bank money at the top of the hierarchy is defined by government ordinance to the extent
that it is the only means of payment that is accepted in the payment of taxes (Bell, 2001).
Hence, by refusing to accept any other form of payment, the government creates demand
for its own liabilities in a manner which cannot be diminished by substitution. A simple
diagrammatical representation is presented in Figure 3.13:
Figure 3.1: The Hierarchy of Money
Bell (2001) stresses that the position of each liability within the pyramid is determined
3Note that the relative areas of the various tiers of the pyramid are not meant to denote quantities of
money in use; the shape is merely intended to reflect the position of government liabilities at the top of
the hierarchy.
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by its liquidity (i.e. the ease with which it can be converted into that form which can
extinguish tax liabilities). She notes that bank money (i.e. deposit accounts) occupy a
special role in modern economies and that firms’ liabilities are more liquid than those of
households due to the existence of superior (or at least deeper) secondary markets. So
where does e–money fit into the hierarchy? Government issued electronic legal tender (as
in Singapore - more on this below) would presumably be part of the top tier alongside cash.
However, most e–money schemes are privately operated and would not enjoy the benefits
of perfect liquidity and unimpeachable risklessness derived from government issuance. The
classification of such schemes depends critically on the costs associated with redemption
in terms of central bank money. The law in most countries states that banks and e–money
issuers cannot impose disproportionate redemption costs on the consumer. In this sense,
the liquidity of bank liabilities and those of e–money issuers are similar.
The position of various types of liability or ‘promise’ within the hierarchy is also
determined by the degree to which that promise is accepted. To the extent that private
e–money schemes are typically limited to single–use or small multiple–use systems and
that the geographical area in which they can be used is typically very limited, it is clear
that e–money should not be considered alongside bank deposits. However, it seems logical
to separate e–money firms from other firms whose primary business is not the provision
of payment services. The liabilities of this latter class of firms are likely to be comprised
of bonds and debt instruments which are considerably less liquid than e–money. Hence
e–money should be placed between tiers two and three.
The chartalist position provides an unambiguously continuing role for central bank
money in a world otherwise dominated by private electronic substitutes as long as the
government continues to limit the range of assets acceptable in the extinguishing of tax
debts to the liabilities of the central bank. However, it should be clear that these central
bank liabilities occupying the top tier of the hierarchy need not take the form of notes
and coins. In the case of Singapore, in which state–issued e–money is due to become
legal tender in the near future, e–money will become an ultimately liquid and riskless
government liability, serving the same role as cash.
This discussion of electronic legal tender leads naturally to an important point raised
by Bell (2001), citing Wray (1998, p. 32). The authors stress that legal tender laws
in themselves are insufficient to keep the monetary system functioning. Rather, it is
the ability of the government to impose legally binding tax obligations and to specify
the acceptable means of payment that is of fundamental importance. This is not to
suggest that legal tender laws are unimportant; government recognition of this type is
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likely to lend credibility to a payment instrument, increasing public trust in its viability
and promoting investment by issuing firms. However, the same results would be achieved
if the government announced that it would accept e–money in the payment of taxes.
3.3.2 The Attributes of Money
A question of fundamental importance in any analysis of e–money is to what extent it
possesses the attributes of money. The following characteristics are typically identified:
(i.) store of value or wealth; (ii.) unit of account; (iii.) medium of exchange; (iv.)
longevity; (v.) divisibility; and (vi.) fungibility.
Store of value or wealth
To the extent that e–monetary value loaded at time t may subsequently be spent at
time t + τ where τ ∈ R+ and R+ = [0,∞), it is clear that e–money allows the bearer
to transfer purchasing power into the future and, therefore, that e–money represents a
store of value. However, e–money in Europe and the US (although not in Singapore)
is forbidden from paying interest per se, rendering it a poor store of wealth due to the
erosion of purchasing power resulting from price level inflation. In these countries, e–
money schemes are comparable to cash. However, circumventive innovation is likely to
occur where e–money issuers are restricted from paying interest. Indeed, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) in the UK recognises the validity of various alternatives to
the direct payment of interest (see Section 4.2.1). Depending on the success of such
innovations, hardware based e–money may surpass cash as a store of wealth, and the gap
between non interest bearing software e–money accounts and bank deposit accounts may
narrow4.
Unit of account
The unit of account property of money refers to its use in the assessment of the value
of goods and services and in financial reporting. Krueger (2002b) notes that there is no
legal impediment to e–money developing into a unit of account. It is likely that e–money
would need to achieve a significant market share in order to be a viable unit of account,
although its dominance in some sectors may be sufficient for it to take on the role of
numeraire in these sectors. The commonly cited areas of strength of e–money schemes are
4Given that the activities of e–money issuing institutions are not typically covered by deposit insurance
schemes, there is a degree of default risk associated with e–money which exceeds the risks associated
with bank instruments where the customer benefits from a governmental guarantee. Hence, in order for
an individual to be indifferent between holding their wealth in relatively riskless bank instruments and
e–money, the latter must offer either a higher risk–adjusted rate of return, or a significant benefit in terms
of increased convenience.
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unmanned point–of–sale (POS) stations such as public transport and vending machines.
The coexistence of multiple units of account is not unusual. Krueger uses the example of
the Swiss WIR–Wirtschaftsring bank to demonstrate that a national and a private unit
of account can coexist in the same country. Moreover, similar systems operate in many
African, Caribbean, Latin and South American countries, where the US Dollar or the
Euro circulate alongside a national currency. A further example is provided historically
by bi–metallism.
While it is theoretically possible for e–money to serve as a unit of account, practical
considerations make it highly unlikely. Taking the EU as an example, the requirement
to redeem e–monetary value for currency at par, combined with its statutorily prepaid
nature, render e–money products little more than a convenient way of transporting and
transmitting central bank money. In such systems, e–money clearly does not serve as a
unit of account, rather it is explicitly pegged to the national currency which performs this
role. Similarly, e–money will be granted the status of legal tender in Singapore in the
near future but the unit of denomination will be the Singaporean Dollar. In order for
e–money to act as a unit of account distinct from the national currency, it would have
to be decoupled from it in the sense that the requirements for redeemability at par and
pre–payment in full would need to be relaxed. However, these requirements are typically
enshrined at the heart of the regulatory framework (see Sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.3) and are very
unlikely to be eased, certainly in the foreseeable future.
Medium of exchange or means of payment
The precise wording has proven contentious in this case and has been contested on the
grounds that credit, for instance, undeniably facilitates exchange but does not represent
final settlement and, for this reason, is not typically considered as money. In a seminal
contribution, Shackle (1971) refined the terminology, distinguishing between a medium
of exchange and a means of final payment or settlement. Goodhart (1989) finds the
root of this distinction in the uncertainty surrounding the ‘personal information’ and
creditworthiness of the purchaser in an economic transaction.
A medium of exchange is simply something which facilitates the exchange of goods
and services and may function merely as an intermediate step in the interactions between
buyer and seller. By contrast, a means of payment refers to some instrument which settles
such obligations with demonstrable finality. Under such a framework, trade credit, credit
cards etc. represent media of exchange but not means of final payment. In the present
legislative environment, e–money cannot provide finality and, in this regard, is similar to
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these various forms of credit5.
The words ‘widely’ ore even ‘universally accepted’ are often included. It seems likely
that e–money will fail to satisfy this point for some time for at least three reasons. Firstly,
most contemporary e–money systems are for single or limited use only and are, there-
fore, by definition not widely accepted. Secondly, interoperability is a prerequisite for
widespread use (otherwise e–money cannot be considered to be a single payment instru-
ment) and this is seemingly a distant prospect. Finally, the hardware requirements neces-
sary for the use of e–money are far from widely operable at present. The costs that must
be borne by merchants in adopting e–money technology will be of fundamental importance
in the future development of this infrastructure.
Longevity, Divisibility and Fungibility
The longevity of money is the property of durability, that it must not degrade sub-
stantially with the passage of time. E–money obviously meets this criterion (in fact it is
infinitely durable in a way that no other form of money has ever been).
The property of divisibility was originally defined in terms of commodity money such
that a given weight of gold, for example, could be divided without any loss in value. In fiat
money systems it is typically taken to refer to the idea that exact change can always be
provided for a purchase no matter what denomination of currency was used for payment.
Strictly speaking, this property only holds up to a limit defined by the smallest unit of
currency.
Fungibility is the property of perfect substitutability. Cash is perfectly fungible in the
sense that one dollar bill may be substituted for another in a perfect zero–sum game. The
same is clearly true of e–monetary value issued by the same firm. However, this condition
often does not hold across service providers.
This exercise has demonstrated that e–money does not possess many of the attributes
of central bank fiat money and, in this sense, it is not a proper substitute for currency.
Without doubt, the most significant issue preventing the widespread use of e–money is
the lack of interoperability. This is fundamental to any payment system in the sense that
it is related to the liquidity of the asset in question. Central bank money sits at the
top of the chartalist pyramid (Figure 3.1) because it is accepted in the discharge of any
debt and this, in turn, leads to near universal acceptability in transactions. Seen from
the viewpoint of the French and Italian circuitists, cash is acceptable in all circuits and
5The potential for e–money systems to develop to the extent that they could operate real–time gross
settlement (RTGS) facilities presents some (limited) scope for them to offer final settlement in the future,
at least in theory. However, the prospect of such developments is so distant as to be largely irrelevant to
the present discussion.
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therefore is perfectly liquid. By contrast, debit cards are not acceptable forms of payment
in many situations and so they are less liquid. In this sense, e–money which can be used
on public transport infrastructure is less liquid than e–money which is also valid in a range
of shops. The more that e–money schemes become interoperable, the more liquid their
liabilities will become.
3.4 The ‘Threat’ to Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
Developments in electronic payment systems have been discussed in the literature in terms
of their potential to substitute for central bank money and the ‘threat’ that this may pose
to the efficacy of monetary policy and to the stability of the financial system. This threat,
it is argued, derives from the reduction in demand for central bank liabilities that would
result from the widespread adoption of e–money. Two extreme scenarios rooted in the
work of Friedman (1999) and King (1999) have dominated discussion in the field while
other, more mundane effects can be identified but have yet to receive much attention.
3.4.1 The Extreme Position
The early and provocative contributions of Friedman (1999) and King (1999) discuss the
threat of e–money in terms of the potential of SVCs and network e–money systems to
compete with central bank money. Where the central bank relies on manipulating the
quantities of borrowed and non–borrowed reserves in order to achieve an operating target
for its short–term interest rate, the existence of such substitutes is potentially significant.
Under such systems, the central bank’s position as the monopolistic supplier of base money
allows it to determine the price of issuance/rate of return. Thus, it is argued that the
adoption of such forms of e–money may weaken the position of a central bank operating
in this way: indeed, if various forms of e–money were to eliminate the demand for cen-
tral bank money entirely, such monetary policy arrangements may be rendered powerless
(Woodford, 2000)6. In terms of Figure 2.1, the proposed threat of e–money relates to the
potential weakening, or even breakage, of the links between reserves and market interest
rates (especially the linkage between high powered money and broad money).
The monetary base is comprised of two elements: currency and reserves. Currency
refers to notes and coins in circulation and represents the bulk of money. Reserves refer
to the balances maintained by commercial banks in order to facilitate their day–to–day
6Fullenkamp and Nsouli (2004) make the obvious point that if the central bank were the issuer of e–
money then its monopoly would remain intact. Hence, it should be clear that the extreme position is
concerned with the private issuance of e–money.
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operations. Commercial banks may be legally bound to hold a certain amount of required
reserves (as in the US) although even in the absence of such requirements, or in the case
that they do not bind7, they will voluntarily hold reserves with the central bank for use
in end–of–day settlement8.
SVCs, which are often subject to purse limits and cannot take deposits or pay in-
terest, are envisaged as a substitute for currency in small–value transactions. Network
money systems, by contrast, provide an alternative vehicle for medium- and large–value
transactions and, therefore, have the potential to substitute for services typically provided
by depository institutions (although such schemes are forbidden from paying interest and
cannot extend credit so the degree of substitution is likely to be minimal - see Chapter
4). Friedman (1999) investigates the situation in which electronic payment media come to
dominate the marketplace to such an extent that the demand for currency and/or reserves
at the central bank falls to negligible levels and even disappears altogether. Two distinct
scenarios can be identified: firstly, that SVCs wholly displace currency for use in transac-
tions (c.f. Costa Storti and De Grauwe, 2001) and, secondly, that network money systems
develop to the extent that they offer settlement systems in competition with those of the
central bank (c.f. King, 1999).
Scenario 1: SVCs wholly displace currency
If SVCs were to eliminate the demand for currency then, as currency comprises the vast
majority of central bank liabilities, the central bank balance sheet would shrink sub-
stantially and its seigniorage revenue would largely disappear. In the case where final
settlement still occurs on the books of the central bank, then it is immediately appar-
ent that channel or corridor systems of monetary policy9 remain effective, as changes in
short–term interest rates are not expressly linked to balance sheet operations. Freedman
(2000) and Woodford (2000, 2001a) argue that, in the case of more traditional monetary
policy arrangements, where the deposits are non interest–bearing and the central bank
manipulates the quantities of borrowed and non–borrowed reserves in achieving its inter-
7There is some debate concerning the nature of US reserve requirements and whether or not they are
binding - see for example Bennett and Peristiani (2002).
8This is the case in Canada and New Zealand for example - see Borio (1997) for a survey of the monetary
policy operating procedures in industrial countries.
9Also known as a Lombard facility, this refers to a system in which the central bank maintains short–
term nominal interest rates within a band defined by its standing facilities: it will provide unlimited
settlement balances at a fixed mark–up over its target for the overnight rate and it will pay interest on
deposits at a rate set symmetrically below its target. Thus, if the rates available in the interbank market
are inferior to those offered by the central bank, commercial banks will make use of the standing facilities
thereby providing strong incentives to ensure that market rates remain within the ‘corridor’. Such systems
are in operation in Canada, New Zealand and the UK, among others. The reader is referred to Woodford
(2001a, pp. 31-46) for a thorough discussion of the technical aspects of the channel system and a comparison
with the US system of monetary policy.
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est rate target, the monetary authority could continue operating in the same way that
it does at present. This can be most clearly seen by reference to Figure 3.2, taken from
Palley (2001a, p. 227, fig. 1):
Figure 3.2: The Composition of Reserve Demand
where R represents the supply of reserves (which adjusts passively to equate to the de-
mand for reserves), Cd currency held by the non–bank public (which is assumed to be
perfectly interest inelastic and fixed in the short–run), Bd the demand for reserves arising
from commercial banks and i the central bank’s policy rate. The curve Cd+Bd is steeply
downward sloping, indicating the short–run interest inelasticity of commercial banks’ de-
mand for reserves. Note that the mechanism underlying the diagram is consistent with the
horizontalist position (Moore, 1988) as the central bank controls the interest rate and the
quantity of reserves, R, responds endogenously due to the actions of commercial banks.
Should privately issued e–money eliminate the demand for currency, Cˆ = Cd = 0
and the demand for reserves would decline dramatically. This would, in turn, reduce the
seigniorage revenue of the central bank. However, as long as there remains a continued
demand for central bank balances to facilitate gross settlement between commercial banks,
a small highly inelastic demand remains. In this case, the linkage between reserves and
market interest rates in Figure 2.1 remains intact, and its manipulation by the central
bank through open market operations remains effective. Hence, Palley (2001a, p. 221)
dismisses the threat to the efficacy of monetary policy arising from developments in what
he calls ‘e–tail money’ (e–money used in retail transactions). Indeed, Woodford (2000, p.
237; 2001a, pp. 23-24) argues that the elimination of currency demand would make the
task of central bankers easier on the grounds that it would remove the feedback which
currently results from the interest–sensitivity of households and firms10.
10In response to an increase in the funds rate (associated with an open market sale of securities),
economic agents reduce their currency holdings and increase their deposits with banks, thereby increasing
the amount of non–borrowed reserves available to banks and partly offsetting the effect of the initial OMO.
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The only major effects of a substitution by the non–bank public away from currency in
favour of e–money would be the shrinkage of the central balance sheet and the reduction
in its seigniorage revenue11. Various measures to recoup the lost seigniorage revenues have
been proposed, including charging banks for services that are currently free or increasing
the cost of chargeable services (Hawkins, 2001, p. 100), the issuance of interest bearing
bonds by the central bank, the imposition of reserve requirements on e–money issuers and
the state issuance of e–money, either competitively or monopolistically (c.f. Freedman,
2000). It is, however, difficult to imagine how private e–money could compete with riskless
central bank e–money under the present legal framework where issuers are forbidden from
paying interest. Presumably an appropriate risk premium would be required to induce
end–users to adopt private e–money in the presence of a riskless alternative. Moreover,
when one considers that central banks are not bound by the constraints of profitability or
the demands of shareholders, it seems likely that they would rapidly come to dominate
the SVC market should they enter it. Such an outcome is clearly incompatible with the
desire to promote competition and innovation in free market economies. However, the EMI
(1994) states that no European NCB has any intention of entering the e–money market in
the foreseeable future, although the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will shortly
begin issuing electronic legal tender (Low, 2002).
While such actions may prove effective in preventing the erosion of central bank rev-
enues, one must question to what extent any action would be necessary at all. The central
bank is under no obligation to operate with a net surplus and so a shrinkage of its balance
sheet is not a cause for undue concern, beyond the extent to which its independence may
suffer if it were indebted to the government.
Scenario 2: e–money provides alternative final settlement mechanisms
Friedman (1999) proposes two ways in which the settlement services offered by the central
bank may become obsolete. Firstly, he argues that commercial banks could agree to settle
net payments imbalances with a nominated commercial bank (i.e. a private bank that takes
on the settlement role of the central bank). Secondly, he contends that an evolution of
existing private interbank clearing arrangements such as CHIPS12 could create a situation
whereby commercial banks could settle bilaterally with no element of mediation provided
This effect is not captured by Figure 3.2, in which the public demand for currency is assumed to be perfectly
interest–inelastic for simplicity.
11In the US in particular and, to a lesser degree, in Europe and the UK, concerns about the reduction
of domestic demand for currency are not excessively pressing due to the vast overseas holdings of these
currencies as a store of value (Meyer, 2001b, p. 10).
12Clearing House Interbank Payments System. At present, such mechanisms merely allow intra–day
netting of claims and still require final settlement on the books of the central bank at the end of the day.
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by a central bank or any other third party13. Friedman notes the similarities between such
a system of bilateral settlement and that of the European Union, in which NCBs settle
payments imbalances directly and do not hold settlement balances with the ECB.
Referring to Figure 3.2, assuming that electronic substitutes eliminate the demand for
settlement balances at the central bank, the overall demand for base money would not
diminish greatly assuming continued demand from the non–bank public. However, it is the
highly interest inelastic demand arising from the banking sector that allows relatively small
open market sales and purchases of securities to affect the interest rate. If the settlement
services of the central bank become redundant, then traditional US–style monetary policy
arrangements will become impotent (Woodford, 2000, 2001a; Palley, 2001a)14. This would
be associated with the breakage of the links between open market operations, reserves and
market interest rates in Figure 2.1.
Goodhart (2000) suggests that the obvious course of action for a central bank faced
with such a situation would be to increase the scale of its open market operations to
the extent that they become significant relative to the size of the financial markets15.
However, in order for a central bank to counterveil market sentiment in order to achieve
its stabilisation goals, it seems likely that it may be forced to engage in loss–making open
market operations on a potentially vast scale. While this is theoretically consistent with
the objectives of a central bank, the associated costs are likely to be politically unpalatable.
Woodford (2000, 2001a) provides an alternative approach. He demonstrates that the
performance of monetary policy in itself is not dependent on the special role of reserves
in the financial system and the inherent monopoly of the central bank in this regard. He
discusses the channel system, in which the quantity of reserves plays no special role in
interest rate setting (i.e. it is a residual)16. He shows that, in the case where the central
bank provides settlement services in a (pseudo) competitive market and its settlement
facilities have no specific competitive advantage, then the payment of interest on reserves
13See also King, 1999, who envisages an extreme evolution of network money systems in which a cen-
tralised super–computer provides real–time gross settlement between individuals with no role for a central
bank. The conceptual similarity to contemporary Local Economy Trading Systems (LETS) which are
detached from the central bank is clear. Closely related to this is the work of Capie, Tsomocos, and Wood
(2003) on ‘e–barter’.
14It should be noted that, in response to the ongoing financial crisis, the Federal Reserve started paying
interest on deposits on October 9th, 2008. This is an important change in the policy regime, as will be
made clear below. However, the operational details of the new system still seem to be subject to revision
and its continuation after the resolution of the current crisis is not guaranteed. See Anderson (2008) for
further details.
15This is a response to Friedman’s (1999) observation that the scale of open market operations relative
to the aggregate value of financial market transactions is very small. Such small operations are effective
in steering the economy (however crudely) due to the highly inelastic reserve demand arising from banks,
a point made clear in Figure 3.2 above and discussed by Palley (2001a, p. 227).
16See also Sellon and Weiner (1996, 1997); Borio (1997); Henckel, Ize, and Kovanen (1999); Meyer
(2001b, p. 11) and Palley (2001a, p. 229, fn13).
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would serve as a reference level for the providers of alternative settlement mechanisms. The
profit–maximising motives of private entities would lead them to use whichever settlement
system provided the highest return (or imposed the smallest cost). Therefore, if the central
bank were to pay a positive rate of interest on reserves, then other settlement institutions
would be forced to follow suit in order for their settlement services to be used. Moreover,
private institutions would not pay a higher risk–adjusted rate than the central bank, as
this would conflict with their own profit–maximisation objectives. Thus, the central bank
may operate monetary policy using the rate of interest paid on reserves, rather than the
spread, as its policy instrument. Such a system is conceptually similar to the channel
system, except that the lending facility is redundant and the deposit rate is exactly equal
to the overnight rate target. In relation to Figure 2.1, it follows that such a system replaces
the role of OMOs and reserves with a direct linkage between market interest rates and the
standing facilities of the central bank.
The above discussion relies on the bold assumption that e–money systems evolve to the
point that they can offer interbank settlement services in competition with those offered by
the central bank. It seems likely that improvements in ICT will permit better forecasting
of the net end–of–day positions of banks vis–a`–vis their competitors, thereby reducing
the demand for settlement balances. However, it is unlikely that this demand will be
eliminated altogether, certainly in the foreseeable future.
Goodhart (2000) and Hawkins (2001) agree that there is no technological impediment
to direct (bilateral) interbank gross settlement. However, this does not occur because
central banks “have evolved to meet a combination of both governmental and structural
needs” (Goodhart, 2000, p. 206, fn27). Among the advantages possessed by central banks,
Freedman (2000) lists their risk free nature, their ability to act as lender of last resort and
their historical position as the provider of settlement services. Moreover, the incentives of
the central bank are, by statute, uniquely compatible with the maximisation of a measure
of economic welfare. This contrasts markedly with private banks, the actions of which are
constrained by their responsibilities to their shareholders (Meyer, 2001b).
Hawkins (2001, p. 101) elaborates on this discussion and provides the following reasons
why settlement will continue to occur on the books of the central bank:
i. it is often compulsory;
ii. central banks are unique in being the only riskless counterparty;
iii. commercial banks are likely to feel uneasy about divulging detailed information to
a competitor;
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iv. the adoption of a new system involves commercial banks incurring migration costs;
v. the central bank offers credit to those banks with net deficits in the overnight market;
vi. the central bank acts as lender of last resort to ensure the solvency of the financial
system as a whole - thus it acts as guarantor of the settlement obligations of banks;
and
vii. it is within the power of governments to require that taxes and other transfers are
conducted using central bank liabilities (the chartalist position).
A Rebuttal of the Extreme Position
An issue which fundamentally underlies the extreme position is the nature of the e–money
value chain. In the current regulatory environment (outlined in Chapter 4), the value
chain of private e–money schemes starts with the purchase of e–monetary value using
conventional financial instruments (e.g. cash, debit and credit cards, direct debits etc.).
This ‘charging-up’ of the e–money account is necessitated by the prepaid nature of e–
money products enshrined in the regulatory frameworks of most countries. Moreover,
e–money issuers in the EU are required by law to redeem e–monetary value for central
bank money at the request of the bearer without imposing disproportionate costs. In
most other countries, such unconditional redeemability is demanded by the end–users of
e–money products and is granted by service providers in order to increase both their
credibility and the degree of public trust in the new technology. Finally, e–monetary value
is redeemed by those merchants that have accepted it in payment for goods and services.
This redemption extinguishes the e–monetary value and results in a bank transfer from
the issuer to the merchant in satisfaction of the transaction. This is neatly summarised
by Lanskoy (2000, p. 21) as follows:
[Hardware based e–money] refers to the electronic units issued by the issuer
and recorded in the electronic purse micro–chip. To make a payment using an
electronic purse, holders transfer electronic units from their card to the sellers
card. This transaction does not generate any debit/credit movement on the
buyers or sellers bank account. Electronic units are converted into currency
units at a later stage and the funds are transferred to the seller’s account by
bank transfer. Purseholders’ accounts are debited when they buy the electronic
units, if the transaction is carried out using bank money.
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This is only technically correct in the case of non–transferable e–money and those
schemes with limited transferability prior to spending. This simplification is fairly innocent
because, although the technology exists to develop systems capable of multiple payments
in which electronic coins may be transferred ad infinitum, such schemes are not widely
available due to the ‘double spending’ problem17, and the necessity to maintain large and
costly databases tracking the usage of transferable e–money (Baddeley, 2004, pp. 242-3).
The implication of the prepayment requirement and the demand for redeemability is
that e–money issuers must hold sufficient reserves of highly liquid assets to ensure that they
can meet this demand. Assuming that there is no compulsion to redeem e–money for cash
(i.e. it may be redeemed by bank transfer or some alternative means) then it is possible,
in theory at least, for e–money to wholly displace currency. However, to the extent that
e–money issuers will hold a fraction of their outstanding float in the form of bank deposits
for the purposes of redemption, the demand for reserves arising from commercial banks
may actually increase with the increasing substitution away from currency. In this way, an
ongoing demand for the liabilities of the central bank arises indirectly from the activities
of e–money issuers themselves.
An interesting thought experiment is to consider the attributes that private e–money
schemes would need to possess in order to eliminate reserve holding at the central bank
altogether. It seems likely that the following would be necessary:
i. faith in the soundness of e–money issuers must be complete so that redeemability is
no longer demanded;
ii. the liabilities of e–money issuers must be universally accepted as a means of payment
and e–money systems must be fully interoperable;
iii. e–money must be fully transferable so that it is not extinguished in the process of
being spent;
iv. wages must be paid in e–money so that the e–monetary value chain can exist inde-
pendently of central bank money (in conjunction with point iii, the prepaid nature
of e–money is effectively circumvented);
v. e–money schemes must be granted the ability to pay interest on deposits so that
e–money may compete with traditional savings instruments;
17It is theoretically possible to create identical copies of units of e–money and so it is feared that
counterfeiting could be a major issue. Given the speed of development of the ICT industry and the
increasing sophistication of personal computers, there are concerns about the security of the encryption
algorithms in use. The recent announcement that the Mifare RFID microchip at the heart of the Oyster
Card in London can be easily and cheaply hacked made headlines around the World (c.f. Richards, 2008).
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vi. e–money schemes must be granted the ability to extend credit such that they can
compete with depository institutions in loans markets;
vii. e–money schemes must develop settlement systems offering all of the desirable char-
acteristics of settlement schemes managed by the central bank; and
viii. e–money must be accepted in the payment of tax debts and must be used by gov-
ernments to the exclusion of central bank money.
Even if these conditions were met, e–money programmes would still have to out–
compete the incumbent instruments/technologies mentioned in points v. - vii. to the extent
that they would come to dominate the market. Moreover, as point viii. makes clear, e–
money could only wholly displace the liabilities of the central bank with governmental
support. Once these conditions have been spelled out clearly, it is understandable why
many economists have dismissed the concerns of Friedman and King merely as an exercise
in futurology of some theoretical interest but of little practical relevance18.
3.4.2 More Mundane Effects of E–Money
The preceding section demonstrated that the two extreme outcomes envisaged by Friedman
(1999; 2000) and King (1999) are not plausible threats to the efficacy of monetary policy.
The interest in these two theories has diverted attention from the more mundane, but also
more serious issues associated with e–money, some of which are now discussed.
Bank Runs
Palley (2001a) and, to a lesser degree, Meyer (2001b) suggest that the emergence of pri-
vately issued e–money which coexists with, and is redeemable in terms of, government
money may revive the spectre of old–fashioned bank runs. Palley reasons that the ‘herd
instincts’ of investors may lead them to react en masse to real or perceived signals from
the market. Such signals may lead investors to believe either that they can make a profit
through arbitraging between private e–money and government money or that their e–
monetary funds are in some way unsafe: in either case the likely outcome is a massive
18In a subsequent paper with a decidedly defensive tone, Friedman (2000) argues that it is not the
complete substitution of e–money for currency or the elimination of settlement balances which poses
the problem (although this would suffice), it is merely the possibility that monetary policy actions may
become decoupled from real macroeconomic activity at the margin. The basis of his argument is that if
some proportion of economic activity occurs through a medium of exchange which is independent of the
central bank, then monetary policy is powerless to influence this section of the economy. If this proportion
becomes sufficiently great, then the economic influence of the central bank may diminish. However, it is
difficult to see how this argument would change the conclusions reached above. It seems unlikely that such
decoupling could occur in a world where e–money is redeemable for central bank money, which will remain
the case as long as there is some degree of (perceived) default risk on the part of e–money issuers.
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liquidity shortage. Meyer usefully highlights the fact that if e–money issuers were deposi-
tory institutions then, under US law, the discount window and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) would protect the integrity of the financial system in the case of a
run on a provider. However, as issuers are not required to be depository institutions under
present legal arrangements (see Chapter 4), the danger of runs exists, at least in the event
that e–money schemes achieve a significant market share.
A related concern frequently raised in the formal literature (especially that of the
monetary authorities) is that the potential mismanagement of e–money schemes may lead
to financial distress or even insolvency on the part of the issuer which could damage
confidence in e–money systems and the payment system more generally. Such concerns
provide the rationale for the security and soundness provisions and the prudential regula-
tory regimes in effect in the EU and US regulatory frameworks (among others) outlined
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively. As long as e–money issuance is 100% backed by
low risk, liquid investments, then there is no cause for concern. Presumably, such strict
working capital requirements will not be lowered until regulators are satisfied that the
risks associated with e–money issuance are suitably small.
Circumventive Innovation
Friedman (1999) notes another frequently overlooked aspect of the development of ICT. He
asserts that the diminution of the credit market share of depository institutions is a cause
for concern of central banks. He argues that recent technological advances have reduced
the advantage of banks in assessing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and that
the securitisation of loans has served to further reduce the proportion of credit which is
backed by deposits at the central bank (these issues have recently come to the fore in
the aftermath of the subprime crisis). Although Friedman’s point is that the proportion
of credit backed by central bank deposits is falling and therefore that the demand for
these deposits may decrease, he does not suggest that there is a particular role for e–
money in this process. If, however, innovation on the part of e–money issuers were to
provide a means by which they could circumvent current regulations which forbid them
from extending credit, this could cause serious problems for the operation of monetary
policy. Moreover, when one considers the cost advantage that non–depository institutions
would derive from avoiding the requirement to hold non–interest–bearing reserve assets
in proportion to their credit extension, the scope of the potential problem becomes clear.
Although existing regulation limits credit provision to depository institutions, profitable
opportunities provide strong incentive for circumventive innovation.
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Inaccuracy of Monetary Aggregates
Another issue raised notably by central bankers and bodies related to the conduct of
monetary policy is the inaccuracy of the narrow monetary aggregates which may result
from the misreporting of e–money balances (see, for example, EMI, 1994). It is argued
that in the absence of clear guidelines concerning the definition of e–money and its place
within the payment system, it is likely to be either omitted from the relevant monetary
aggregate, included in the wrong aggregate or not reported at all. To the extent that the
monetary aggregates are used for modelling and as indicators in monetary policy decisions
(at the ECB at least), such an outcome is undesirable. However, is should be clear that
such concerns are easily allayed by the introduction of suitable regulation. Indeed, this
has been achieved in the EU where Directive 2000/46/EC clearly outlines the reporting
obligations of e–money issuers.
Systemic Risks Arising from Offshore Issuers
As is commonly noted in the literature (see, for example, Krueger, 2002b) it is possible for
a company to largely or even entirely circumvent national e–monetary regulation by basing
its operations overseas. Given that many countries are yet to regulate the business of e–
money issuance, it may be possible for an overseas issuer to act in a largely unregulated
manner. While it is conceivable that, in the absence of effective regulation, private agencies
will act in a self–policing manner in order to instill confidence in their customers, this is
by no means a guarantee of the safety of such schemes. In light of such concerns, national
governments may wish to explicitly extend their regulation to cover any e–money issuer
operating within their borders where this is not already the case (as in the EU - see
Section 4.2.1). Lee and Longe-Akindemowo (1999) call for a harmonised global regulatory
framework in order to address such issues of international regulation. If offshore issuance
is seen to pose a significant threat to systemic security, then there may be a role for an
international agency in deploying an integrated global regulatory framework. The obvious
candidate is the Bank for International Settlements (this is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 4).
Systemic Risks Arising from the Insolvency of Issuers
Government issued currency has the fundamental advantage that it is backed by an in-
stitution whose solvency is unimpeachable. Therefore, the default risk associated with
central bank liabilities is zero (to a first approximation). In the case of any privately
issued money not covered by deposit insurance (or similar arrangements), there is a risk
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associated with the possibility that the issuer may either refuse to honour its liabilities
or, more likely, that it will be unable to do so. Given the interconnections characteris-
ing financial contracting, it is possible that the default of one issuer could have serious
ramifications for the financial system as a whole. Such risks are, however, mitigated by
the institutional framework. E–money schemes are targeted at low value transactions,
e–money accounts are subject to relatively strict purse limits and issuers are subject to
stringent asset–backing requirements. Moreover, if the default of an e–money issuer was
considered likely to have substantial repercussions, it seems likely that the central bank
would intervene in its role as lender of last resort even if it was not obliged to do so. Hence,
the threat posed to systemic security by e–money is relatively minimal.
Social Exclusion
Van Hove (2003) raises the issue of social exclusion, reasoning that those members of
society without a bank account will be unable to use the new technology. He identifies
low–income consumers and the poor as those groups which are likely to become excluded
from the new technology. However, this argument is not particularly persuasive as it is
possible to load SVCs using cash without recourse to a bank account. Van Hove does,
however, identify another reason why groups may become socially excluded. He argues
that some groups within society may be unable (or unwilling) to master the new technology.
The European Union e–Inclusion policy identifies five groups that may be excluded from
technological innovations: those without the required skills and education, the elderly, the
disabled, ethnic minorities and residents of remote areas (European Commission, 2006).
Among the recommendations of the e–Inclusion policy that are likely to prove relevant in
the case of e–money are the promotion of affordable solutions and the necessity to close
geographical disparities.
Anonymity and the Underground Economy
Individuals and groups that wish to maintain a degree of anonymity and privacy may
voluntarily exclude themselves from e–money technology. In particular, agents involved
in the underground economy find the anonymity of cash particularly useful (Goodhart,
2000). This suggests that as e–money usage proliferates through the legal economy, the
usage pattern of cash will shift increasingly toward the underground economy. This raises
the question of whether the central bank should continue to provide a convenient and
anonymous means of transacting when the demand for these properties originates largely
from illicit sources (Rogoff, 1998).
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The other side of the debate is the question of whether it is desirable for money to
be traceable. While it is theoretically possible to provide anonymous e–money, this is not
typically done in practice. Contemporary e–money leaves an electronic trail which can
be tracked in a similar way to a credit or debit card transaction. The degree to which
this would impinge on civil liberties in a world in which cash is wholly displaced by e–
money (i.e. one in which anonymous payment is no longer possible) is unclear, but it is
an important and interesting issue.
The extent to which the consequences of e–money issuance discussed above may be
considered important depends on the degree to which the technology is used and its future
growth prospects. These issues are addressed below.
3.5 The Adoption of E–Money To Date
The uptake of e–money schemes to date has been slow. They have mainly developed
only where competing payment technologies are unavailable (Furche and Wrightson, 2000;
Meyer, 2001b; Stefanadis, 2002). Two main theories attempt to explain this limited
adoption. Firstly, it is often argued that there is no convincing business case for e–money
on an economy–wide scale at the present time (Furche and Wrightson, 2000, p. 41). Meyer
(2001b) and Krueger (2002b) argue that e–money typically succeeds in limited purpose
applications because it possesses attributes which make it uniquely compatible with the
particular use to which it is being applied. Such attributes may include purse limits in
the case of company–issued SVCs, or the ability to limit the items that may be purchased
with an e–money product (Krueger, 2002b, p. 20, suggests that parents could give their
children allowances in such a form). By contrast, e–money fails in open systems where
alternative means of payment exist because it does not possess a sufficient comparative
advantage in a general setting relative to the incumbent payment systems. Indeed it may
even suffer from a comparative disadvantage due to concerns over its safety (mentioned
above), the first–mover advantage of the established system and the regulatory uncertainty
surrounding the new technology (Furche and Wrightson, 2000, pp. 42-45). Furthermore,
migration to e–money systems is costly for at least two of the three actors in the market
(c.f. Van Hove, 2003, pp. 13-14). The service provider must invest in infrastructure and
the merchant must invest in the appropriate terminals with which to process payments.
To the extent that e–money schemes may charge a subscription fee, some cost may also be
borne by the customer. In order for the three actors in the market to be willing to bear
these migration costs, the new technology must offer some benefit relative to the old. It
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is not clear that this is the case at present.
The second explanation is rooted in the work on the diffusion and adoption of inno-
vations. Following Rogers (2003), it is commonly argued that the uptake of innovative
solutions follows a sigmoid pattern similar to that depicted in Figure 3.3(a) which plots
the simple logistic function, y = (1 + e−x)
−1
for x ∈ [−10, 10]. Figure 3.3(b) plots the
first difference of the logistic function, demonstrating the implication of the sigmoid hy-
pothesis that the per–period rate of adoption of an innovative product will increase until
some point at which the pool of non–users shrinks to a critical level. An example of the
















Figure 3.3: Sigmoid Adoption of Innovation
The proposed sigmoid pattern reflects the notion that the probability that an individual
will adopt the new technology depends positively on the number (or proportion) of their
friends and colleagues that already use it. Such a scenario naturally leads to nonlinearly
increasing market penetration until the pool of non–users shrinks to such a point that
the market becomes saturated and the adoption rate declines. Once this stage is reached,
firms can no longer hope to simply attract new users and must attempt to actively win
customers from their competitors if they wish to increase their market share.
The sigmoid adoption hypothesis has intuitive appeal in markets with significant net-
work effects. Payments technology is an extreme example of a network industry which
gravitates toward either a single monopoly network or an interoperable system of sub–
networks (Van Hove, 1999a, 1999b). A critical feature of network technologies is that the
number of potential bilateral interactions between users (or more accurately the number
of nodes in the network as each user may possess multiple devices) increases quadratically
with the number of terminals/cards in use. This may be most clearly seen with reference
to Table 3.119.
19Hardware–based e–money schemes may not conform to this model as users often cannot transfer
66 CHAPTER 3. E–PAYMENTS: ADOPTION, DISPERSAL AND MARKET SHARE
Nodes Possible Interactions
A AA
A, B AA, AB, BA, BB
A, B, C AA, AB, AC, BA, BB, BC, CA, CB, CC
A, B, C, D AA, AB, AC, AD, BA, BB, BC, BD, CA, CB, CC, CD, DA, DB, DC, DD
Table 3.1: Quadratic Growth of Interactions in Network Industries
The quadratic increase in the number of potential bilateral interactions resulting from
the addition of each new node provides strong incentives for e–money service providers
to strive for greater interoperability. Each service provider that subscribes to a common
standard gains access to a larger network than would be the case otherwise, increasing
the liquidity of their liabilities and providing stronger incentives for merchants to accept
payment in this manner (i.e. the number of different transactions/uses to which the e–
money device can be put increases). With this said, product differentiation becomes more
difficult, making the market more competitive and squeezing profit margins.
The uptake of e–money may be interpreted within the sigmoid adoption framework.
The slow initial growth of the new technology reflects the relatively high costs of adoption
and the strength of the network effect in this case. The logistic curve plotted above is a
highly simplistic representation of the sigmoid adoption hypothesis. In general, the shape
of the curve will depend on a range of factors including cost and the importance of the
network effect. Where the cost of adoption is relatively high, as is the case with e–money,
the initial low adoption phase may be considerably extended. Moreover, for products with
significant network effects, the rate of growth is likely to become very rapid once a critical
mass of users is achieved. These issues are addressed in Section 3.6, in which a Gompertz
curve is fitted to the data in order to test Rogers’ model.
3.5.1 The Historical Performance of E–money at the Macro Level
Discussions of the historical performance of e–money are typically undertaken at the firm-
or product–level (e.g. Van Hove, 2000; Giannopoulou, 2004) and rarely in the macro con-
text, largely due to the lack of reliable data and the relatively short span of data where
it is available. The most authoritative source of data on e–money schemes at the macro
level (certainly in a global context) is the Committee on Payments and Settlements Sys-
tems (CPSS) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Using figures from their
annual publication Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries it
is possible to build a picture of the nature of, and developments in, the payments infras-
value from one card to another directly (Mondex, among others, is an exception to this rule). However,
software–based schemes may be reasonably accurately described in such a manner.
3.5. THE ADOPTION OF E–MONEY TO DATE 67
tructure in these countries20. This data not only provides an interesting insight into the
adoption and diffusion of innovative payment platforms, but also illuminates the nature
of substitution between competing technologies.
The CPSS data on e–money is most complete for the Euro Area (EA), its member states
and Singapore, with most other countries either reporting negligible activity in e–money
schemes or, more often, failing to report data altogether. However, the availability of data
for these two regions permits interesting comparisons, especially in light of their differing
degrees of e–money adoption, their respective approaches to the regulation of the newly
created innovative markets and the social attitudes prevailing toward such innovations.
Payments Systems in The Euro Area and Singapore Compared
Figure 3.4 plots the volume of e–money, cash and bank deposits in the EA and Singaporean
economies, and their respective rates of growth21. Panels (a)-(c) reveal that the volume
of e–money outstanding is very small relative to cash and overnight deposits (in 2006
e–money outstanding accounted for just 0.1% of cash and 0.02% of overnight deposits in
the EA while the equivalent figures for Singapore were 1% and 0.4%). However, panels
(d)-(f) show that e–monetary value outstanding is growing at a considerably faster rate
than either currency or bank deposits, averaging 35.6% p.a. in the EA and 62.3% p.a.
in Singapore. These figures are somewhat exaggerated by the exceptionally rapid growth
over the period 1997-8, and fall to 29.7% and 32.1% respectively if this initial period
is discounted. This compares to average growth in currency of 12.2% and 5.3% and in
deposit accounts of 14.6% and 10.6% in the EA and Singapore, respectively. This vibrant
growth suggests that interest in e–money schemes is healthy and indicates clear scope for
further development and commercialisation of e–money products.
The quantity and rate of growth of e–monetary value outstanding suggests that e–
money schemes are somewhat more developed in Singapore than in the EA. This is per-
haps not surprising given Singapore’s reputation as a technological leader in a number
of fields. Furthermore, as a small city state with a remarkably high population density
(approximately 6,500 residents per square kilometre), the infrastructural costs associated
with the roll–out of new technologies is very low in comparative terms. Hence, the average
cost of e–money transactions is likely to be lower in Singapore than in the EA, resulting
in increased demand if these costs are borne by the end–user, or in increased revenue
accruing to the issuer if they are not passed on in this manner.
20A comprehensive description of the data used in this section may be found in the Appendix.
21The adoption of the Euro as a physical currency is responsible for the spike in 2001 in panels (b) and
(e), reflecting households’ desire to exchange national currencies that they had accumulated before the
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Figure 3.4: Outstanding Balances (panels a-c, billions US$) and Growth Rates (panels d-e, % p.a.)
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The greater relative importance of e–money in Singapore is underscored by Figure 3.5
which plots the outstanding value of each of the three payment media both as a fraction
of GDP and on a per capita basis. Panels (a) and (d) reveal that not only is e–money
considerably more widely used in Singapore than in the EA but that the rate of adoption is
more rapid. This observation is distinctly consistent with Rogers’ sigmoid adoption theory
and suggests that e–money usage is gaining momentum in Singapore (i.e. that Singapore
is further along the curve than the EA). This process will surely accelerate when e–money
is formally granted the status of legal tender under the SELT initiative.
In the analysis of Figures 3.4 and 3.5, e–monetary value outstanding is assumed to be a
crude proxy for the usage of e–money schemes, but it must be acknowledged that it does not
capture the level of activity in e–money schemes per se, as e–money is typically destroyed
in the process of being spent, unlike cash and bank deposits which are simply transferred.
Hence, the data contained in the figures are likely to understate the importance of e–
money in both the Euro Area and in Singapore. This may be overcome by the analysis of
the relative importance of various payment media according to various criteria, including
their share of total transactions. However, this data is not available at the EA level so the
five member states covered by the CPSS surveys (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands) are considered separately in the following analysis22.
Relative Importance by Transactions Volume and Value
Figure 3.6 plots the transaction shares of five classes of cashless payment instrument (credit
and debit cards23, cheques, credit transfers, direct debits and e–money) by volume. A
number of general trends are common to each country. Firstly, the share of cheques is
falling across the period considered in all cases. Secondly, the share of credit and debit
cards is growing in all cases except Germany and Singapore, although at a decreasing rate
(this could be seen as evidence that these technologies are in the late stages of sigmoid
adoption). Thirdly, credit transfers and direct debits account for a large proportion of
transactions by volume, and that proportion has remained relatively constant over the
sample period in most countries, with the notable exception of Singapore.
The plots differ most significantly with regard to the role of e–money. In the largest of
the three EA countries, e–money usage is negligible, while it is gradually growing in both
22In the data analyses based on the CPSS comparative tables, ‘neg’ (negligible) entries are replaced with
zero. Furthermore, ‘nap’ (not applicable) and ‘nav’ (not available) entries are computed by extrapolation
based on the 5 year growth rate where applicable. A detailed discussion of the data cleansing process may
be found in the Appendix.
23Further subdivision of this category is possible in the more recent CPSS surveys but the required data
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Figure 3.5: Outstanding Balances Relative to GDP (panels a-c) and per Capita (panels d-e, US$)
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Belgium and the Netherlands, accounting for 4.9% and 3.9% of all cashless payments in
2006 in each country, respectively. However, the most striking feature of Figure 3.6 is the
remarkably rapid expansion of e–money schemes in Singapore, the market share of which
has grown from 0.4% in 1997 to 84.2% in just nine years. This growth has come largely
at the expense of cheques, debit and credit cards.
The most rapid growth of the market share of e–money occurred in the year 2001-
2, coinciding with the government’s announcement of the SELT initiative. This episode
provides an example of the power of state–backing. Two of the greatest hurdles facing
e–money schemes are overcoming the lack of trust and achieving widespread acceptance
and interoperability. By announcing its plans for an electronic legal tender system, the
Singaporean government has increased the credibility of electronic payment media with its
end–users (the Congressional Budget Office, 1996, p. 45, makes a similar point concern-
ing the public issuance of e–money), and has provided an institutional framework around
which providers can rally, achieving greater integration and providing a unified service
environment. For its part, the government has propelled Singapore into the international
spotlight as a leading technological innovator and hopes to steal a march on its interna-
tional competitors in the provision of integrated electronic payment systems, a market
with massive growth potential. Furthermore, by moving toward an increasingly electronic
payments environment, the government may hope to reduce the costs associated with the
existing payments infrastructure and increase its efficiency (Low, 2002).
Figure 3.7 presents the share of each of the cashless payment media in terms of total
transaction value. Interestingly, credit transfers dominate in all countries with the ex-
ception of Germany, where direct debits account for a share of approximately 10%. The
share of credit transfers in Singapore is more than 95% on average across the sample24,
with e–money accounting for just 0.2%. The dominance of credit transfers results from
their use in large value transactions and also reflects the nature of the large value transfer
systems, in which all transactions above a threshold value are settled electronically in this
way.
24The Singaporean data on transactions values is adjusted to account for an apparent revision error or
anomaly that saw the value–share of cheques in 2002 revised from 3.8% to 78.1%. The data for 2003-2006
was constructed by extrapolation of the original (unrevised) series using the growth rates of the revised
series under the assumption that the pattern should be similar despite the apparent rescaling of the series.
The value–shares of the four other payment mechanisms were then recalculated to be consistent with the
new series.















































































Figure 3.6: Relative Importance of Cashless Payment Instruments by Transaction Volume
(percentage of total)














































































(f) Singapore (accounting for data revision)
Figure 3.7: Relative Importance of Cashless Instruments by Transaction Value Measured
in USD (%)
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Number of Cards by Category
Figure 3.8 compares the number of cards issued in terms of their functionality. The data
covers three classes of cards: cash cards, debit cards and e–money cards (i.e. hardware–
based e–money schemes). The number of cards in circulation provides an indication of the
degree of access to each payment instrument, as well as a measure of public awareness of,
and interest in, each product25.
Firstly, it is apparent that the proliferation of e–money cards has been very uneven
between countries, with France and Italy displaying delayed adoption and the remaining
four countries experiencing different patterns of growth. Among the remaining European
countries, there has been a tendency toward stagnation after rapid growth in the late
nineties, whereas Singaporean growth accelerated markedly with the announcement of the
SELT initiative in 2001.
Around the turn of the millennium, the number of e–money cards in circulation in the
Netherlands briefly equalled the number of debit cards, a feat not since repeated in any
European country. By contrast, the number of e–money cards in Singapore exceeded the
number of debit cards in 1999, before the major acceleration of e–money growth, and has
now reached a relatively stable level at approximately one and a half times the number of
debit cards.
The Singaporean data suggests that there are approximately three e–money cards
per head of population in Singapore. However, if one accounts appropriately for the
demographics of the population, there are probably at least five e–money cards per adult
in Singapore, indicating that these cards perform different functions. In light of this, the
recent cessation of growth in the issuance of e–money cards may be interpreted as evidence
that the degree of interoperability of Singaporean e–money schemes is increasing (i.e. that
fewer cards are required to perform the same number of functions).
Belgium and Italy are the only EA countries in the sample where the gap between the
number of debit cards and the number of e–money cards in circulation is closing. Indeed,
these are the only EA countries in which the number of e–money cards seems to be growing
significantly.
25Unfortunately, the coverage of the CPSS surveys in terms of credit card usage statistics is relatively
limited and so this category is omitted. The same is true for delayed debit/charge cards. Note that there
is likely to be a considerable degree of double counting between cash cards and debit cards. The spread
reflects credit cards with a cash function as well as cash cards without a debit function.
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Figure 3.8: Number of Cards per Million Inhabitants by Function
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ATMs and E–Money Loading Terminals
Figure 3.9 plots the number of automated telling machines (ATMs) and e–money load-
ing terminals (ELTs) per million head of population. The purpose of ATMs and ELTs
is essentially similar. ATMs are used to increase an agent’s stock of cash (notes and,
indirectly, coins) for use largely in purchase transactions26. Similarly, ELTs are used to
increase the stock of e–monetary value held on an e–money device for use primarily in
purchase transactions. In this sense, the relative number of ATMs and ELTs provides an
indication of the shoeleather costs associated with each means of payment.
Among the EA countries, the proportion of ELTs relative to ATMs is small and even
negligible in some cases (especially Italy). The only exception is Belgium, where the
ratio briefly exceeded 30% in 2003 and has been non–negligible throughout the sample.
Unfortunately, ELT data is not available for Singapore, although the number of ATMs
has been gradually declining (panel (f)) which may reflect a degree of substitution away
from cash in favour of e–money.
Given the shortage of ELTs relative to ATMs, certainly in the EA countries, it may
be reasonably inferred from the simple Baumol–Tobin framework that agents must hold
larger e–money balances than cash balances in order to carry out their day–to–day trans-
actions without incurring higher shoeleather costs. Given that neither e–money nor cash
balances are interest bearing, the necessity to hold a larger average balance of e–money
implies that its user–cost is higher than that of cash. If one assumes that the attributes of
the two payment systems are essentially similar, then this observation provides an unam-
biguously continuing role for cash and suggests that there is no business case for e–money.
However, as e–money is currently in relatively widespread use in a number of countries,
it follows that it possesses unique attributes that induce a willingness to pay on the part
of the consumer. These attributes include the removal of the ‘exact change’ problem, the
increased efficiency associated with contactless card technology (i.e. time savings through
reduced queueing), increased security relative to cash and the potential for remote use
(e.g. for internet purchases).
Point–of–Sale and E–Money Purchase Terminals
Unlike the situation regarding the e–money loading infrastructure discussed above, e–
money purchase terminals (EPTs) are gradually gaining ground relative to the established
POS infrastructure in the larger European economies, with the possible exception of France
26Of course, cash may also be held as a store of wealth (although it performs this role badly in an
inflationary environment) and for speculative reasons, although the assumption that its dominant role is
in exchange seems relatively innocuous.










97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
ATMs E-money loading terminals










97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06










97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06











97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06









97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06









97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
ATMs
(f) Singapore
Figure 3.9: Number of ATMs and E–Money Loading Terminals per Million Inhabitants
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(see Figure 3.10). The installed POS and EPT capacity in Belgium and the Netherlands
is comparable, while in Singapore there have been more EPTs than POS terminals since
2001. An interesting trend which seems to be emerging in Singapore and, to a lesser
degree, in the Netherlands and Belgium, is that the number of EPTs and POS terminals
have come to track one another increasingly closely. This may be due to the adoption of
multi–purpose purchase terminals that can accept payment from debit, credit and e–money
cards.
In general, by comparing Figures 3.9 and 3.10, it is clear that access to e–money
loading and unloading facilities seems to be in greater relative shortage than access to
e–money purchase facilities, in the EA at least. The observation that, in some cases,
EPTs outnumber POS terminals is, perhaps, not surprising given that many e–money
schemes often provide either single–purpose or simple multi–purpose products where the
range of uses is limited. Considered in this way, the apparent wealth of e–money purchase
terminals may simply reflect a lack of interoperability. As has already been discussed,
payments technology exhibits extreme network effects and the concept of interoperability
is inextricably linked to that of liquidity. Hence, the apparent lack of coordination is both
a serious impediment to the further development of electronic payment media, as well as
a potentially profitable opportunity for existing firms and new entrants alike.
The effects of the announcement of the SELT initiative by the Singaporean government
in 2001 can be discussed in either of two ways. Firstly, it could be argued that SELT was a
response to the growing market share of e–money in Singapore prior to 2001 and that the
government may have wished both to promote this growth and to regulate it for reasons
of systemic security. If one subscribes to this reactionist view, there is little need for
electronic legal tender laws in the EA because e–money usage in the EA countries is not
even approaching the levels observed in Singapore in 2001.
The SELT initiative may also have been motivated by a desire to promote the growth
and development of the new technology by increasing the credibility of the new payment
instruments and providing a common framework around which service providers could
coordinate, increasing interoperability. Given the relatively early stage of development of
e–money systems in Europe, the European Commission faces a trade–off. One may argue
that the deployment of a comprehensive regulatory framework risks stifling innovation27.
Alternatively, it could be argued that a carefully crafted policy outlining common stan-
dards for the industry could provide a nexus for coordination that could act as a catalyst
to growth.
27There are some signs that the current legislation may already be having this effect - this is discussed
in detail in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.10: Number of POS and E–Money Purchase Terminals per Million Inhabitants
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3.6 Forecasting the Future Growth of E–Money
The only serious attempts at forecasting the degree of uptake of e–money to date have
taken the form of simple substitution models in which e–money is assumed to compete with
cash for use in transactions below a certain threshold value (c.f. Boeschoten and Hebbink,
1996; Bounie and Soriano, 2003). The usefulness of such models is limited due to the
strength of the assumptions upon which they rely. For example, it is typically assumed
that the only payment instruments available for small transactions are cash and e–money.
While this may be a relatively innocuous simplification for genuinely small transactions,
the thresholds that are commonly discussed in the literature are ¤10 and ¤30 which
provide scope for other forms of payment including credit cards, debit cards and cheques.
In light of the data presented above which clearly demonstrates that e–money competes
with other forms of cashless payment instrument as well as cash, this assumption becomes
untenable. Moreover, the assumption that the probability of carrying out a transaction
with cash as opposed to e–money is time–invariant is inconsistent with Rogers’s sigmoid
adoption hypothesis.
To date, no data–driven forecasts of e–money adoption and usage have been made
publicly available for the Euro Area. However, the ECB has provided an e–monetary
aggregate at a monthly frequency since 1997m9. Using this data, it is possible to forecast
the growth of outstanding e–money balances. The Baumol–Tobin framework discussed
above suggests that these outstanding balances are likely to be small on average because
e–money bears a zero nominal interest rate (and therefore a negative real interest rate of
-π/ (1 + π), where π is the rate of inflation). However, if the stock of e–monetary value
outstanding is closely related to the volume of transactions carried out using e–money,
then one can draw inferences about the degree of usage of e–money. This assumption
seems relatively innocuous in the short–term. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows
that, between 2002 and 2006, the ratio of e–money/M2 to billions of e–money purchase
transactions has been approximately constant at 2.14x10−4 and that the two series are
strongly positively correlated (ρ = 0.937)28. This approach has the advantage that high
frequency data on e–money balances outstanding may be used to compute sophisticated
forecasts which may then be used to draw inferences about series for which no such data is
available (data on transaction volumes is only available annually since 2000 for the Euro
Area, for example). Moreover, these inferences do not rely on strong assumptions about
the nature of the substitution of e–money for other forms of payment.
28Data on the volume of e–money purchase transactions in Europe comes from the Eurostat series
PSS.A.U2.F000.IEM.Z00Z.NT.X0.20.Z0Z.Z.
3.6. FORECASTING THE FUTURE GROWTH OF E–MONEY 81
Three different forecast models are considered. Firstly, a simple geometric random walk
model is estimated as a benchmark against which the performance of the other models
may be evaluated. Secondly, a simple model–averaging exercise is undertaken in order to
account for model uncertainty and to sharpen the resulting forecasts. Finally, the sigmoid
adoption hypothesis is tested by fitting a Gompertz curve to the data.
3.6.1 The Dataset
The following variables are considered for use in the multivariate forecasting models:
Symbol Variable definition
mhp Log of e–money balances outstanding relative to M2
c Log of currency in circulation relative to M2
d Log of demand deposits relative to M2
y Log of real industrial production
r Log of the 1 month Euribor
z Log of the technology index
q Log of the deflated NASDAQ adjusted closing price
Table 3.2: Variable Definitions
All series are seasonally–adjusted with the exception of the technology index which is
interpolated from annual data (see the Appendix for details). E–monetary value outstand-
ing, currency in circulation and demand deposits are expressed as a fraction of M2 so that
the development of e–money schemes may be discussed in terms of market penetration
rather than simply aggregate value outstanding. The ECB reports the stock of e–money
as an overnight deposit, a category conventionally included in the M1 aggregate. However,
given that e–money is theoretically a multiple of currency and deposits (the multiplier is
currently set at 1 but this need not remain the case in the long–term) it seems more ap-
propriate to consider the stock of e–money relative to M2. Table 3.3 provides descriptive
statistics. Unit root testing (the results of which are presented in the Appendix) reveals
that all series are I(1).
The series mhp is smoothed using the method of Hodrick and Prescott (1997) in order
to remove the high frequency noise characterising the raw data. This noise does not
reflect pure seasonal variation as both component series (e–money and M2) are seasonally
adjusted. Rather, it is a result of trial schemes and promotional activities which are not
strictly relevant for forecasting the trend growth of the e–money stock. Minimal smoothing
is employed so that the noise is attenuated while retaining as much of the informational
content of the raw data as possible. Hence, the smoothing parameter λ is set to 14,400,
the figure typically associated with quarterly data. This is considerably lower than the
value of 126,400 recommended for monthly data by the frequency rule of Ravn and Uhlig
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mhp c d y r z q
Mean -9.886 -2.449 -0.904 4.562 1.156 4.881 3.999
Median -9.826 -2.412 -0.889 4.559 1.208 5.029 3.945
Maximum -9.278 -2.352 -0.764 4.623 1.598 5.560 4.849
Minimum -10.828 -2.817 -1.136 4.524 0.714 3.551 3.403
Std. Dev. 0.457 0.099 0.100 0.022 0.289 0.562 0.280
Skewness -0.293 -1.399 -0.578 0.799 -0.218 -0.878 0.917
Kurtosis 1.833 4.155 2.458 3.290 1.656 2.642 4.190
Jarque–Bera 9.171 49.272 8.772 14.171 10.725 17.248 25.688
Probability 0.010 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000
Sum -1275.350 -315.882 -116.662 588.467 149.075 629.633 515.855
Sum Dev.2 26.711 1.261 1.269 0.063 10.671 40.371 10.039
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
(2002), and results in considerably reduced smoothing. The smoothed and raw series are
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Figure 3.11: Hodrick–Prescott Filtering of E–Money Relative to M2 (λ = 14, 400)
3.6.2 The Benchmark Case: A Geometric Random Walk Model
The geometric random walk model is appropriate for series exhibiting exponential growth.
The model is defined as follows:
lnYt = β0 + β1lnYt−1 + ǫt (3.1)
Due to its simplicity and relatively robust forecasting performance, the random walk
model is used as a benchmark against which to evaluate the alternative specifications.
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3.6.3 Model Averaging
In recent years, much applied forecasting work has employed various model averaging tech-
niques in the Bayesian tradition in order to reduce the problems associated with model un-
certainty and to sharpen the resulting forecasts. The principle difference between Bayesian
econometrics and the frequentist approach is that the matrix of model parameters, θ, is
treated as a random variable. Given a number of models, Mi, i = 1, 2, ...,m, which span
the model space, one may calculate the posterior model probability which permits optimal
weighting of these m models in the averaging process.
Here, a simplified version of the general Bayesian framework is employed in which
models are averaged using the simple arithmetic mean with equal weights. This case is
often used as a benchmark against which more sophisticated Bayesian systems may be
judged and has the advantage that it is valid even when the ‘true’ model is not among the
candidate set. The m component models will be:
AR Models AR(p) including the benchmark geometric random walk model;
ARIMA Models integrated ARIMA(p,d,q) models;
VAR Models p-th order VAR–in–differences models using the regressors in Table 3.2;
VEC Models p-th order cointegrating VARmodels using Johansen’s (1991) exactly iden-
tifying restrictions.
Every combination of the models containing up to four lags is considered, resulting in
m = 2829. The computation of forecast intervals in the case of model averaging is non–
trivial. The most obvious method is to generate bootstrap samples from the residuals of
each model independently and use these to compute intervals for each of the candidate
models. The resulting 28 pairs of intervals could then be averaged to yield the forecast
interval for the model as a whole. An alternative method is to generate bootstrap samples
from the residuals of the average model, and then re–estimate every component model
for these samples which are common for all candidate models. In this way, the average
model could be generated for each bootstrap replication, thereby generating an empirical
distribution of forecasts from which the relevant intervals could be easily computed. How-
ever, these approaches are unlikely to yield the same result, and it is not clear which is
preferable. Given this uncertainty, the computation of forecast intervals for the average
model is left for future work.
29The cointegrating VAR models are estimated with five cointegrating vectors based on the Johansen
trace statistic.
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3.6.4 Forecasting from a Simple Sigmoid Specification
The model averaging exercise undertaken above accounts for model uncertainty in a simple
but effective manner. However, it does not provide any obvious means by which the
sigmoid adoption hypothesis may be examined. Among the class of sigmoid functions, the
Gompertz function stands out for its simplicity and ease in estimation. The Gompertz
curve is defined as:
yt = αe
−βeγt (3.2)
where α denotes the saturation level, γ the rate of growth, β is a positive parameter
determining the lateral position of the curve and t is a deterministic trend.
Franses (1994) provides a method for fitting a Gompertz curve based on simple es-
timation of a single equation using non–linear least squares (NLS), and where the coef-
ficients and standard errors can be computed in the normal manner. By a process of
log–linearisation, first differencing, further log–linearisation, and the addition of an id-
iosyncratic error term, Franses transforms equation 3.2 into the following form:
ln (∆lnyt) = −γt+ ln (βe
γ − β) + ǫt (3.3)
The upper asymptote, α, is then estimated by substituting the parameter estimates





Forecast errors and confidence intervals may then be computed by non–parametric
bootstrapping. The boostrapping procedure involves the construction of B error series ǫ∗(b)
by resampling with replacement from the residuals from initial estimation of equation 3.3.
Using the parameter estimates βˆ and γˆ, one may then compute the series y∗(b) associated
with each of these error series using:
y
∗(b)







Equation 3.3 is then re–estimated on each of the B simulated datasets. For each of
the models estimated in this way, forecasts ŷ(b)t+h may be generated over the horizon
30Franses (1994) assumes that α is constant so that it may be removed in the process of first–differencing.
Estimates of α derived from equations 3.3 and 3.4 tend to support this assumed constancy. Note also that
the Newey–West procedure is employed to adjust for the apparent serial correlation of the error process in
equation 3.3.
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to yield ŷ(b)t+h = e
lnŷ(b)t+h−1+e
ŷ∗(b)t
which is easily solved using the value yT for initial-
isation. Forecast intervals are then retrieved as the relevant percentiles of the empirical
distribution. Once again, more detail is provided in the Appendix.
In his original application, Franses fits the model to smoothed data. In the present
application, such smoothing has the appealing feature that it renders the first difference
strictly positive, avoiding the indeterminacy of the left–hand–side of equation 3.3 that
would result from attempting to take the log of a negative number.
3.6.5 Pseudo Out–of–Sample Forecasting
The forecasting performance of each of the models may be evaluated in the usual manner
by pseudo out–of–sample testing. The sample period used in estimation is restricted to
1997m9-2007m5 while the remaining 12 observations are reserved for comparison against
the forecasts. Figure 3.12 plots the pseudo out–of–sample forecasts derived from each
model. It is immediately apparent that all models have a tendency to over predict to
some degree but that the average model performs considerably better than either the
benchmark or the Gompertz specifications. Furthermore, the similarity of the Gompertz
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Figure 3.12: Pseudo Out–of–Sample Forecasts
Table 3.4 provides analytical statistics for each of the three models. The root–mean–
squared forecast error (RMSFE) and mean absolute forecast error (MAFE) are of com-
parable magnitude for the benchmark and Gompertz models but considerably smaller in
the case of the average model. Furthermore, the mean absolute forecast percentage error
(MAFPE) of the average model is less than one seventh that of the random walk model,
indicating considerably superior forecasting performance.
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Benchmark Average Gompertz
RMSFE 2.87x10−6 4.56x10−7 2.80x10−6
MAFE 2.51x10−6 3.58x10−7 2.44x10−6
MAFPE 2.710 0.387 2.640
Theil Inequality Coef. 0.015 2.38x10−5 0.015
Bias proportion 0.762 0.617 0.762
Variance proportion 0.237 0.365 0.238
Covariance proportion 3.65x10−4 0.018 3.79x10−4
Table 3.4: Pseudo Out–of–Sample Forecast Analysis
The Theil Inequality Coefficient of the average model is considerably smaller than those
of the other models, again indicating a superior forecast (a value of zero indicates a perfect
fit). In all cases, however, the bias and variance proportions are substantial, reflecting the
persistent over–prediction of the forecasts. Ideally, the covariance proportion should be
dominant as it reflects the unsystematic errors in forecasting.
3.6.6 Dynamic Out–of–Sample Forecasting
Simple h–step ahead dynamic interval forecasts are computed for both the average model
and the Gompertz specification over the 60 months between 2008m6 and 2013m5. These
may be compared to those derived from the benchmark geometric random walk model.
Benchmark Random Walk Forecast
The forecast from the geometric random walk model is plotted in Figure 3.13(a) with
analytical standard errors. The logarithmic approximation to the annualised rate of growth
is presented in Figure 3.13(b). This simple benchmark case suggests a slowly decreasing
growth path of the ratio of e–money to M2 over a five year horizon. Indeed, the rate of
growth is forecast to fall below 4% in 2013m5. The model achieves an adjusted R2 of 1.000
to 3d.p. and has a near–unit AR coefficient of 0.990.
Average Forecast
The average forecast is plotted in Figure 3.14. The model indicates that the rate of growth
of e–money as a fraction of M2 is likely to increase over a five year horizon, exceeding 7%
per annum by 2013. These figures are considerably more optimistic than the benchmark
case. It is interesting to note that the forecast rate of growth is considerably smoother
than either the benchmark or the Gompertz forecasts (i.e. there is no spike at 2008m6).
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Gompertz Forecast
The forecasts from the Gompertz curve are presented in Figure 3.15, including standard
errors derived from non–parametric bootstrapping with 500 iterations. The model achieves
an adjusted R2 value of 0.670. The h–step ahead levels forecasts suggest that the rate of
growth of e–money relative to M2 will decelerate over the five year horizon, falling below
3% by 2013m1. This is the most pessimistic of the forecasts, suggesting that the adoption
of e–money technology may be in the latter stages of the sigmoid process.
The parameters β and γ are estimated as 1.909 and 0.012 respectively and both are
highly statistically significant. β measures the lateral position of the curve and reflects
the duration of the initial low adoption phase. γ measures the rate of growth of the curve.
The mean saturation level α̂ across the sample is 0.013% of M2. While this seems rather
low at first sight, it must be remembered that e–money is destroyed in the process of
being spent and so the outstanding balance is simply that which has been pre–loaded but
not yet spent. The estimated saturation level does not greatly exceed the present level,
indicating a rather limited scope for the development of e–money in the future (at least to
the extent that the relationship between e–monetary value outstanding and transactions
volume remains constant in the short–run).
The forecasts derived from the various models provide support for a range of scenarios
concerning the growth of e–money. As the model which performed best in pseudo out–of–
sample testing, it seems logical to place somewhat more faith in the average forecast than
in either the random walk or Gompertz forecasts. Even though this is the most optimistic
of the forecasts, indicating growth reaching 7% per annum by 2013m5, the figure remains
relatively modest. With growth occuring at this rate it seems unlikely that the EC will be
forced to reconsider its regulatory framework by sweeping change in the payments system,
certainly in the foreseeable future (i.e. if one subscribes to the reactionist view then there
is no case for regulatory change at this time). However, the EC may choose to change its
regulatory framework precisely because of these uninspiring growth prospects, in an effort
to foster growth and innovation.
3.7 Longer–Term Prospects of E–Money Systems
The forecasting exercises undertaken above indicate that the degree of adoption and usage
of e–money technologies will grow moderately but uninspiringly in the medium–term. In
the longer–term, the prospects of these innovative payments technologies depend critically
on three issues: (i.) the incentives for end–users and issuers; (ii.) security issues and the
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potential for identity theft; and (iii.) developments in the capabilities of e–money systems.
i. Incentives
Three key groups may be identified in the e–money market: the issuers and the end–users,
comprising both merchants and their customers (Wenninger and Laster, 1995). In order
for e–money to succeed, the incentives for each group must be sufficiently strong. In an
early contribution, Friedman (1999, p. 329) recognises the importance of these incentives:
[a]s long as taking deposits and providing payment services is a source of
profit for banks, bank customers - like telephone companies, New York’s MTA
[Metropolitan Transport Authority] or the merchants whom the MTA would
like to induce to use its cards - have an incentive to recoup some of their costs
by undertaking a form of this activity themselves. And to the extent that they
can pass on some of what they recoup to their own customers, individuals will
have an incentive to use these alternative payment vehicles just as non–bank
firms will have an incentive to provide them31
The incentives for the issuers of e–money are relatively clear. As Friedman notes, to
the extent that banks charge fees for their services, non–banks will attempt to avoid paying
them or, better still, to appropriate some of the rent that would otherwise accrue to the
bank. Similar logic can be applied to the central bank. If e–money were to substitute
entirely for currency, the private sector would capture the seigniorage revenue OCd from
the central bank in Figure 3.2. Given such incentives, it is likely that both banks and
non–bank financial institutions will continue developing innovative payment systems.
While the incentives for service providers are clear, the incentives for merchants and
consumers are less so. Friedman’s optimistic view outlined above suggests that those
merchants that engage in e–money issuance may make cost savings and may choose to
pass some of their savings on to their customers. However, in the first instance, it is
unclear whether they would actually pass them on. Secondly, and more fundamentally,
only a limited proportion of merchants are likely to enter the e–money market as issuers;
the majority are likely to remain simple merchants. In order to accept electronic payments,
merchants will have to invest in the relevant infrastructure, an outlay which represents a
fixed cost which may be relatively high32. Furthermore, the costs associated with training
31The implication that deposit–taking is a source of profit for depository institutions is somewhat mis-
leading, as it actually represents a cost. The profit accrues indirectly through the lending operations of
banks which maintain a spread between their deposit and lending rates.
32Low (2002, p. 154) provides a breakdown of the costs associated with an e–money trial in Singapore
in which each terminal cost S$200.
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staff to use the technology may be non–negligible. In order for merchants to be willing
to bear these costs, they must expect to derive quantifiable benefits. In businesses that
rely on providing a quick, efficient and convenient service, these benefits may derive from
increased trade resulting from the increased efficiency of e–money (particularly contactless
card technology) relative to payment with cash. Furthermore, given that e–money schemes
eliminate the costs associated with handling and securing cash, the marginal cost to the
merchant may be lower.
Finally, the incentives for the consumer must be considered. The cost of e–money
to the consumer is typically positive. Many contemporary e–money schemes charge ad-
ministrative fees and sometimes a commission on purchases (for example Giannopoulou,
2004, reports a 0.9% commission on Moneo transactions in France). Although it is true
that there are costs associated with all payment systems, the customer is often unaware
of them, as they are typically borne by the service provider. Hence, the user costs of e–
money may actually prove higher than those of many other payment vehicles. The critical
issue is the willingness of consumers to pay for the benefits afforded to them by e–money.
Wenninger and Laster (1995, p. 2) note a willingness to pay among US consumers of be-
tween 2 and 5 cents per transaction, or an equivalent annual fee. Provided that the value
attached to the benefits derived from e–money exceeds the costs imposed by the issuers,
consumers will adopt the new technology.
Irrespective of the willingness to pay, in some situations individuals may be obliged
to use a specific means of payment. Examples include the requirement to use stored
value cards to pay for parking in Paris (Giannopoulou, 2004) and in a number of cities
in the Netherlands (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2002, p. 24) and for toll roads in Singapore
(Van Hove, 2003). In such situations, the consumer has a simple choice between using the
new technology and bearing the associated costs or excluding themselves from these ser-
vices. Such initiatives exploit a little–known feature of legal tender laws in these countries
whereby legal tender need not necessarily be accepted in exchange, merely in extinguish-
ing existing debts (Van Hove, 2003, pp. 5-6). Of course, one may question whether it is
ethical to impose e–money usage in this manner, but the fact remains that such policies
will have significant impacts on public attitudes toward the new technology.
A common theme that pervades the preceding discussion is that of cost. A key factor
in determining the extent to which a new product will displace an existing competitor is
its relative cost (in the case of e–money, this is composed of two parts, namely the cost
of its implementation and of its subsequent use). Meyer (2001b, p. 7) and Stefanadis
(2002) show that while the costs of operating an e–money system are very low, the initial
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fixed costs incurred in development and implementation are substantial. This suggests
that while the marginal cost of e–money usage is presumably lower than that of cash
(which is positive due to the expenses incurred in its transport, storage, counting etc.), its
average cost is likely to be higher until it becomes sufficiently widely used. Overcoming
this average cost barrier poses a problem: e–money schemes must achieve a critical mass
before retailers will accept payment in e–money, and consumers demand for e–money will
remain low until a sufficiently large number of retailers accept the new technology. Thus,
there is a ‘chicken–and–egg’ problem (Van Hove, 1999a; Stefanadis, 2002; Krueger, 2002b).
ii. Security Issues and Identity Theft
E–money is, in principle, more secure than cash for the end–user. If one loses an SVC,
for instance, it is possible to cancel the card and recover any unspent e–monetary value.
However, as already mentioned, counterfeiting could be a serious problem for e–money
schemes as it is possible to produce a perfect, indistinguishable copy of an electronic
image. Moreover, to the extent that online systems are vulnerable to hacking, remote theft
is possible, adding to the complex task of securing the new payments technology. Finally,
the fact that e–money schemes rely on computer networks suggests that viruses may be
a further significant threat to security, whether deliberately targeted or otherwise. These
security issues are likely to significantly shape the future development of e–money schemes
(particularly network money) not simply because of concerns over monetary losses, but
also due to the potential for identity theft. The issue of identity theft is likely to be
exacerbated by the use of multi–purpose cards which incorporate a range of non–money
functions. A prime example of this is the Malaysian Government Multi–purpose Card
which combines stored–value functionality with an ID card, drivers license, passport and
health records (Van Hove, 2003, pp. 15-16).
None of these security threats are insurmountable, they simply suggest that e–money
issuers are likely to have to invest heavily in advanced encryption technologies and security
software. Given public scepticism about the security of online systems in many countries,
it is likely that firms will compete to some degree to offer the most secure service, or may
use security to achieve product differentiation once the market becomes more developed.
iii. Developments in the Capabilities of E–Money Schemes
As mentioned above, the payments system is an extreme example of a network industry.
The largest obstacle to the success of e–money schemes at the present time is their lack of
interoperability. Until e–money systems are fully interoperable, e–money will not become
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widely accepted as a medium of exchange. The expectation of increased interoperability in
Singapore following the announcement of SELT in 2001 provided a substantial impetus to
the industry. While it is possible that e–money issuers will develop interoperable systems
of their own accord without government intervention, it seems likely that there is a role
for government in providing a basic framework around which issuers can coordinate.
The market for electronic payments is becoming increasingly competitive and dynamic.
The growing interest of mobile telecommunications providers in e–payments solutions has
led to rapid developments in m–payments technologies. Furthermore, the development
of contactless smart–card technology has greatly increased the convenience of e–money
relative to traditional means of payment. Continuing investment in such areas is likely to
increase public interest in the new technology.
Finally, although e–money schemes are prevented from paying interest in many coun-
tries (although significantly not in Singapore) and from the extension of credit in most (if
not all) countries, the record of private firms circumventing such regulations where a prof-
itable opportunity presents itself is well established. Many e–money schemes are already
paying de facto interest in a form of lottery, a practice acknowledged by the FSA (see
Section 4.2.1). Such circumventive innovations provide fresh challenges for policy–makers
on the one hand, and on the other they provide fresh opportunities for both firms and
consumers.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
E–money became a high profile topic at the turn of the millennium due to the proposed
threat that it posed to the efficacy of monetary policy and the stability of the payments
system. Once the debate concerning this threat had been largely settled, research interest
in e–money dwindled. However, with the imminent launch of electronic legal tender in
Singapore and the proliferation of prepaid smart–cards in many countries around the
world, the subject is once again becoming topical. Furthermore, the ongoing development
of the Single European Payments Area (SEPA) is providing a largely unprecedented forum
for the discussion of issues relating to the design and regulation of (cross–border) electronic
payments systems.
A number of regulatory challenges present themselves as a result of the development of
e–money systems. Among the most serious are the possibility of bank runs, circumventive
innovation, misreporting of macroeconomic statistics, systemic risks, social exclusion and
the erosion of privacy. The extent to which these issues may be judged to be important
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depends on the degree to which the new technology is used and is likely to be adopted in
the future. Comparison of the retail payments systems in the Euro Area and Singapore
reveals that e–money usage in Europe is significantly less pronounced than in Singapore.
Moreover, it is clear that there are significant regional disparities between EU member
states. The forecasting exercises carried out in Section 3.6 suggest that e–money usage will
continue to grow at a moderate rate in the Euro Area as a whole but that the probability
of a significant shift toward increased electronification of the payments system is unlikely
in the medium–term. In light of this, the EC may consider that e–money is not a threat at
present and that its existing regulatory framework is sufficient. Alternatively, it may take
a more proactive position and engage in regulatory reform to promote the development of
electronic payments technology in a manner similar to the Singaporean government.
In the longer–term, regulatory reform is inevitable. Given the strong incentives for
innovative firms to enter the market and attempt to circumvent the regulation, there is
likely to be a regulatory ‘arms–race’ between the regulator on the one hand, and issuing
firms on the other. In particular, the nature of the implicit multiplier between reserve
assets and e–monetary value outstanding is likely to change substantially as both parties
learn about the nature of the market. It seems likely that the reserve asset portfolios of
issuers will come to contain less cash as estimates of the demand for redemption become
increasingly precise. This will result in portfolios skewed toward less liquid assets with a
higher rate of return. It is likely that such evolutions will lead to the establishment of a
fractional–reserve system similar to those currently operated by banks. These and other
regulatory issues are the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The Regulation of E–Money
4.1 Introduction
Given the fundamental importance of a well–functioning and secure payments system, both
at the national and international level, the issue of the regulation of e–money schemes has
received a great deal of attention. The nature of the legislative environment varies from
country to country and reflects both the relative importance of the e–money in the broader
economy and the attitude of the regulators towards such innovative enterprises.
The previous chapter presented statistics which demonstrate that e–money usage is
considerably more deeply embedded in the Singaporean economy than in that of the
European Union. The regulatory stance of the respective governments of these regions
was identified among a number of factors that may explain this difference. This chapter
will demonstrate that the proposed regulatory framework in Singapore is more conducive
to innovation that those of either the EU or the US. Hence, the European and American
authorities will be well advised to closely monitor the progress of the Singaporean legal
tender experiment and must remain open to the adoption of similar policies should the
need arise.
In the longer–term, the need for a unified international regulatory framework accom-
panied by a set of common technological standards is clear if e–money usage is to expand
across national boundaries. The BIS already monitors the state of payments systems in
a number of countries and has published guidance on a variety of important issues for
electronic payments systems. Considered alongside its central position in the regulation
of banking activities, the BIS is the natural candidate for the role of coordinator of such
an international accord.
This chapter progresses in five sections. Firstly, Section 4.2 offers a detailed discussion
of the regulatory frameworks in place the EU and the US and of the Singaporean proposals.
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Furthermore, a crude comparison of the three is provided. Section 4.3 discusses some of
the characteristics of an optimal regulatory approach to e–money and attempts to balance
the need for systemic security against the reduction in innovation with which stringent
regulation may be associated. Section 4.4 discusses two important considerations for the
future; the benefits associated with extension of the lender of last resort facility to e–
money issuers and the impact of potential evolutions in the nature of the asset portfolios
backing e–monetary value. Section 4.5 offers some concluding remarks and advocates an
active role for the BIS in promoting international interoperability.
4.2 The Current Regulatory Framework
The regulation of e–money is being approached from a number of angles in different
parts of the world. One of the most liberal, laissez–faire regimes is that of the US. This
contrasts markedly with the early regulation approach of the EU (Krueger, 2002a). The
most extreme case is undoubtedly that of Singapore where the MAS intends to issue e–
monetary value with the status of legal tender in the near future, and where the government
is actively engaged in the provision of common technical standards for e–money systems.
These three frameworks are now briefly reviewed.
4.2.1 E–Money Regulation in Europe
In 1994, the European Monetary Institute (EMI, the predecessor of the ECB) raised three
concerns about the development of electronic purses: firstly, the potential for e–money to
damage consumer confidence in the payment mechanism; secondly, that the development of
e–money may hamper the implementation of monetary policy by conventional means; and,
lastly, that the substitution of e–money for cash may affect the ‘activities and revenues’
of member central banks. Paragraphs 41-2 in the report develop rather unconvincingly on
this last point, concluding merely that central banks may need to evaluate their banknote
‘printing and handling activities’ as the new technology develops, and that the reduction
in the use of banknotes resulting from the adoption of the new technology would lead to a
reduction in central bank revenues. This last point would have little effect on the actions
of central banks given that they are not bound by constraints of profitability.
It was the opinion of the EMI that “the money received by the issuer of an electronic
purse is a bank deposit” (EMI, 1994, ¶31) and, therefore, that the issuance of electronic
purses should be limited to credit institutions. Given their concerns, the Institute advo-
cated early regulation of the new technology. Despite the emphasis on gentle regulation
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in the 1998 draft of the directive on e–money1, the final version published on October
27, 2000 (European Commission, 2000c) after extensive consultation with the ECB and
industry figures represents a rigorous regulatory framework2.
Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 2000/46/EC offers the following definition of e–money
(European Commission, 2000c, p. 40):
‘electronic money’ shall mean monetary value as represented by a claim on the
issuer which is:
(i) stored on an electronic device;
(ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary
value issued;
(iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.
An additional feature of e–money not mentioned above but embodied in Article 3 of
the Directive is that it should be redeemable for government currency at par in order to
maintain the link between central bank money and commercial bank money. Koenraad
de Geest (Deputy Director General of the Payment Systems Directorate General at the
ECB) explains this point as follows:
For us it is essential that e–money is redeemable. That means that it can be
easily exchanged, at par, in central bank money. Without this redeemability
you risk to lose [sic] the link between central bank money and commercial
bank money. The functioning of the economy is based on the implicit...perfect
substitutability of commercial bank money and central bank money (de Geest,
2001, p. 8).
Krueger (2002a) argues that this redeemability criterion represents a concession to the
ECB. It is, however, noteworthy that the Commission rejected the recommendation of the
1994 EMI report that only credit institutions should be licensed to issue e–money and,
instead, created a new type of institution which may perform this role:
‘electronic money institution’ [ELMI] shall mean an undertaking or any other
legal person, other than a credit institution as defined in Article 1, point 1,
1This was due, in large part, to the view of the Commission that Europe may be able to steal a march
on the rest of the world in developing electronic payments and more broadly defined e–commerce and then
may be able to leverage these gains in promoting integration between the member states (Krueger, 2002a).
2E–money–related activities in the EU are actually governed by two directives, 2000/46/EC (hereafter
‘the Directive’) and also 2000/28/EC (European Commission, 2000b) which amends the definition of a
credit institution in Directive 2000/12/EC (European Commission, 2000a).
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first subparagraph (a) of Directive 2000/12/EC which issues means of payment
in the form of electronic money (Article 1(3)(a)).
In order to facilitate entry by non–banks into the e–money market and thereby promote
competition and innovation, ELMIs are not subject to the same strict regulations as
traditional credit institutions. The counterpart of this regulation is that ELMIs may not
engage in the extension of credit (Article 1(5)(a)).
Article 4 of the Directive requires that ELMIs have an initial capital of at least
¤1,000,000 and ongoing capital of at least the same amount or 2% of either the aver-
age or current level of their e–money liabilities over the preceding six months (whichever
is greater). Article 5 stresses that the liabilities of ELMIs must be 100% backed by
investments in financial assets, and states that these “investments...shall be subject to
limitations which are at least as stringent as those applying to credit institutions” (Article
5(2)).
Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive require that ELMIs report financial statistics twice
yearly and that they must exercise ‘prudence’ in their operation. Lastly, and significantly,
Article 8 introduces a waiver clause whereby national authorities can waive some or all of
the clauses of the Directive under certain circumstances (notably when the total liabilities
of the ELMI or their acceptability are limited).
To address the inherent transnationality of the institutional arrangements, the Com-
mission makes provision for ‘passporting’ whereby an ELMI licensed in one member state
may operate in the other member states as well. However, the responsibility for imple-
menting the Directive lies with the relevant authorities in the member states, each of which
has exercised some discretion, resulting in a degree of heterogeneity across countries (c.f.
The Evaluation Partnership, 2006).
In the UK, for instance, the issuance of e–money is regulated under the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The
definition of e–money under UK law omits item (ii) of the EC definition concerning issuance
of e–money at a discount (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2001, p. 4). The FSA and the Treasury
felt that this provided a loophole whereby e–monetary value issued at a discount would
not constitute e–money (see also Lelieveldt, 2001 and Krueger, 2002b). In response,
the FSA banned the issuance of e–money at a discount per se3. Furthermore, the FSA
(2002) imposed a purse limit of £1000 in order to limit the exposure of the bearer of
e–money to losses due to damage, loss or theft of their e–purse. Finally, ELMIs are
3ELMIs may sell e–monetary value to their customers at a discounted value in order to act as an
incentive on the condition that a third party makes up the value of the e–money float to 100% prior to the
issuance of the discounted value (Financial Services Authority, 2002, pp. 9-11; 2006, ELM4.4).
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again restricted from “granting any form of credit” and also from paying interest on their
liabilities (ELM4.3.2R and 4.3.7R).
4.2.2 E–Money Regulation in the US
The general approach to e–money regulation in the US may be well summarised as laissez–
faire; the authorities have proved reluctant to regulate the market early for fear that this
may stifle future development and innovation. There is, therefore, no specific legislation at
the Federal level (although there is a discretionary framework in place, as discussed below)
and e–money issuers are subject to state–level financial regulation (Ramasastry, 2001).
This cautious approach to regulation has resulted in a degree of heterogeneity between
states, and is likely to hinder issuers wishing to operate on a nationwide level. This is
likely to lead to a high level of undesirable market segmentation, reduced interoperability
and depressed investment in the new technology. Furthermore, the resulting concentration
of firms at the state level may act as a barrier to the entry of new firms, leading to the
proliferation of uncompetitive practices detrimental to social welfare.
Krueger (2002a) identifies the following six inputs into e–money regulation in the US:
i. the general concern of the Federal Reserve for the security of the payment system
and confidence therein;
ii. Federal Regulation E concerning electronic funds transfers;
iii. state money transmitter laws;
iv. state banking laws;
v. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and
vi. anti–money–laundering laws.
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) ratified
the Uniform Money Services Act (UMSA) in August 2000. Pichler (2001, pp. 16-17)
summarises the priorities of the UMSA as “(i) [p]roviding a harmonised and uniform legal
framework with respect to MSBs [money services businesses, a type of non–bank financial
institution]; (ii) ensuring the safety and soundness of MSBs; and (iii) reducing barriers to
competition and growth in new sectors such as emerging Internet and electronic payment
mechanisms”.
Unlike the Directive, the UMSA is concerned not just with e–money and its issuers but
with ‘monetary value’ and with any entity engaged in the provision of ‘money services’.
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The UMSA defines monetary value as “a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable
in money” (§102(11))4 where the term ‘medium of exchange’ implies that the monetary
value is accepted in transactions by a community consisting of more than two parties (§102,
comment no. 10)5. Similarly, ‘money services’ identifies a “group of entities that engage
in any of the following activities: money transmission, sale of payment instruments (i.e.
money orders, travellers’ cheques or stored value), check cashing and currency exchange”
(§102, comment no. 8). ‘Stored value’ refers to “monetary value that is evidenced by
an electronic record” (§102(21)). The UMSA views the flexibility of these definitions as
a positive attribute of the Act, although such vagaries in its drafting combined with its
discretionary nature are unlikely to yield a level playing field across the US.
The UMSA distinguishes between banks and MSBs in a manner similar to that of the
EC Directive, and does not impose banking regulations on MSBs (Pichler, 2001). MSBs
are not permitted to engage in deposit taking activities or the extension of commercial
loans. The UMSA requires that MSBs adhere to the following requirements at a minimum:
Licensing: MSBs must be licensed with the relevant authority in every state in which
they operate (§201). There is no passporting principle whereby a license granted in
any state is effective in all states.
Surety Bond: A ‘surety bond’ must be posted with the application for a license of
$50,000 plus $10,000 per additional location up to a maximum of $250,000 (§203(a)).
The purpose of this bond is to ensure that the MSB can continue to honour its obli-
gations to its customers in the event of insolvency or financial distress.
Net Worth: An MSB must maintain a net worth of at least $25,000 (§206). This amount
seems rather trivial although it must be considered alongside the surety bond and
prudential regime included in the UMSA.
Examination and Reporting: Sections 601 and 602 make provisions for the superin-
tendent and any other relevant authorities to examine the MSB. Sections 603, 605
and 606 outline the reporting and record–keeping requirements of MSBs.
Permissible Investments: A licensee must maintain a portfolio of permissible invest-
ments not less in value than the aggregate amount of their liabilities outstanding
(§701(a)). Permissible investments are defined in Article 7, Section 702 of the Act.
4Monetary value includes both stored value products and ‘internet scrip’ which represents non–
redeemable monetary value including bonus points and coupons. The implication of this is that it would
be infeasible to impose a redeemability requirement similar to Article 3 of the Directive.
5This provision excludes barter systems such as LETS and allows state–level regulatory bodies to
exercise discretion with regard to the inclusion of schemes with limited participation or geographical
dispersion.
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Even before the UMSA, some states had brought electronic payment systems under
their regulations governing money transmitters. Thus the UMSA was not enacted to
create a legal framework for the regulation of e–money where previously there was none.
The goal of the UMSA was to provide a degree of uniformity across states in order to
create a level playing field for the various types of MSB at a national level. To the extent
that the content and adoption of the UMSA is discretionary, it seems unlikely to succeed
in this endeavour. Moreover, the omission of a passporting principle is significant, as it
will impose costs on those firms wishing to operate on a national scale, leading to a highly
segmented market and preventing firms from realising the scale economies that could be
reaped by a national operation. Hence, the light–touch regulation undertaken in the US
may prove counter–productive and, far from promoting innovation and competition, may
actually hinder both.
4.2.3 The Singaporean Proposals
The case of Singapore is interesting not because of its current regulatory environment but
because of its proposed reforms. For this reason, I will offer only a brief discussion of the
core principles of the current framework and will concentrate instead on the forthcoming
changes.
E–money in Singapore is regulated by the Payments Systems (Oversight) Act 2006
(PSOA). The PSOA distinguishes between single- and multi–purpose Stored Value Facili-
ties (SVFs), and between those which are widely accepted (WASVF) and those which are
not. In an effort to promote innovation among small providers and to reduce unnecessary
bureaucracy, only multi–purpose WASVF are subject to regulation by the MAS.
A WASVF is defined as a multi–purpose scheme (meaning its liabilities are accepted by
businesses unrelated to the issuer) with outstanding stored value of at least S$30,000,000.
Furthermore, an approved bank must assume full liability for all monies collected by a
WASVF scheme. At the present time there are just two registered WASVFs in Singapore:
the Network for Electronic Transfers Singapore (NETS) whose cashcard is used to pay for
parking and road tolls, and ez–link , whose cards are used on the mass–transit system. The
distinction between WASVFs and other SVFs revolves around the value of the outstanding
float, and reflects a belief by the Singaporean authorities that small issuers pose no threat
to systemic security.
Purse limits are not explicitly mentioned in the PSOA, a provision which allows issuers
discretion in this regard. The government information portalMoneysense notes that limits
vary by provider but do not typically exceed S$1,000 (MAS, 2007).
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WASVFs must register with the MAS and are subject to an annual license fee, the
magnitude of which is determined on a discretionary basis by the MAS (§9). Rather
than insisting on net–worth and ongoing capital requirements, the PSOA states that an
approved bank must accept full liability for the outstanding stored value of a WASVF.
This regulation may be supplemented by the MAS which “intends to issue guidelines to
encourage the adoption of sound practices in the SVF market” (Shanmugaratnam, 2006,
¶34). Furthermore, the PSOA defines a supervisory role for the MAS and grants it the
power to issue directives to an e–money business, even to the extent of appointing an
officer to advise the firm on its actions (§20(2)(b)).
The PSOA grants the MAS the authority to exempt schemes from the regulations
outlined in the PSOA as it sees fit (§53). This last point, in consort with a number of
those made earlier, reflects the substantial discretionary powers afforded to the MAS. The
legal framework governing e–money businesses in Singapore is generally less transparent
than those of either the EU or the USA. While Shanmugaratnam portrays this as an
attempt at promoting innovation in the market, it is likely to lead to a undesirable degree
of regulatory uncertainty.
The theme of efficiency pervades the Singaporean approach to e–money. Section 5 of
the PSOA states that the MAS must consider the efficiency of the payments system in
its capacity as overseer. Indeed, Shanmugaratnam (2006, ¶13) stresses that “[e]fficiency
and innovation for retail payment systems are essential if we are to keep our economy
vibrant and meet consumer needs”. In many respects, the existing regulation may be
viewed as an interim measure before the adoption of a number of widely–publicised reform
proposals which are expected to increase efficiency and bolster Singapore’s reputation as
a technological leader.
The Proposed Reforms
Under the proposals, two institutions would govern the issuance of e–monetary value and
the technological framework underpinning the new technologies. The Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS) would be responsible for the introduction and commission of SELT.
The Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) would lead a multi–agency task–force re-
sponsible for the oversight and development of a common standard for interoperable e–
money transactions (a project known as the Contactless e–Purse Application, CEPAS 2.0)
as part of the Intelligent Nation 2015 initiative.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore Act charges the Authority with a responsibility
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to “develop Singapore as an international financial centre” (§4(2)(d))6. The MAS appar-
ently feels that this goal may be served by its active participation in the e–money market.
More specifically, the MAS proposes to issue e–monetary value with the status of legal
tender in the near future.
The earliest comprehensive announcement relating to SELT appeared in the OECD
publication The Future of Money (Low, 2002). Low stresses that the principle motivations
of the SELT proposals are to exploit the lower handling and transaction costs of e–money
relative to physical currency and to improve the efficiency of the retail payments system
(pp. 148-149). While this statement reflects a Mengerian view of money, the fact that e–
money will be granted the status of legal tender would suggest a concern with the chartalist
position as well.
The concept of legal tender outlined by Low (p. 147) is not universal in the sense
that it permits firms to refuse to accept legal tender as payment for goods and services
(Van Hove, 2003). While it is not uncommon for legal tender laws to be selective, it is
nevertheless significant in this case. As long as firms are not obliged to accept payment in
e–money there will be a continued demand for currency, at least in the short- to medium–
term. For this reason, although SELT, unlike physical currency, is seen as consistent with
the Singaporean government’s goal of achieving a cashless society (Low, 2002, p. 149),
the MAS will continue issuing currency until there is widespread public support for full
electronification (Van Hove, 2003, p. 4).
The proposed SELT arrangements are outlined in Figure 4.1 which is taken from Low
(2002, p. 151, fig. 1). SELT is electronic value issued by the MAS in a similar manner
to currency (notes and coins). In this way, the MAS will monopolise the issuance of
e–monetary value. However, the MAS has expressed no interest in monopolising the
provision of e–money services. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, banks7 would draw e–
monetary value from the MAS (referred to in the diagram by its old name, the Board of
Commissioners of Currency Singapore, BCCS) which would be held on a suitably secure
computer system. Account holding customers of these banks could then withdraw SELT
from their accounts onto any appropriately enabled device such as a smart–card or mobile
phone. Furthermore, Low suggests that idle balances may accrue interest.
The existing infrastructure referred to in the diagram is that of the NETS payments
system which is currently owned and operated by a number of large Singaporean banks. By
leveraging on this infrastructure, the MAS may deliver SELT in a rapid and cost–effective
6It also provides for a “Financial Sector Development Fund” which may be employed to this end (§30A-
D).
7Although Low does not mention non–bank financial institutions engaged in the issuance of e–money,
one must assume that they would act in a similar manner.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed SELT Arrangements
manner. Of course, as a small and densely populated island state, Singapore already
enjoys a considerable infrastructural advantage when compared to many other developed
countries, which makes it uniquely suitable for the roll–out of such technologies.
The ‘enhancement’ of between 15% and 100% identified in the diagram is rather am-
biguous. Low does not elaborate on the figure in his text and so it is difficult to comment
on its validity. Presumably it is supposed to reflect the gains in efficiency and the reduc-
tion in costs associated with the migration from physical currency to SELT, although the
range seems rather implausible.
Low advances three reasons that government issuance of e–monetary value is preferable
to private issuance of stored value: (i) the risk of bank runs under a system of free–banking
(c.f. Palley, 2001a); (ii) the risk of bank failures, a sensitive subject in the aftermath of
the Asian financial crisis and the subprime debacle; and (iii) to retain seigniorage revenues
in the public domain (p. 150).
While it may be the case that restricting the right to issue e–monetary value to the
state will mitigate the risks associated with the use of e–money, it is not clear that it is
the best way to do so. Extending deposit insurance provisions to e–money schemes would
provide a simple means of ensuring the soundness of the payments system. However, such
a system would fail to retain seigniorage revenues in the public domain. The concern
with seigniorage is a common theme among regulators (see, for example, the EMI’s 1994
report on e–money) who fail to realise that seigniorage is not of fundamental importance
to the central bank, which can easily fund itself by other means if necessary, including
the issuance of bonds, the levying of charges for services and the imposition of additional
reserve requirements (see Section 3.4). Indeed, the potential to appropriate seigniorage
revenues provides strong incentives for private firms to enter the market. Hence, by
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extending its monopoly to incorporate the issuance of e–money, a central bank may reduce
the incentives for innovation in the payments system. It is not clear that a public monopoly
is preferable to a private oligopoly and certainly not to a reasonably competitive market.
The SELT proposals do not seem to preclude the issuance of non–widely–accepted SVF
(i.e. those schemes with outstanding e–money liabilities of less than S$30,000,000). The
effect on such schemes would presumably be rather modest, with the only notable change
being that their prepayment and redemption requirements could be met with SELT as
opposed to physical currency. Indeed, the introduction of SELT may lead to a proliferation
of smaller schemes in an attempt to circumvent the new regulatory framework.
The initial timescale for the introduction of SELT indicated that the system should
be operational by 2008. However, this timeframe seems to have been informally relaxed.
It seems unlikely that SELT will become a reality until 2010 at the earliest, when the
common technological standards contained in CEPAS 2.0 are scheduled for adoption.
4.2.4 A Brief Comparison
The key attributes of the proposed Singaporean arrangements and the European and
American regulatory frameworks are summarised in Table 4.1. The degree of stringency
of the regulation may be considered to decrease as one moves leftward through the table
(certainly in terms of the degree of governmental involvement). The Singaporean decision
to engage in state issuance of e–money represents the most significant regulatory step taken
by any of the world’s governments regarding e–money to date. However, contrary to the
generally accepted wisdom, it is not clear that less stringent regulation will encourage
innovation, as the comparison between the Singaporean and European experience of e–
money in the previous chapter has demonstrated8. Indeed, the reticence of the authorities
to engage in active regulation seems likely to be one of the causes of the slow adoption
of e–money in the US, as it has created regulatory uncertainty and has failed to create a
level ‘playing field’ across states.
A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the Singaporean proposals because there has
been no official discussion of the legal aspects of SELT. The most authoritative source of
information at present is the brief conceptual outline provided by Low. For this reason,
a number of entries in the table are taken from the existing regulatory framework and
may change with the adoption of electronic legal tender. In particular, the asset backing
and capital arrangements will need to be redrafted following the migration to SELT. In
8It should be noted that the most stringent of the Singaporean regulations are yet to be implemented,
although their announcement even at the conceptual stage had a profound positive impact on the uptake
of e–money.





Includes single–use products? No No Yes
Includes internet scrip? No No Yes
Role of Government
Government issuance? Yes No No
Legal tender status? Yes No No
Unified architecture? CEPAS 2.0 No No
Unified regulatory framework? Yes Yes No
Licensing
Surety bond? Bank–backing No $50,000-250,000
Asset backing requirements? Bank–backing 100% 100%
Net worth? Bank–backing No $25,000
Initial Capital? Bank–backing ¤1m No
Own Funds? Bank–backing ¤1m / 2% liab No
Issuance restricted to banks? No No No
Passporting provision? n/a Yes No
Waiver clause? Yes Yes Not explicitly
Characteristics of e–money
Prepaid? Yes Yes Yes
Legally imposed purse limit? No Varies by state No
Exchange rate parity? Yes Yes Yes
Redeemable for CB money? Yes Yes No
Extension of credit? No No No
Balances are interest bearing? Yes No No
Note: Italicised text indicates that existing regulation has been inserted where the Singaporean pro-
posals are unclear. References to ‘bank–backing’ in the Singaporean column indicate that the PSOA
currently requires a registered bank to accept liability for the outstanding stored value of a WASVF.
Hence, one might consider that the requirements pertaining to banks regarding net worth etc. are
applicable.
Table 4.1: Regulatory Frameworks Compared
some other cases, the properties of the system have not been made explicit but can be
inferred with a reasonable degree of certainty. For example, SELT will be denominated
in Singaporean Dollars, so the exchange rate parity between SELT and tangible currency
will be absolute. Furthermore, Low’s SELT proposals suggest that most economic activity
would continue in much the same way as it does at present. Wages would continue to be
paid electronically into one’s bank account in most cases and in order to retrieve monetary
value one would simply transfer money from one’s account onto a suitable SELT enabled
device. In this sense, SELT remains prepaid and, to the extent that unwanted SELT value
could presumably be credited back into one’s account, SELT remains redeemable.
A great deal of variation exists between the licensing requirements embodied in each
system. The Singaporean system transfers the risk of default of a WASVF to an approved
bank. Both the EU and US systems insist on 100% asset backing of outstanding e–
monetary value but this is where the similarities end. The US system stresses the need for
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positive net worth (i.e. the balance sheet must remain in the black) while the European
approach relies on initial capital and own–funds requirements.
The characteristics of e–money in each system are generally comparable with the in-
teresting exception of SELT, which provides for the payment of interest on idle balances.
This will fundamentally change the relationship between e–money and other payment in-
struments, positioning it between cash and demand deposits in terms of its attributes and
functions. If it transpires that e–money systems can be operated at a lower cost than
traditional payment systems, e–money issuers may find themselves in a position to pay
higher rates of interest than banks which are subject to more stringent regulation. Left
unchecked, such developments could lead to a potentially destabilising restructuring of the
market for deposit accounts and savings instruments.
4.3 Towards An Optimal Regulatory Strategy
All of the regulatory frameworks outlined above possess a number of significant shortcom-
ings. This section draws on these three cases to address a number of these issues.
4.3.1 Scope of Regulation
Single- and Multi–Purpose Products, Internet Scrip etc.
The issue of whether single and limited multi–purposes schemes, internet scrip etc. should
be regulated in the same way as e–money must be considered in terms of their systemic
importance. In general, such schemes present no threat to systemic security and so should
not be subject to the same degree of regulation9. Indeed, it seems likely that liberalising
these markets in the US and Europe may promote innovation. Furthermore, the authori-
ties should consider issuing waivers to innovative firms that drive progress in the market
for retail payments and to those that serve the public interest in order to provide the
appropriate incentives for the continuation of such activities (this is discussed in more
detail in Section 4.3.3 below).
A threshold system similar to that currently operating in Singapore is an appropriate
means of ensuring that a small scheme which grows into a significant player in the market
would fall under the scope of the e–money regulations passively, without any need for
intervention from the authorities. Whereas the Singaporean system currently concentrates
solely on the value of outstanding stored value, it seems desirable to consider a broader
range of factors including, for example, the number of active users and the range and
9Clearly some regulation in these markets is important to prevent blatant abuses, including fraudulent
activities and money–laundering.
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nature of uses to which the system is put. In this way, if the outstanding float exceeds $A
and/or the number of users exceeds B and/or the system is used for various purposes that
are considered important in their own right, then the system would need to meet the full
set of regulatory requirements. In this way, a mass transit or prepaid household utility
scheme which does not exceed the float or circulation thresholds might be considered
important due to the fact that it provides access to a public utility.
4.3.2 The Role of Government
Government Issuance of E–Money
The government may be involved in the issuance of e–money in at least two ways. Firstly,
and most simply, the central bank may simply provide stored–value and network products
directly, either monopolistically or in competition with the private sector. As discussed in
Section 3.4, it seems unlikely that private sector firms could compete with the central bank
for a number of reasons including its riskless nature, its freedom from profit–maximisation
constraints and its legally enshrined status at the heart of the financial system. Hence, it
seems likely that the central bank would rapidly come to dominate the market should it
enter it, stifling innovation and removing market discipline.
The alternative is that the central bank issues e–monetary value in the same way
that it currently issues currency (in the manner envisaged in Singapore). As discussed
above, this approach may reduce the risks associated with bank runs and bank failures,
although it is not clear that it is the best way to do so. By retaining seigniorage revenues
for itself, the central bank removes a major incentive driving the innovation required to
maintain the dynamism of the retail payments system. Furthermore, it is not clear that
a public monopoly is preferable to a private oligopoly which is likely to be considerably
more efficient.
Rather than issuing e–monetary value itself, the central bank could extend existing
deposit insurance schemes to include e–money balances outstanding. This would increase
public confidence in e–money issuers and would greatly reduce the risk of ‘bank runs’.
In order to limit the risks associated with the failure of e–money issuers, a system of
prudential regulation and oversight would be required. Some of the salient points of such
a system are described in Section 4.3.3 below.
Legal Tender Status
The Collins Essential English Dictionary defines legal tender as “currency that a creditor
must by law accept to pay a debt”. This definition is broadly consistent with both the
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selective and absolute concepts of legal tender identified by Van Hove (2003). It seems
clear that the extension of legal tender laws to include electronic payments will have an
important signalling role. By backing e–money in this way, the government would lend
credibility to the system and increase public perceptions about its longevity. In this sense,
electronic legal tender is likely to promote the development of electronic retail payments
systems. However, it is not clear that the role of government extends to promoting one
payment system over another (except to the extent that some may be unsound or insecure).
With this said, to the extent that the government and central bank are concerned with the
maintenance of a well–functioning payments system, as opposed to just a secure system,
then the promotion of efficient and convenient technologies may be justified.
Even if one sets aside doubts about the role of government in an electronic legal tender
system, a fundamental hurdle to the concept of electronic legal tender in most countries
is the lack of complete and unconditional interoperability. It is inconceivable that the
government would consider affording non–interoperable, isolated e–money systems the
status of legal tender. The only country which has shown any significant development
in the direction of an interoperable system is Singapore but this system revolves around
government issuance of e–monetary value which, as noted above, may be criticised from a
number of angles. Even if market participants were to develop a system of interoperable
networks independently of government, the willingness of regulators to extend legal tender
status to private, non–governmental monies would, in all likelihood, be limited. Indeed, in
many countries, such a move would require a fundamental redrafting of the constitution
of the monetary authority, which currently exercises monopoly power over the issuance of
legal tender. It seems likely, therefore, that there may be a trade–off between the benefits
to be derived from making e–money legal tender on the one hand, and the losses associated
with its monopolistic issuance by central government on the other. Given such a trade–off,
one must favour the competitive outcome.
Unified Technological Architecture
A unified technological architecture is essential for the development of the type of inter-
operable systems which many commentators see as a prerequisite condition for e–money
usage to become widespread (see Van Hove, 1999b, for a discussion of the importance of
interoperability for e–money usage over the internet)10. Furthermore, the adoption of a
unified architecture could simplify the tasks of regulation and oversight, particularly with
10Issues of cross–border interoperability are particularly prevalent in the case of online transactions. The
involvement of a supra–national body would be required to coordinate the development of an international
standard, the obvious candidate for this role being the BIS.
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regard to the security of the systems in use. Given that payment systems are extreme
examples of network industries, there are strong incentives for market participants to de-
velop the required technology without Government intervention (as discussed in Section
3.5).
An early attempt at such a scheme was the Common Electronic Purse Specifications
(CEPS) developed collaboratively by Visa, it’s Spanish subsidiary SERMEPA and ZKA,
the firm responsible for German e–purse Geldkarte. However, despite considerable interest
from market participants (Van Hove, 1999b), CEPS has yet to be put into practice and
seems to have been largely abandoned.
The failure of CEPS reflects the conflicting incentives of firms in network industries.
On the one hand, subscribers to a common standard benefit from an increase in the
effective size of the network. On the other hand, interoperability implies substitutability
and hampers the efforts of firms to differentiate their product. As Van Hove notes, the
relative strength of the expected network and substitution effects faced by each firm in the
market will determine their attitudes toward interoperability. New entrants to a market
gain substantially from achieving interoperability with established firms as there is no
possibility of substitution away from their, as yet, non–existent product. By contrast,
the substitution effect is likely to substantially outweigh the beneficial network effects
achieved by a large incumbent entering into an interoperable system with a much smaller
firm, let alone a new entrant with no existing network. When viewed in this way, it is
easy to see how technological cooperation between firms may break down or may even be
hijacked in an attempt to erect barriers to the entry of new firms. Hence, the potential for
coordination failures and antitrust issues in a highly concentrated market environment11
provides an a priori case for government intervention of the type being undertaken in
Singapore in the form of CEPAS 2.0.
A potential drawback of interoperable systems is the increased risk posed by hackers
and fraudsters. Firstly, the adoption of a unified architecture is likely to encourage hackers
to focus their efforts on one system rather than targeting a number of different systems.
This increases the probability of a successful attack on the system. Secondly, while thieves
have traditionally been limited by the quantity of money stored in any given location and
the amount that they can physically transport, these constraints are no longer binding in
an electronic world. Of course, existing LVTS and clearing systems also face these issues.
However, the public has no direct contact with these systems, rendering the study of their
security features more difficult and reducing the opportunity for remote access.
11The Singaporean e–money market is essentially a duopoly. Even in the EU, the market structure is
oligopolistic with a small number of dominant firms.
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Unified Regulatory Framework
Current US policy regarding e–money is not unified in at least two respects. Firstly,
there are at least six inputs into the regulation of e–money in the US. The lack of clear
regulation increases the likelihood of exploitable loopholes and creates a situation of reg-
ulatory uncertainty inconducive to a well–functioning system. Such opaque regulation is
likely to undermine public confidence in e–money systems. Secondly, the fact that the
implementation of the UMSA is discretionary has led to an unacceptable degree of regu-
latory heterogeneity between states. Hence, a well defined, unambiguous legal framework
is clearly essential both to maintain confidence in the system and to ensure a level playing
field for system operators.
Lee and Longe-Akindemowo (1999) stress the need for a harmonised regulatory frame-
work across countries to avoid what they refer to as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. It has already
been suggested that the allegedly restrictive regulatory stance of the EC may lead to
the proliferation of offshore ELMIs not subject to the same rigorous regulation (Krueger,
2002b). Similarly, it may be in the interests of some governments to relax their e–money
regulation in order to attract investment from foreign issuers. In this way, regulatory
arbitrage may be practised by both firms and regulators.
While the risks posed by loosely regulated offshore issuers could be mitigated to some
degree by public education schemes, disclosure requirements (discussed below) and do-
mestic regulation, the desirability of international regulatory coherence is obvious. The
BIS (2001) already publishes ‘core principles for systemically important payment systems’
which reflect good practice. It would be relatively straightforward to elaborate on this
framework to lessen the scope for regulatory arbitrage. The core principles could be re-
vised and extended to provide a set of basic standards for regulators. Countries could
then ratify this framework and ensure that their existing regulation is consistent with it.
It would then be a simple matter for members of this community to insist that any firm
willing to issue e–money within their borders must be licensed in a country that has also
ratified the BIS guidelines.
4.3.3 Licensing Requirements
Surety Bond/Licensee Deposit
The insistence of the US authorities that would–be e–money firms post a surety bond
adds unnecessary complexity to the regulatory system. Furthermore, the fact that the
size of the bond does not depend on the size of the operation (except to the extent that it
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increases in proportion to the number of locations) discriminates against small innovative
entrants to the marketplace and fails in its goal of ensuring that the obligations of the
issuer to its customers will be met in the event of the insolvency of a large firm. In a
system in which the asset backing and ongoing capital requirements are well developed, a
surety bond is unnecessary.
Asset Backing, Net Worth and Own Funds Requirements
The third of the BIS core principles holds that “[t]he system should have clearly defined
procedures for the management of credit risks and liquidity risks, which specify the re-
spective responsibilities of the system operator and the participants and which provide
appropriate incentives to manage and contain those risks” (2001, p. 3).
The Singaporean system of regulation transfers the risk associated with the failure of
a WASVF to the underwriting bank. While this system places an emphasis on a market
solution to the governance of risk which may yield efficient outcomes, it seems likely that
the WASVF market will be dominated by banks or bank subsidiaries, quite probably to the
exclusion of all other types of organisation. This is likely to limit the degree of competition
in the market for widely accepted retail payment systems.
Security of US MSBs is achieved using a combination of a surety bond, 100% back-
ing of outstanding liabilities by a portfolio of permissible investments, and a net worth
requirement of $25,000. The purpose of the rather meagre net worth requirement is osten-
sibly to screen prospective entrants to the marketplace to ensure that they have “sufficient
resources to honor [their] obligations to customers” (p. 30, §206, comment no. 1). There
is, however, no provision to vary the net worth requirement in accordance with the scale
of the operation which casts doubt over the validity of this signalling role. If net worth
requirements are to be employed, they must reflect the scale of the undertaking.
The EC requirement that ELMIs possess initial capital of¤1,000,000 and maintain own
funds of the greater of this value or 2% of their outstanding e–money liabilities12 imposes
an effective liquidity ratio. This ensures that issuers have, at their disposal, liquid assets
in proportion to their activities for instant use in the event of financial difficulties. The
EC regulation is not, however, subject to the criticism that it’s capital requirements are
scale invariant as there are provisions to waive the initial capital requirements (or rather
to reduce its value appropriately) in the case of small firms.
The critical difference between the US and EU systems revolves around the use of own
funds. While the US system does, of course, involve the own funds of issuers, the UMSA
12The Directive stresses that the value of the float should be considered both instantaneously and on
average across a moving six month window, and that the larger figure should be used.
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is silent on their proportion in the asset portfolio. It is essential that the portfolio should
be sufficiently liquid to meet the demands of the customer base and so the imposition of
minimum standards in this regard is equally essential.
Permissible Investments
There is no doubt that the e–monetary liabilities of issuers should be backed on a one–for–
one basis by low risk, liquid investments at the present time. What is less clear is which
classes of investment should be permitted and what proportion they should contribute
to the portfolio as a whole. In most countries, permissible investments include currency,
certificates of deposit, government bonds, sight deposits at regulated banks, equities and
high grade non–governmental paper. In many cases, limits are placed on the proportion
of the portfolio for which each class of assets may account. These regulations are gen-
erally similar in spirit (and often in substance) to the asset backing requirements facing
commercial banks as outlined in the Basel II agreement. However, the recent experience
of asset bubbles and the controversy surrounding computational errors made by the rat-
ing house Moody’s (c.f. Jones, Tett, and Davies, 2008) call into question the prudence of
these regulations.
The difficulty in defining the range of permissible investments lies in achieving an
acceptable balance between liquidity, risk and return. In light of recent events, regulators
have an obligation to the public to err on the side of caution until the shortcomings that
allowed bond ratings to be so drastically misleading have been addressed.
Should Issuance be Restricted to Banks?
Opening the provision of e–money services to non–bank financial institutions introduces
a wide range of inputs from firms with different specialisms. The benefits of existing laws
permitting non–bank institutions to enter the market are already apparent with firms such
as Google offering innovative payment systems enhanced by their unique capabilities13.
While there are advantages to allowing non–banks to issue e–money, the regulation
must be carefully constructed to avoid any loopholes whereby non–banks may engage in
activities that the spirit of the law intends should be restricted to registered banks. Two
such activities include the taking of deposits and the extension of credit.
13Google Payment Limited (GPL) is a registered ELMI in the UK and provides an innovative online
payment system which builds on Google’s existing internet presence.
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Passporting Provision
Passporting provisions that permit e–money issuers to operate in all the states within a
union, wherever they are domiciled and licensed, are essential for the European Union
and the USA as they remove unnecessary bureaucracy from the system and reduce the
costs faced by firms intending to operate across state boundaries. An interesting question
is whether a similar principle could be adopted by the members of a free–trade area, for
example. Such a scheme would require a significant degree of cross–border legislative
cooperation which, while possible in a bilateral setting, is unlikely to be forthcoming in
a multilateral setting. Should demand for such systems become non–negligible, the BIS
should engage in discourse with the relevant countries. In the long–term, this may lead to
the type of harmonised global regulation mentioned above.
Exemptions and Waiver Clauses
The central bank should be able to exercise a degree of discretion in its oversight of e–
money systems. In particular, where it feels that the benefits associated with a particular
scheme outweigh any potential risks, it should be permitted to waive some (or perhaps
even all) of the provisions of the regulatory framework14.
Consider, for example, the introduction of an electronic purse version of the UK Gov-
ernment’s Education Maintenance Allowance whereby students undertaking post–GCSE
qualifications are paid up to £30 per week. The central bank could argue that this would
yield quantifiable reductions in the the operating cost of the system and that it could be
designed in such a way as to limit the basket of goods that could be purchased with the
money, thereby combating under–age alcohol and substance abuse, smoking etc. Given the
small amounts of money involved, the central bank may consider that the asset backing or
net worth requirements could be relaxed to some extent in order to provide an incentive
for firms to undertake such schemes in the public interest.
In order to avoid the opacity of the Singaporean regulations regarding exemptions, the
central bank should be required to undertake a thorough analysis of the potential costs
and benefits associated with the scheme. The results of this consultation should then be
made publicly available, so that the central bank could be held accountable for its decision.
14Note that such a waiver provision would add a further degree of flexibility to a regulatory framework
employing a threshold system of the type discussed in Section 4.3.1. Indeed, it seems unlikely that waivers
would be granted particularly often. This contrasts markedly with the current EU system in which waivered
institutions outnumber licensed ELMIs (c.f. TEP, 2006) owing to the lack of such a threshold provision.
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Disclosure Requirements
The second of the BIS core principles is that “[t]he system’s rules and procedures should
enable participants to have a clear understanding of the system’s impact on each of the
financial risks they incur through participation in it” (2001, p. 3). An economic agent can-
not make a well–informed decision if the information is not publicly available. Regulators
should stress that all e–money schemes must clearly indicate whether they are subject to
full domestic regulation, whether they have been granted a waiver by the central bank
(and which clauses have been waived) or whether they are domiciled and regulated over-
seas. Furthermore, issuers must be obliged to state unambiguously the risks that their
clients are exposed to and their privacy policy regarding client information. Such disclo-
sure requirements would be conceptually similar to the guidelines currently in place in the
UK which oblige financial institutions to indicate whether they are FSA regulated and to
clearly state the conditions of their various products.
4.3.4 Characteristics of E–Money Products
Prepayment
Prepayment is essential in any stored value scheme in which the issuer is restricted from
extending credit. If the e–monetary value is not prepaid, then the issuer is effectively
entering into a loan agreement with the consumer in the intervening period between the
loading of the value and it’s repayment. While this may seem relatively innocuous in small
value, limited purpose schemes, it would set a dangerous precedent if it were legalised. It
cannot be stressed enough that granting credit in any form must remain the preserve of
licensed credit institutions.
Purse Limits
At present, purse limits are imposed under some regulatory regimes (for example in the
UK) as a safety feature. However, it seems likely that the market participants would arrive
at suitable purse limits without any government intervention. In the first instance, the
issuer will presumably impose some form of limit which it considers balances the risks of
fraudulent use against convenience. Should this limit prove too low, market participants
will migrate to providers with more liberal policies, providing an incentive for the issuer
to increase their limit. Should they prove too high, the issuer will notice that very few
individuals are constrained by the purse limit and that they could potentially reduce their
losses through fraud by reducing the limit appropriately. To borrow a term from Le´on
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Walras, a process of taˆtonnement would result in the installation of appropriate purse
limits in a reasonably competitive market. An exception to this general principle may
arise in the case of interest–bearing e–money, as discussed below.
Exchange Rate Parity and Redeemability vis–a`–vis Central Bank Money
Currently, e–monetary value is typically denominated in the national currency of the
country in which the scheme operates. From a regulatory viewpoint, there is no particular
issue with a non–par exchange rate as long as it is irrevocably fixed. However, it is difficult
to see what benefit either the issuer or the end–user would derive from such a system, while
a number of drawbacks are immediately apparent. Any situation in which the effective
exchange rate could fluctuate would expose both the issuer and the customer to exchange
rate risk. Moreover, it would open issuers to the possibility of speculative attack which
is clearly inconsistent with the central bank’s responsibility for the stability and security
of the payments system. Hence, the development of any form of floating exchange rate
system cannot be permitted.
The redeemability of e–money is viewed as essential in the EU (de Geest, 2001) and yet
neither the UMSA nor the Singaporean framework enforce a redeemability requirement.
In general, firms will continue to offer to redeem unused e–monetary value as a guarantee
to their customers. De Geest stresses that redeemability is necessary to maintain a link
between e–money and central bank money, although there is little reason to think that this
is the case. In a regulatory framework in which the exchange rate between e–money and
central bank money is irrevocably fixed, no further link is necessary. However, redemption
regulations may be important if they improve public confidence in the payments system.
Extension of Credit and Issuance of Discounted E–Monetary Value
The extension of credit by e–money providers is universally prohibited on the grounds that
it may prove deleterious to systemic security. Such restrictions are entirely appropriate
as long as e–money issuers are not subject to the same degree of regulation as credit
institutions.
The EC Directive also prohibits the issuance of e–money at a discount in order to
maintain the solvency of ELMIs. In the UK, however, while FSA guidelines ban the is-
suance of e–money not backed 100% by float investments, there is no restriction on the
sale of e–monetary value at a discounted price to the end–user (FSA, 2006, ELM4.4). This
regulation permits ELMIs to issue discounted e–money (presumably for promotional pur-
poses) on the condition that a third party makes up the deficit arising from the discounted
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value. While such provisions are likely to prove popular with issuing firms as they provide
an obvious means of generating interest in the product, they open a number of potential
loopholes. For instance, the third party provision opens an obvious channel for money
laundering and even in the case where the investment is ostensibly legitimate, it is not
clear exactly what the money would be exchanged for. It is not inconceivable that the
third party firm could agree to make up the balance of the float in exchange for various
commitments from the issuer. Such antitrust issues will be very difficult to detect, let
alone combat, in this type of regulatory framework.
A point that seems to have been largely overlooked by the literature concerns the
granting of credit in the form of e–money by registered credit institutions. Providing that
all of the requirements of existing banking regulation are met, e–money cards issued by
such institutions could act in much the same way as credit cards. Such a system could
significantly expand the range of goods and services which could be purchased on credit.
It is questionable whether this is desirable in an era of record household debt but there
is likely to be considerable interest in such schemes nevertheless. An incidental benefit
that may obtain as a result of legalising ‘e–credit’ in this way is that it may reduce the
incentives for circumventive innovation on the part of non–bank e–money issuers.
Payment of Interest on Balances
The payment of interest on outstanding stored value is generally prohibited (the SELT
proposals are a notable exception). This is presumably based on a desire to avoid e–money
expanding beyond its current domain of frequent low–value transactions. In particular, it
would seem to be motivated by a desire to prevent e–money acting as a depository savings
instrument, the provision of which is strictly the domain of deposit–taking institutions.
With clear parallels to the discussion of discounted e–monetary value above, the pay-
ment of bonus points on outstanding e–money balances, or the use of lottery schemes
whereby accounts are randomly credited with additional value, represent the payment of
de facto interest. As mentioned above, the validity of such schemes is recognised by the
FSA. One must question whether anything is achieved by encouraging issuers to engage
in farcical lotteries in this manner.
If the restrictions on interest–bearing e–money were relaxed, the regulator would have
to ensure that issuers were adequately prepared to meet the additional flows generated by
their interest payments. This may be achieved by a combination of prudential measures
combined with appropriately enhanced asset backing and working capital requirements.
Furthermore, where e–monetary balances are interest–bearing, it may be necessary to
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impose purse limits to ensure that e–money issuers do not offer savings services in com-
petition with those of depository institutions. A simple way of doing this would be to
specify that an e–money issuer wishing to extend it’s purse limit beyond a threshold con-
sidered consistent with usage as a low–value retail payment instrument must register as a
depository institution. This would prevent allegations of unfair competition arising from
the well–known reserve–requirement ‘tax’ faced by banks and would provide for enhanced
competition in the provision of savings instruments.
Privacy/Anonymity
As discussed in Chapter 3, the electronification of the payments system has important
implications for its anonymity and for the privacy of participants. Electronic transactions
are typically recorded and concerns centre around the uses to which these records may
be put. Of course, to the extent that anonymity facilitates criminal and otherwise repre-
hensible economic activities, a number of ethical concerns may be raised about the role of
the central bank in providing anonymous payment vehicles. However, individuals have an
inalienable right to conduct their business dealings with a degree of privacy.
Recent developments in ICT have made anonymous e–money possible15. However,
the issue is not whether e–money is technically anonymous but rather whether the pub-
lic perceives that this anonymity is credible. Credible anonymity would require more
than contractual non–disclosure agreements: the issuer itself would have to be incapable
of viewing a customer’s transaction history such that no amount of pressure from the
authorities could secure the release of private information (Goodhart, 2000, p. 199).
In many respects, the anonymity of e–money is not an issue as long as individuals have
the option of paying for goods and services using cash which is, to a first approximation
at least, anonymous. For this reason, there seems to be little to be gained at the present
time in insisting that firms provide anonymous e–money. Furthermore, given the double–
spending problem discussed in Chapter 3, such regulation may render e–money systems
increasingly prone to attack. Should there exist a strong demand for anonymity, the market
is likely to provide the appropriate signals and incentives to e–money service providers to
respond appropriately16. Of course, should the MAS stop issuing currency altogether and
migrate wholly to e–money, end–users will no longer have the option to use an anonymous
payment instrument, and the right to privacy will become a very important issue.
15See Schneier (1996) for a discussion of the use of blind signatures in anonymously securing computer
systems.
16Blind signature systems are likely to be required for the development of transferable e–money, which
Baddeley (2004) sees as a means of unlocking great efficiency gains in the realm of micropayments. Hence
the market may again provide anonymity of its own accord.
4.4. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 119
4.4 Considerations for the Future
Like many hi–tech markets, the market for electronic retail payments systems has proven
itself to be very dynamic and evolutionary. Within the last ten years, e–money has been
transformed from an exciting prospect to a reality far broader than many could have
imagined: it is now possible to pay for a wide range of goods and services by simply
passing your mobile phone before a contactless reader or by sending an SMS text message.
This rapid development in the nature and capabilities of e–money systems raises at least
two considerations for the future.
Extension of the Lender of Last Resort Function
Currently, there is no provision to extend lender of last resort provisions to the issuers
of e–money, presumably because none are viewed as systemically important at this stage.
However, should an e–money system develop to the extent that its failure could have sig-
nificant repercussions for systemic stability, it is absolutely inconceivable that the central
bank would fail to intervene in the market. Similarly, the central bank could not allow
an e–money system providing access to essential public utilities (e.g. public transport) in
a monopolistic manner to fail. This begs the question of whether the scope of the lender
of last resort facility should be extended to include e–money issuers. In the event of an
informal intervention in the e–money market, the credibility of the central bank would
suffer, it’s reputation would be tarnished and the transparency of regulation blemished.
Viewed in this way, the benefits of extending the facility seem rather substantial.
However, the moral hazard introduced by an assurance from the central bank that an
e–money issuer will be rescued from insolvency may lead firms to act imprudently and
engage in riskier activities than they would otherwise undertake. Such problems already
arise in the case of institutions covered by the lending facility. This effect has come to be
known ironically as the ‘Greenspan put’.
Recalling the striking transactions importance by volume statistics reported in Section
3.5.1, Singapore may be rapidly approaching a point at which e–money must be considered
systemically significant. It will be interesting to see how the Singaporean government
approaches the issue of contingency planning for the event of a WASVF failure.
Toward a Fractional Reserve System
The historical record of firms circumventing regulations that prevent them from exploiting
profitable opportunities is well known. Such circumventive innovation is likely to be par-
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ticularly prevalent in the hi–tech market for electronic retail payments systems. Friedman
(1999, p. 329) envisages the development of a ‘regulatory race’ which the central bank is
likely to lose. One such area where the likelihood of such a race developing is relatively
high concerns the nature and composition of e–money issuers’ reserve asset portfolios.
A commercial bank accepts deposits of high powered money, a fraction (1−τ) of which
it lends out. The complement of this fraction, τ , is the proportion that the bank holds in
reserve to ensure that it can meet its obligation to redeem deposits on demand. It follows
that an initial deposit of £1000 with a reserve ratio, τ = 10%, will lead to the creation
of a loan of £900. This loan, in turn, will create a further deposit of £900. The iteration
of this process will result in a situation in which the total amount of money in circulation
will tend toward a multiple 1/τ of the supply of high powered money. This is the essence
of fractional reserve banking.
An e–money issuer is in a slightly different position, however, as it cannot take deposits
or extend loans. When an e–money issuer receives funds, they must be exchanged for e–
monetary value in a timely fashion. To differentiate such activity from deposit–taking, let
us adopt the term ‘loading’. This e–monetary value is transferred to the vendor when it is
used to purchase goods and services. The vendor will then redeem the e–monetary value
thus received with the issuer, which clears its debt by bank transfer. Hence, the issuer
must at all times maintain sufficient liquidity to meet these requirements.
It is likely that both the income generated from loading and the redemption of spent e–
monetary value will assume an approximately uniform distribution over a given timeframe.
Such an outcome simply reflects the plausible outcome that agents will use e–money for
frequent transactions and replenish their e–monetary stocks in an uncoordinated fashion.
This suggests that, in any given period, the income generated from loading operations will
be approximately equal to the redemption of spent value. On average, therefore, the net
movement of an issuer’s balance sheet should be relatively small, indicating that the asset
backing requirement is rather more onerous than is necessary.
The discussion so far has, however, omitted the fact that e–money account holders
typically have the right to withdraw value from their accounts. Such withdrawals could
lead to large imbalances between loading income and redemption demands, particularly if
confidence in the integrity of the issuer were to fail. However, once an e–money issuer has
achieved a reputation for prudence, the likelihood of such a dramatic swing in consumer
confidence will decline. Furthermore, as issuers learn about the markets in which they
operate, they will be able to forecast their net end–of–day closing position with greater
accuracy. Against this backdrop of reduced risk, e–money issuers are likely to seek ways
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of trading return against liquidity in their investment portfolios.
Current regulations already provide a degree of latitude in terms of permissible invest-
ments, as discussed above. However, issuers managing a large portfolio will be faced with
strong incentives to circumvent existing regulations and will undoubtedly find innovative
ways of doing so. An obvious approach would be to create an inter–issuer market for liquid-
ity modelled on existing interbank markets. Similarly, issuers may move toward a practice
of averaging their holdings of reserve assets across a window in order to economise on their
liquid asset holdings. Such innovations must not necessarily be treated as undesirable by
the regulators as they may improve on the efficiency of established systems.
A cursory glance at the history of banking suggests that, in the long–term, it is entirely
possible, and even likely, that fully–fledged fractional reserve systems will come to operate
in which e–money issuers engage in both deposit–taking and the extension of credit. Of
course, such a system would require substantial revision to existing laws which, at the
present time, may seem at best a distant prospect and at worst impossible. However, the
process of regulatory drift should not be underestimated: a seventeenth century goldsmith
would undoubtedly greet current practices with equal incredulity.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has surveyed the regulatory frameworks in place in three of the key players
in the global market for e–money. The US is arguably the most important market in the
world and yet it has enacted deeply inadequate regulation that fails to provide appropriate
incentives for innovative firms and introduces unnecessary obstacles into the path of those
attempting to operate schemes across state borders. The European system of regulation is
extensive and well–founded but has been criticised from some quarters for stifling innova-
tion. Finally, the currently under–developed Singaporean system has an air of anticipation
about it in the run–up to the introduction of government–issued electronic legal tender
and the national roll–out of common technological standards for e–purse systems.
What is clear is that each of these systems has a number of shortcomings. In the
US case, there is an urgent need for unified regulation across states, the introduction of
passporting provisions to remove unnecessary bureaucracy and the revision of the security
provisions to reflect the scale of the operation. The European system could benefit from
liberalisation of the regulation surrounding small ELMIs, and from the relaxation of laws
restricting the payment of interest on outstanding stored value. The Singaporean system
is currently rather ad hoc but it is undergoing comprehensive revisions which should align
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it more closely with the recommendations outlined above.
Based on the preceding discussion, this chapter has discussed the characteristics of an
optimal regulatory structure. In particular, there is a need to achieve the greatest possible
transparency in order both to engender confidence and trust within the private sector and
to minimise regulatory uncertainty. Similarly, one must attempt to balance the need for
unambiguous regulation concerning the restriction of lending activities and the nature and
content of asset portfolios, for example, against the need for flexibility and support for
innovative new systems. Undoubtedly the most controversial of the proposals are those
advocating the payment of interest on balances and the extension of credit in the form of
e–money by licensed credit institutions. However, the risks from such activities may be
mitigated by the installation of appropriate regulatory systems and the benefits in terms
of increased efficiency may be substantial. Furthermore, if substantial demand for such
facilities were to develop, firms would find ways of evading the regulations in order to
provide them. It seems preferable to formalise such activities rather than to encourage
firms to act outside the spirit of the law.
The need for harmonised global regulation has been stressed by Lee and Longe–
Akindemowo (1999) in terms of combating regulatory arbitrage. A range of additional
benefits may be identified, including increased competition and enhanced convenience for
the end–user. It seems likely that such a system of global cooperation would require
the adoption of common technological standards across national boundaries. Payments
systems clearly represent network industries and, therefore, standard economic theory sug-
gests that market participants will naturally endeavour to extend their networks and seek
interoperability with their competitors. A good example of a market in which develop-
ment has followed this pattern is that for mobile telecommunications. However, stored
value schemes have shown little sign of such progression and there are reasons to believe
that various market failures will prevent the development of viable market–led solutions.
Hence, the Singaporean experiments with electronic legal tender and government–led com-
mon technological standards will be monitored closely by national and international bodies
alike.
Chapter 5
Monetary Policy and Financial
Fragility
5.1 Introduction
Economic history has been characterised by booms and busts in the asset markets which
seem neither predictable nor avoidable ex ante. The seemingly universal rule is that bust
follows boom as extravagant speculative profits, evidenced by ever more conspicuous con-
sumption, fuel an increasingly bullish economic outlook. This, in turn, drives investors
to progressively more risky undertakings. For various reasons, confidence in the sustain-
ability of prices eventually fails, with insiders typically leading the exodus. Subsequently,
many commentators are left wondering how so many investors, seasoned and novice alike,
were swept up in an ex–post obviously unsustainable clamour to realise vast unearned
profits based on unconsolidated gains.
In the wake of the 1929 crash, The Atlantic magazine printed the following statement
from an anonymous Wall Street trader which captures the point eloquently:
In these latter days, since the downfall, I know that there will be much talk
of corruption and dishonesty. But I can testify that our trouble was not that.
Rather, we were undone by our own extravagant folly, and our delusions of
grandeur. The gods were waiting to destroy us, and first they infected us with
a peculiar and virulent sort of madness.
(Anonymous, 1933, ¶27)
Examples of such admissions are rare; investors are typically loath to acknowledge
culpability in the aftermath of a bubble, favouring instead the farcical explanation calix
meus inebrians. The elegant prose of American poet and philosopher George Santayana
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comes to mind: ‘those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’. And
repeat it they do: in recent years, bubbles have become a part of the economic landscape:
the 1987 ‘one–day’ crash; the 1990’s real–estate–collateral crash in Japan; the ‘dot–com’
bubble, the 2002 stock market slump and the current subprime crisis, to name but a few.
The historical inability of investors to prevent the growth and subsequent collapse of
bubbles has been well documented. The obvious socio–political and economic costs asso-
ciated with severe asset market distortions furnish an a priori case for state intervention.
However, this in turn raises the question of whether the state is any better equipped to
preemptively identify and harmlessly discharge bubbles than market participants them-
selves.
This chapter investigates the proposition that the central bank could formulate its
monetary policies in a manner designed to alleviate market distortions. Such a contention
depends critically on the notion that the central bank enjoys various advantages which
place it in a privileged position in terms of preempting bubbles (or at a minimum recog-
nising them at an early stage of development). Moreover, the linked assumptions that the
central bank possesses the requisite tools with which to manipulate individual overheated
markets and sectors, and that such manipulation is within its aegis, are implicit. Finally,
a pragmatic point may be made: does the remit of the central bank extend to concern for
particular markets beyond the extent to which they affect aggregate economic activity?
The chapter progresses in six sections. Section 5.2 develops a small macroeconomic
model embodying many of the salient features of Hyman Minsky’s Financial Fragility Hy-
pothesis (FFH). In particular, investment is modelled as a function of the internal funds of
firms and their debt–servicing obligations, a specification which allows one to investigate
the ability of firms to meet their obligations to their creditors. Section 5.3 introduces
the dataset and provides details of the calculation of potential output. Estimation results
are then presented and discussed in detail in Section 5.4. In general, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that the use of the interest rate as the principle implement of monetary
policy is potentially destabilising and that core inflation may be an insufficient summary
statistic of the state of the economy. In this sense, monetary policy may be improved by
considering a broader range of indicators. In light of these results, Section 5.5 discusses
the controversy over the role of asset prices in the formulation of monetary policy, and
proposes a rule by which the central bank can attempt to moderate asset market cycles by
setting heterogeneous reserve requirements on the asset side of bank balance sheets (c.f.
Palley, 2004). Section 5.6 concludes. Detailed data analysis and a review of the empirical
methodology are contained in the Appendix.
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5.2 Hyman Minsky and the Financial Fragility Hypothesis
Hyman Minsky (1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1986a, 1986b) develops an alternative theory of
financial fragility rooted in the work of Keynes. Erturk (2006, p. 3) captures the essence
of the Minskyan scheme elegantly as follows:
[t]he essential insight Minsky drew from Keynes was that optimistic expecta-
tions about the future create a margin, reflected in higher asset prices, which
makes it possible for borrowers to access finance in the present. In other words,
the capitalized expected future earnings work as the collateral against which
firms can borrow in financial markets or from banks. But, the value of long-
lived assets cannot be assessed on any firm basis as they are highly sensitive to
the degree of confidence markets have about certain states of the world com-
ing to pass in the future. This means that any sustained shortfall in economic
performance in relation to the level of expectations that are already capital-
ized in asset prices is susceptible to engendering the view that asset prices are
excessive. Once the view that asset prices are excessive takes hold in financial
markets, higher asset prices cease to be a stimulant and turn into a drag on
the economy. Initially debt–led, the economy becomes debt–burdened.
Minsky takes the view that a capitalist economy left to its own devices will become
increasingly financially fragile and subject to crises. Market participants are incapable
in themselves of averting such crises; momentum- and noise–trading strategies may even
contribute to the problem. Hence, financial fragility develops endogenously and is an
outcome of the normal working of a capitalist economy under laissez–faire governance.
Minsky emphasises the destabilising effects of the interest rate implement of monetary
policy and the conditions under which credit may be obtained. To Minsky, any change in
the rate of interest is akin to ‘moving the goalposts’ once the economic game is underway
and can only have undesirable consequences1. In a system characterised by Keynesian
uncertainty, economic agents faced with long–lived and irreversible investment decisions
engage in forward planning based on an optimal forecast of future conditions which, owing
to this very uncertainty, must be heavily conditioned on recent historic experience. Manip-
ulation of the interest rate after such plans have been enacted in an ex ante unforeseeable
manner represents a significant perturbation to the system.
1Minsky focuses on the destabilising influence of rate rises, as these may result in a situation where
firms can no longer meet their debt–servicing obligations. Unexpected interest rate cuts will not lead to
instability, as firms will have planned for higher interest expenditure. However, they may lead to the
suboptimal allocation of economic resources.
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A simple Minskyan boom–bust cycle is presented in Figure 5.1. In the initial recovery
phase, the rate of capital accumulation is determined by firms based on their tentative
forecasts of the path of key variables (including the interest rate). As expectations grow
increasingly optimistic and the previous bust is forgotten, an investment boom ensues.
Minsky assumes that the investment boom is largely debt–funded and that it is associated
with a rising share of profits in national income. The rising profit–share leads workers
to bargain for nominal wage increases to maintain the wage–share. The resulting wage
inflation is passed through to the general price level as a result of mark–up pricing. The
central bank responds to the inflationary pressure by raising the short–term nominal inter-
est rate. This change is passed through to the lending rate, rendering the debt–servicing
obligations of firms more onerous and causing a general shift toward increasingly frag-
ile financing arrangements2. This is particularly important given the earlier assumption
that the investment boom was debt–funded. In the euphoria of the boom phase, financial
institutions loosened their credit criteria and reduced their safety margins, leaving them
particularly vulnerable to defaults in their loan portfolios3. Beyond some threshold, the
increasing incidence of default, coupled with the financial difficulties of lenders, causes
confidence in the boom to fail, precipitating the bust. If one assumes that memories are
short and/or selective, then the cycle is free to start over.
It is important to note that no exogenous spur is required to start this sequence of
events: the cyclical behaviour emerges endogenously. Furthermore, unlike most theories
of financial bubbles, the financial fragility hypothesis does not rely on informational asym-
metries. Rather, it relies on the observation that in a world characterised by Keynesian
uncertainty, a rational arbitrageur should be concerned not with the basis of a particular
pricing convention but rather with its expected duration (c.f. Hayes, 2006).
The Minskyan explanation of the business cycle can be related to the theories of mone-
tary transmission discussed in Chapter 2 in a number of ways. Firstly, Minsky’s emphasis
on the conditions under which credit may be obtained implies the existence of strong credit
channels. In particular, a powerful financial accelerator mechanism underlies Minsky’s ap-
2Sufficiently large interest rate hikes may cause safe hedge financing units to become either potentially
unstable speculative units or demonstrably fragile Ponzi units. This will be reflected in increasing rightward
skewness of the distribution of firms along the spectrum hedge–speculative–Ponzi. Minsky (1986b, pp. 335-
341) rigorously defines these three financial structures. For an example of his view of the transition between
financial structures see Minsky (1982, p. 66-8).
3A corollary to this derives from Minsky’s view of the lender of last resort facility which, he argues, will
erode the safety margins of the financial sector still further by increasing the losses associated with moral
hazard. Hence, the LoLR facility may increase the riskiness of the loan portfolio and may reduce prudential
reserve holdings, thereby rendering the economy increasingly susceptible to financial distress. Essentially,
Minsky’s argument is that the extension of insurance to the financial sector increases the risk–appetite of
lenders beyond that which would prevail in its absence, increasing the likelihood that such insurance will
be required.
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Figure 5.1: A Schematic Representation of the Minksyan Boom–Bust Cycle
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proach, resulting in strong countercyclicality of the external financing premium. Similarly,
the FFH can be related to the narrow credit channel, and this would suggest that exposure
to financial fragility may be borne disproportionately by smaller, bank–constrained firms
without access to the commercial paper market. Secondly, there is a clear role for the
asset channel in the Minskyan model, as reflected by the specification of the investment
function in Section 5.2.1. Indeed, an important implication of the inclusion of Tobin’s q
in the investment function is that it opens the possibility that monetary policy may have
long–run real effects through its impact on the rate of fixed capital formation. Finally, the
FFH can be readily related to the cost–of–capital channel given the role of the discount
rate in determining the net present value of an investment project4.
Minsky stresses the role of active stabilisation policies in preventing financial crises.
In his 1986 book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky discusses the 1974-5 and 1982
episodes of instability in the US and credits ‘Big Government’ with averting crisis. In par-
ticular, the increasing importance of transfer payments since World War II has helped to
steer the economy away from crises by acting as an automatic stabiliser: “[w]ith Big Gov-
ernment, a fall in income automatically leads to a massive government deficit” (Minsky,
1986b, p. 21). When confidence starts to fail, the scale of any contraction is reduced as
increased government spending supports the profitability of businesses, helping them to
meet their debt–servicing obligations. Of course, automatic stabilisers act symmetrically
and so it could equally be argued that Big Government reduces the scale of booms through
taxation, thereby smoothing the upside movement as well as the downside.
The Minskyan view may be summarised crudely as a belief in the destabilising na-
ture of the phenomenon of interest rates and an advocacy of stabilisation policies on
the part of the government, enacting automatic stabilisers in order to avert financial
crises which would occur under passive governance. A similar summary may be found in
Fardmanesh and Siddiqui (1994). In this framework, fiscal policy is effectively elevated
above monetary policy in stark contrast to the New Consensus model.
5.2.1 A Minskyan Model of the Long–Run
While various authors have developed highly sophisticated chaotic systems in the Minskyan
tradition (a succinct survey is to be found in Nasica, 2000, ch. 4) and a good deal of re-
search effort has been devoted to model–based simulation (e.g. Hannsgen, 2005), relatively
little empirical testing has been carried out to date. This has, no doubt, contributed to
the relatively contentious nature of Minsky’s two key propositions (that financial fragility
4The wealth channel may also be important in the FFH. Indeed, it provides an obvious means by which
Minsky’s model, which focuses on firms, could be extended to the household sector.
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increases throughout the expansion and that interest rates eventually rise, triggering a
contraction). This has led to criticism from some areas and to the neglect of the theory
within much of the literature (although the FFH has received renewed interest since the
onset of the subprime crisis). This chapter attempts to contribute to this limited literature
by developing and estimating a simple macroeconomic model with many of the salient fea-
tures of a Minskyan economy. The model owes an intellectual debt to Lavoie’s (1986-87)
early contribution, and extends his modelling in a number of directions.
The long–run structure of the model may be represented by a system of five equations:
an aggregate demand function, an interest rate rule, an investment function and a pair of
price- and wage–inflation equations5.
Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand is modelled following equation 5.1 where yt denotes real output, rt the
central bank policy rate, ∆pt is the logarithmic approximation to the rate of inflation (and
hence rt −∆pt is the real interest rate), it real gross investment, y
∗
t real potential output
and t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 is a deterministic time trend.
yt = b10 + b11t+ φ11 (rt −∆pt) + φ12it + φ13y
∗
t + ξ1,t (5.1)
Restricting the value of φ13 to unity allows one to interpret equation 5.1 in terms of
the output gap rather than aggregate demand per se and this is the form that is to be
preferred subject to its non–rejection by the likelihood ratio test of the over–identifying
structure. In this form, it resembles a New Keynesian IS curve of the form presented in
Section 2.2.
The Monetary Policy Reaction Function
Turning now to the modelling of monetary policy, the central bank is assumed to follow
the a Taylor–type interest rate rule represented by equation 5.2, where ∆p∗ denotes the
desired rate of inflation. In New Keynesian macroeconomics, r∗ is referred to as the natural
rate of interest although here it is interpreted as the liquidity premium that prevails when
the price level is constant (c.f. Lavoie, 1986-87).
rt = b˜20 + b˜21t+ ϕ21r
∗ + ϕ22∆pt + ϕ23 (∆pt −∆p
∗) + ϕ24 (yt − y
∗) + ξ2,t (5.2)
5Note that all variables are expressed as natural logarithms in the following equations.
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For simplicity, r∗ and ∆p∗ are assumed to be constant over the period under study.
Laubuch and Williams (2003) provide empirical support for the notion of a time–invariant
natural rate of interest in the US. However, the constancy of both the natural rate of
interest and that of the inflation target has been strongly challenged by Woodford (2001b)
in which the author argues that, in a coherent system, the inflation target should track
the (time–varying) natural rate of interest. Support for the approach adopted here may
be derived from practical experience; the systems operated by inflation–targeting central
banks have typically involved time–invariant finite positive targets of the order of 1-4%
CPI inflation, albeit with occasional breaks.
The constancy of r∗ and ∆p∗ allows one to re–write equation 5.2 as follows, making
the substitutions b20 = b˜20 + ϕ21r
∗ − ϕ23∆p
∗, b21 = b˜21, φ21 = ϕ22 + ϕ23 and φ22 = ϕ24:
rt = b20 + b21t+ φ21∆pt + φ22 (yt − y
∗) + ξ2,t (5.3)
The empirical tractability derived from these substitutions comes at the expense of
the ability to uniquely identify the constituents of the composite parameters b20 and
φ21 without the imposition of further identifying restrictions. The magnitudes of these
quantities are not, however, of interest in themselves. Finally, it should be clear that
equation 5.3 reduces to a simple inflation targeting rule when φ22 = 0.
The Investment Function
At the core of the model is a theory of investment behaviour inspired by that of Godley
and Lavoie (2001-2) which, in turn, draws on Ndikumana (1999) and Fazzari and Mott
(1986-7). Ndikumana proposes an investment function of the form of equation 5.4, where
L is the lag–operator, et/kt represents the ratio of cash-flow to capital, rl,t the rate of
interest on bank–lending, lt/kt the leverage ratio
6, ∆st sales growth, ∆c
k
t the change in
the cost–of–capital, qt Tobin’s (1969) average q

















+ α5L (qt) + ǫt (5.4)
Godley and Lavoie modify Ndikumana’s specification in a number of ways. They
model the rate of capital accumulation as follows, where ut is the rate of utilisation of
6Hence the product rl,tL (lt/kt) is interpreted as the minimum cost of servicing existing debt.
7Typically it is not average q which is of interest but marginal q, which is unobservable. However,
Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that the two quantities are equal when certain strict conditions relating to
the installation function, the nature of competition and the constancy of returns–to–scale are met (see
Ndikumana, 1999, pp. 460-1 for a technical summary).
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productive capacity, defined as the ratio of current output to potential output at full
capacity and represents the output gap in logarithmic form:
∆kt
L (kt)










+ β3L (qt) + β4L (ut) (5.5)
This links the investment function presented here to the standard accelerator theory
of investment. Noting that the change in the capital stock, ∆kt, is equal by definition to
fixed capital formation less depreciation, one may substitute ∆kt/L (kt) = (it − δt) /L (kt).
The similarities between the Godley–Lavoie and Ndikumana specifications are particularly
clear if one assumes zero depreciation.
Godley and Lavoie argue that the inclusion of a constant allows for animal instincts in
the investment decision. The removal of the cost–of–capital and the replacement of sales
growth with capacity utilisation reflects the move from the micro- to the macro–level. The
cost–of–capital faced by each firm depends on the characteristics of that firm. Given the
essentially microeconomic nature of this concept, it is difficult to arrive at a meaningful
macro–level equivalent. This is not to deny the importance of the cost–of–capital in the
aggregate, however, which is captured by the term, rl,t · L (lt/kt). The rate of growth
of sales is proxied at the macro–level by capacity utilisation. Such an approach is valid
if one assumes that changes in the rate of growth of sales are closely related to changes
in aggregate demand which, if they are not immediately offset by changes in potential
output (presumably associated with changes in the levels of investment, unemployment or
productivity), will be reflected in any measure of capacity utilisation. Hence the Godley–
Lavoie specification is an aggregate approximation of Ndikumana’s micro model.
The Godley–Lavoie model exhibits some particularly interesting features. For instance,
if one assumes that the loans rate is a (potentially time–varying or regime–dependent)
mark–up over the base rate, rl,t = (1 +mt) rt, then monetary policy innovations affect
investment in at least two ways. A direct effect arises through the change in the cost of
borrowing associated with a change in the base rate. A further, indirect effect operates
through the impact of a change in the base rate on the balance sheets of firms brought
about by the associated change in the opportunity cost of retained earnings.
The rate of capacity utilisation is a standard feature of Kaleckian investment functions
but the inclusion of the Tobin’s q is rather unusual. This provides a mechanism whereby
market sentiment can affect investment decisions. During a financial boom, the market
value of the equity of the representative firm increases relative to its capital replacement
cost. In such a situation, the firm finds the acquisition of second–hand capital assets
on the financial markets (takeovers) relatively less attractive than the purchase of new
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capital, which may be expected to stimulate non–financial investment. Perhaps more
importantly, if one assumes that changes in Tobin’s q are driven predominantly by asset
prices, then it may be viewed as a proxy for market sentiment. Increasing optimism
among participants in the financial markets is likely to drive stock prices up, increasing
q. Such bull markets typically reflect favourable conditions in the broader economy and
also provide listed companies easier access to investment funds. As mentioned earlier, this
suggests a prominent role for both the broad and narrow credit channels in the transmission
of monetary shocks.
Godley and Lavoie make an important point about the implications of the inclusion of
q noting that, when household preferences shift away from saving in the form of equity, the
rate of investment may decrease accordingly. The reverse would be true of an increased
demand for equity, mutatis mutandis. They cite Basil Moore, noting that the operation
of such a mechanism “leads back to the neoclassical conclusions of the control of the
rate of accumulation by saver preferences, albeit through a quite different mechanism.
A reward to property must be paid. . .to induce wealth owners to hold voluntarily, and
not to spend on current consumption, the wealth accumulation that results from business
investment”(Moore, 1973, p. 543).
Godley and Lavoie acknowledge the controversial nature of their omission of expecta-
tions from the investment function. However, they contend that expectational effects are
incorporated implicitly in the term rl,tL (lt/kt). They argue that any increase in the in-
debtedness of firms reflected in the leverage ratio will lower the level of investment on the
grounds that higher debt in the present period reduces expected profits in future periods.
They also suggest that changes to the constant term could reflect changing expectations
about future demand and/or profitability.
For the purposes of this chapter, the investment function is specified as follows:
it = φ30 + φ31ft + φ32 (rl,t −∆pt) lt + φ33qt + φ34 (yt − y
∗) + ξ3,t (5.6)
where ft denotes real internal funds (which proxies real cash–flow) and (rl,t −∆pt) lt de-
notes the inflation–adjusted cost of servicing real debt. Equation 5.6 relates the level of
real investment to the level of internal funds, the burden of existing debt, the valuation
ratio and capacity utilisation (proxied by the output gap).
This formulation exhibits two principle differences to that of Godley and Lavoie.
Firstly, investment, internal funds and the debt–servicing cost are considered in levels
form and are not normalised by k. This results in I(1) series which may exhibit long–run
cointegrating behaviour. Secondly, all lagged variables are considered contemporaneously
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so that they can be treated as endogenous in the proposed CVAR modelling framework. If
one were to treat the lagged terms as endogenous, the implication would be that observed
historical data may be effected by changes in contemporaneous values. Such a situation
is clearly impossible given the irreversible continuum of time. Alternatively, one could
treat all of the lagged terms as exogenous, although this would result in rather limited
contemporaneous interaction among the variables.
The use of deflated cash flow and debt–service cost is rejected by many scholars of
Minsky, who would argue that firms make loan repayments in nominal terms out of their
nominal cash–flow and, therefore, that real magnitudes are irrelevant to the investment
decision8. The statement that nominal cash inflows must at least equal nominal outflows
is basically a non–Ponzi condition; in the limit, a firm becomes insolvent when expected
cash inflows fall below expected cash commitments.
It is clear that if one deflates both cash–flow and the interest cost by the same price
index, the relationship between them remains unchanged. It follows obviously that if
et − lt = ηt then et/pt − lt/pt = ηt/pt ∀t. Hence, the fundamental issue is the use of
the real rate of interest on loans, rl,t − ∆pt as opposed to the nominal rate. While it
is true that firms must meet their nominal debt–servicing obligation irrespective of the
rate of inflation, it does not follow that they are not concerned with the erosion of the
purchasing power of the loan principle. One can decompose the term (rl,t −∆pt) lt into
two separate effects, +rl,tlt and −∆ptlt which capture the nominal interest cost of existing
real debt and the inflationary erosion of the real loan principle, respectively. In principle,
one could include these terms independently in the investment equation and then Wald
test the equality of the coefficients in order to assess the use of the real rate of interest.
This approach is not followed here in the interests of keeping the dimensionality of the
model sufficiently small given the size of the data set9.
Price and Wage Inflation
The model is completed by two equations characterising the inflationary processes in
the price- and wage–levels. Minsky and Ferri (1984, pp. 491-2) propose a relationship of
the form of equations 5.7 and 5.8, where wt is the nominal wage, z¯ is average labour
productivity, pet is the expected price level, xt is a vector of real factors influencing the
8I would like to thank Eric Tymoigne for bringing this to my attention and for a number interesting
discussions on the matter.
9Four combinations of nominal/real interest rate and nominal/real cash–flow and debt–service cost were
entertained in the early stages of model construction. The combination of the real interest rate and real
values for the two series was found to yield the most theory–consistent patterns of dynamic adjustment
and also did not suffer from convergence problems unlike some of the other combinations.
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wage–setting process (including, for example, taxes, technological progress and trade union









wt = δ1 (xt, pt) + δ2p
e
t (5.8)
Following this approach, the current model employs price and wage inflation equations
of the following form:
∆pt = b˜40 + b˜41t+ ϕ41 (∆wt −∆zt) + ϕ42 (yt − y
∗) + ϕ43∆p
e
t + ξ˜4,t (5.9)
∆wt −∆zt = b˜50 + b˜51t+ ϕ51∆pt + ϕ52 (yt − y
∗) + ϕ53∆p
e
t + ξ˜5,t (5.10)
Equation 5.9 follows Gordon (1985) in including the output gap as a measure of demand
pressure in order to account for generalised demand pulls in the inflationary process. The
inflationary process is a pure cost–push when ϕ42 = 0, with the coefficient ϕ41 representing
the markup of prices over productivity–adjusted wages. Equation 5.10 represents the
process of wage bargaining in which the labour force demands that the productivity–
adjusted wage increases by no less than the price level such that the real wage does not
fall10. ξ˜4,t and ξ˜5,t are stationary mean–zero error processes.
Equations 5.9 and 5.10 jointly capture price- and wage–setting behaviour. Taken
together, they imply bi–directional causality between the rates of price and wage inflation.
Inflation expectations are, however, not readily observable (certainly for most classes of
goods not traded on an organised exchange) and an uncontroversial proxy remains elusive.
In order to overcome this problem without simply removing expectations from the model,
equations 5.9 and 5.10 may be combined in order to substitute out the expectations terms,
yielding:
∆pt = b40 + b41t+ φ41 (∆wt −∆zt) + φ42 (yt − y
∗) + ξ4,t (5.11)
10The model was initially estimated following Lavoie (1986-87) including the gap between the share
of profits in national income, πt, and its ‘fair’ level, π
∗, which was assumed constant. The rationale for
inclusion of the profit–share terms reflects the underlying assumption that output is divided solely between
corporate rents and wages. In such a system, any increase in the rate of profits beyond its fair level will
prompt demands from the workforce for a compensatory increase in wages. However, empirical testing of
this model yielded unsatisfactory results. In particular, the theory–motivated over–identifying structure
was rejected by the likelihood ratio test, estimates often failed to converge and the impulse responses failed
to asymptote in some cases. Inspection of the Johansen reduced–rank regression results suggested that the
share of profits term was the root of the problems.














































Economic theory suggests the existence of the four long–run relationships represented by
equations 5.1, 5.3, 5.6 and 5.11. This long–run structure may be used to describe the
cointegrating relationships embodied in a vector error correction model. Garratt, Lee,
Pesaran and Shin (2006, GLPS) advance a long–run structural modelling approach which
provides for the inclusion of weakly exogenous I(1) variables. The system is composed of
a conditional VECM for the endogenous variables, yt, and a marginal VAR for the weakly










Γ˜∗yi∆zt−i + ηyt (5.12)
Axx∆xt = a˜x + b˜xt− Π˜xxxt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γ˜xi∆zt−i + ǫxt (5.13)
A detailed derivation of this result may be found in the Appendix, including a dis-
cussion of the restrictions that the weak exogeneity of the variables in xt imposes on the
coefficient vectors and matrices.
Formal structural modelling is not considered in this chapter due to the dependency of
the results on a number of strong modelling assumptions and on a limited number of deep
parameters (GLPS make a similar point). However, the pseudo–structural orthogonalisa-
tion associated with Sims (1980) is considered. This imposes a Wold–causal ordering on
the variables and requires that the contemporaneous matrix A0 is lower triangular and
that the covariance matrix Ω is diagonal. The variables in zt = (xt|yt)






t , qt,∆wt −∆zt,∆pt, rt, dt, ft, it, yt)
′
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where pot is the price of crude oil and dt = (rl,t −∆pt) lt. The oil price is included in the
model to account for exogenous business cycle fluctuations. Given that the model is to be
estimated over a timescale which includes the oil price shocks of the 1970’s, the Gulf wars
and the recent turbulence in global oil markets, the rationale for its inclusion is obvious.
The proposed ordering reflects the sequencing of economic decisions. The variables
pot and y
∗
t are placed first as they are treated as weakly exogenous I(1) forcing for the
system in the sense of Granger and Lin (1995). Given that no contemporaneous effect
of the endogenous variables on the exogenous variables can exist, it seems reasonable to
assume that their values are known prior to the decision process. qt is the first of the
endogenous variables, followed by ∆wt and ∆pt. This ordering reflects the Minskyan view
of the inflationary process. The inflationary pressure leads the central bank to raise the
interest rate, rt. The ordering of dt and ft reflects the belief that firms are likely to notice
increased interest costs before they notice the reduction in their cash–flow associated with
reduced demand. The relationship between cash–flow and the cost of debt–servicing will
influence the investment decision and this, in turn, will impact demand.
Based on this recursive structure, the matrix of contemporaneous coefficients, A0 is











where Axy is a 2× 8 null matrix (see the Appendix for further details).
Using the long–run structural modelling approach, the four relationships may be re–
written in terms of the long–run deviations from equilibrium as follows:
ξ = β′zt−1 − b0 − b1t (5.14)
where:
b0 = (b10, b20, b30, b40)
′ and b1 = (b11, b21, b31, b41)
′
and β is the 4× 10 cointegrating matrix defined either as the exactly–identified Johansen
long–run matrix, βex, or the theory–based over–identified matrix, βov, where:
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β′ov =

0 1 0 0 −φ11 φ11 0 0 φ12 −1
0 −φ22 0 0 φ21 −1 0 0 0 φ22
0 −φ34 φ33 0 0 0 φ32 φ31 −1 φ34
0 −φ42 0 φ41 −1 0 0 0 0 φ42
















To this point, very little has been said about the nature of the deterministic time trends
included in the long–run relationships and captured by the vector b1. In general, one may
be reasonably certain that the demand and investment equations should contain such
trend terms owing to the process of economic growth. However, it is not clear that either
the reaction function or the inflation equation should incorporate deterministic trends. It
is possible that the series co–trend, a hypothesis that will be investigated empirically.
5.3 The Dataset
5.3.1 Data Used in Estimation
The dataset consists of 164 quarterly observations for the US economy between 1967Q1
and 2007Q4 on the variables listed in Table 5.1. Details of the data sources and manip-
ulations, as well as detailed descriptive statistics and graphical analysis, are recorded in
the Appendix.
Symbol Variable Definition
pot Natural log of the real price of crude oil
†
y∗t Natural log of potential output (computation discussed below)
††
qt Natural log of Tobin’s q
∆wt −∆zt Natural log of productivity–adjusted wage inflation
∆pt Natural log of consumer price inflation
rt Natural log of the Federal funds rate
dt Natural log of the real debt–service cost (i.e. ln ((rt −∆pt) lt))
ft Natural log of corporate non–financial internal funds
it Natural log of real gross corporate non–financial investment
yt Natural log of real GDP
† Note that all variables except y∗t are indexed at 100 in the year 2000 prior to logging.
†† Potential output is indexed relative to realised output in the year 2000 - see Appendix.
Table 5.1: Variables used in Estimation
5.3.2 The Estimation of Potential Output
The output gap is typically defined as 100 (yt − y
∗) /y∗, which expresses the gap between
actual and potential output as a percentage of potential output. Potential output, in turn,
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typically refers to the highest sustainable level of output given installed capacity which is
consistent with stable inflation. Hence, a zero output gap is often set to coincide with the
NAIRU, although such normalisation is essentially arbitrary.
Recent controversies surrounding the NAIRU, ranging from both observationally and
empirically motivated doubts over its constancy to empirical difficulties in terms of sat-
isfactory estimation, have serious implications for such applications (see in particular
Gordon, 1997, and Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997). In light of this, and influenced
by the Bank of Japan’s (2003) ‘benchmark output gap’, potential output is defined here
as the level of output that would be achieved if all factors of production were utilised to
the fullest possible extent, regardless of the inflationary consequences. Potential output
estimated in this way is always higher than the realised level and, therefore, always results
in a negative value of the output gap. This notion of the output gap may be considered
as a measure of aggregate economic slack.
Two main methods exist for the estimation of potential output. The first, and most
popular, is statistical detrending using, for example, the Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
filter. Such procedures attempt to distinguish between permanent and transitory com-
ponents in the series of interest, thereby separating trend from cycle. However, such
statistical filtering is atheoretic and results in an estimate of potential output which may
be more accurately termed trend output. The second approach involves the construction
of an aggregate production function, which is initially estimated using realised quantities
and then used to impute the level of output that could be achieved if all productive inputs
were fully utilised. The definition of full employment is typically that which is consistent
with stable inflation (i.e. unemployment is at the NAIRU).
The Cobb–Douglas production function has gained some popularity in the estimation
of potential output. It is used by the OECD (Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare and van den
Noord, 1995), the European Commission (Roeger, 2006) and the Bank of Japan (2003),
among others. However, concerns over the empirical performance of the Cobb–Douglas
function and the apparently flawed assumption of a time–invariant labour share have led
many to question its usefulness, certainly at an aggregate level. To address these concerns,
a transcendental logarithmic (translog) specification is employed here, of the form:









+ βLK ln (Lt) ln (Kt) + βtLln (Lt) t+ βtK ln (Kt) t+ αtt+ βttt
2 + ǫt (5.15)
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where Yt, Lt and Kt denote output, labour input and capital input in non–logged form.
In order to achieve a tractable specification, linear homogeneity is imposed by setting
αL + αK = 1, βLK = βKL, βLL = βKK , 2βLL = −βLK and βtL = −βtK . Substituting
these restrictions into equation 5.15 yields:









− 2βLLln (Lt) ln (Kt) + βtLln (Lt) t− βtLln (Kt) t+ αtt+ βttt
2 + ǫt (5.16)
It is well established that simple OLS estimation of equation 5.16 will yield biased
results (see, for example, Kim, 1992). To achieve unbiased estimation, equation 5.16
is estimated simultaneously with the associated cost–share equations which are defined
following Kim as:
SL =
δln (Y ) /δln (L)
δln (Y ) /δln (L) + δln (Y ) /δln (K)
SK =
δln (Y ) /δln (K)
δln (Y ) /δln (L) + δln (Y ) /δln (K)
= 1− SL
where SL and SK denote the cost shares of labour and capital, respectively, and sum
to unity by construction. Under the assumption that SL and SK are logistic–normally































αL + βLLln (L)− 2βLLln (K) + βtLt
αK + βLLln (K)− 2βLLln (L)− βtLt
]
+ et (5.17)




is an idiosyncratic error process.
In order to estimate potential output from equations 5.16 and 5.17, parameter estimates
are first obtained using data on realised output and capital and labour inputs, and these
are then used in conjunction with estimates of potential capital and labour inputs to
impute the level of potential output consistent with full factor utilisation. Details of the
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data used in estimation and the computational process may be found in the Appendix.
Table 5.2 presents the coefficient estimates resulting from full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) estimation of equations 5.16 and 5.17 using the Marquardt optimisation
algorithm. While the specification suffers from serial correlation which invalidates the
inferential statistics, the coefficient estimates are unbiased. These coefficient values are
imposed in the estimation of potential output under the assumption that the error process
is Gaussian. In this way, three potential output series are computed:
i. Y ∗1 uses the estimated constant NAIRU in defining the potential labour input;
ii. Y ∗2 uses the estimated time–varying NAIRU; and
iii. Y ∗3 assumes zero unemployment (this series is used in estimation of the CVAR
model).
Coefficient Std. Error z–Statistic Prob.
Const. 1.575 0.154 10.230 0.000
αL 0.525 0.007 71.499 0.000
βLL 0.027 0.002 12.602 0.000
βtL 0.000 0.000 5.419 0.000
αt 0.005 0.000 20.762 0.000
βtt 0.000 0.000 3.196 0.001
Log Likelihood 422.822
Determinant residual covariance 1.98E-05
Statistics for equation 5.16:
R–squared 0.998 Mean dependent var 8.764
Adjusted R–squared 0.998 S.D. dependent var 0.360
S.E. of regression 0.017 Sum squared resid 0.045
Durbin–Watson statistic 0.113
Statistics for equation 5.17:
R–squared 0.107 Mean dependent var 1.053
Adjusted R–squared 0.096 S.D. dependent var 0.360
S.E. of regression 0.342 Sum squared resid 18.858
Durbin–Watson statistic 0.087
Table 5.2: FIML Estimation of Equations 5.16 and 5.17
For comparative purposes, potential output is also estimated using a log–linearised
constant returns–to–scale Cobb–Douglas function of the form:
ln (Yt) = αln (Lt) + (1− α) ln (Kt) + ǫt (5.18)
In order to estimate potential output, the production function is first re–written in
terms of ǫt, the Solow residual (the change in output not explained by measurable changes
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in productive inputs), which is composed of total factor productivity (TFP) and an id-
iosyncratic Gaussian error, ut. Hence:
ln (TFPt + ut) = ln (Yt)− αln (Lt)− (1− α) ln (Kt) (5.19)
Estimation of equation 5.19 requires knowledge of the output elasticity of labour de-
mand, α. It is well established that, under perfect competition, α is equal to the labour–
share. The arithmetic mean of the US adjusted labour share (based on data from Table
9 of the European AMECO database over the range 1967-2007) is 0.686. It is possible to
remove the noise from the residual series ǫ using the HP filter (λ = 1600), thereby estimat-
ing TFP. The resulting series is then used in conjunction with the potential capital and
labour inputs to estimate the level of potential output. The three estimates corresponding
to the various potential labour series are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those computed from the translog function.
5.4 Estimation of the Model
5.4.1 Order of the VAR model
The order of the underlying VAR model is determined in the normal manner using the
AIC, SIC and the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. The results are summarised in Table 5.3.
The figures reported result from the estimation of an unrestricted VAR model comprising





favours the inclusion of two lags while SIC selects just one. Given the ambiguity of the
tests, a parsimonious VAR(2) specification is selected. This represents the best balance
between achieving a sufficiently rich lag structure to account for any serial correlation on
the one hand, and keeping the dimensionality of the model sufficiently low given the range
of the dataset on the other.
Order LL AIC SIC LR test Adjusted LR test
4 3575.1 3303.1 2884.9
3 3515.3 3307.3 2987.5 χ264 = 119.683[.000] 94.250[.008]
2 3454.1 3310.1 3088.7 χ2128 = 242.069[.000] 190.629[.000]
1 3387.9 3307.9 3184.9 χ2192 = 374.502[.000] 294.920[.000]
0 2505.6 2489.6 2465.0 χ2256 = 2139.000[.000] 1684.400[.000]
Table 5.3: Selection of the Order of the Underlying VAR
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5.4.2 Estimation of the Long–Run Relationships
The Johansen cointegration test results for the VAR(2) are presented in Table 5.4. Based
on the simulated critical values tabulated by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000), the trace
statistic indicates three cointegrating relationships while the maximum eigenvalue statistic
indicates four. Given the theoretical model described above, the modelling proceeds on
the assumption that r=4.
VAR(2) CV of Trace CV of Max
H0 H1 Trace Max 95% 90% 95% 90%
r = 0 r = 1 331.59 90.60 215.79 209.11 61.22 58.18
r ≤ 1 r = 2 240.98 78.59 177.79 171.62 55.83 52.69
r ≤ 2 r = 3 162.40 59.20 141.73 136.21 50.10 47.08
r ≤ 3 r = 4 103.20 43.87 108.90 103.71 43.72 40.94
r ≤ 4 r = 5 59.33 20.02 81.20 76.68 37.85 35.04
r ≤ 5 r = 6 39.31 19.66 56.43 52.71 31.68 29.00
r ≤ 6 r = 7 19.65 14.34 35.37 32.51 24.88 22.53
r ≤ 7 r = 8 5.31 5.31 18.08 15.82 18.08 15.82
Table 5.4: Johansen Cointegration Test Results
Estimation of the system subject to the full theory–based over–identifying restrictions
outlined in Section 5.2.1 results in convergence failure. Through a process of trial and
improvement, the following over–identified structure was developed:
yt = b10 + b11t+ φ11 (rt −∆pt) + φ12it + φ13y
∗
t + ξ1,t , φ13 = 1 (5.20)
rt = b20 + φ21∆pt + ξ2,t (5.21)
it = b30 + b31t+ φ31ft + φ32dt + φ33qt + φ34yt + φ35y
∗ + ξ3,t (5.22)
∆pt = b40 + φ41 (∆wt −∆zt) + φ42rt + ξ4,t , φ41 = 1 (5.23)
Based on this system of equations, the long–run matrix β′ov is estimated as follows:
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 16.810 −16.810 0.000 0.000 0.170 −1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.439 −1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.060 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.275 −0.112 −1.000 2.311
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 −1.000 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

while b1 = (−0.002 0.000 − 0.013 0.000)
′.
Convergence was achieved by the Newton–Raphson and batch–sequential algorithms
with a tolerance of 1× 10−4 after 18 iterations. The imposition of 33 restrictions in the β
matrix represents 17 over–identifying restrictions, resulting in a likelihood ratio of 113.682
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and a restricted maximum likelihood of 3541.531. Hence, the over–identified long–run
structure is rejected by the analytical critical values of 24.769 (10% level) and 25.587 (5%
level). However, the poor performance of the LR test in small samples is well documented
(c.f. GLPS, p. 140). For this reason, a bootstrap procedure was employed (details may be
found in the Appendix) resulting in critical values of 130.508 (90%) and 139.709 (95%),
providing support for the proposed over–identifying structure11.
The inclusion of an output gap of the form (1,−1) in equation 5.20 associated with
the restriction φ13 = 1 is not rejected by the LR statistic and results in sharper impulse
response functions compared to the weaker form in which φ31 is freely estimated. However,
the estimation results are improved considerably by weakening the restriction that φ34 −
φ35 = 0 in the investment function. The divergent parameter estimates in this case suggest
that the level of investment is strongly affected by the level of output, not simply by the
output gap.
The inclusion of the output gap in either strong- or weak–form in the reaction func-
tion and inflation equation resulted in poor estimation results. Their removal carries the
implication that inflation is modelled as a cost–push phenomenon and that the central
bank is modelled as a simple inflation–targeter. Furthermore, the imposition of a (1 -1)
relationship between inflation and wage inflation in equation 5.23 was not rejected and
resulted in improved dynamic performance of the model.
Convergence failure was frequently encountered when experimenting with specifications
that omitted the interest rate from the inflation equation and, where convergence was
achieved, the LR statistic was typically inflated. Its inclusion reflects the notion that
interest expense is a cost faced by firms and may be passed on to consumers in a situation
of mark–up pricing. In order to model this proposition, it follows that one should include
the interest rate which affects not only the effective cost of the existing debt–stock but also
the cost of obtaining new credit, as opposed to the debt–service cost which only directly
captures the former. Furthermore, it should be clear that it is the nominal interest rate
that should be included in this case as inflation is the left–hand–side variable12. Hence,
equation 5.23 states that wage costs are fully passed through to the price level in the long–
run, while interest rate (capital) costs are only partially passed through. Such a result
could be used as a justification for incomes policy as opposed to (or possibly in concert
with) monetary policy in the pursuit of low and stable inflation.
11The non–parametric method was employed with 5000 replications, 3126 (62.52%) of which converged
to a tolerance of 1x10−4 within 1000 iterations using the Newton–Fourier and batch–sequential algorithms.
12Although the four long–run relationships remain uniquely identified under the proposed specification,
the inflation equation is rendered rather similar to the reaction function. For this reason, estimation results
must be interpreted with some care.
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Empirical testing of the model provided little support for the inclusion of deterministic
trend terms in either the reaction function or the inflation specification, indicating that
the series co–trend. This co–trending is entirely consistent with economic theory under the
assumptions that inflation is a cost–push phenomenon and that monetary policy attempts
to meet an inflation target.
5.4.3 Dynamic Analysis
Persistence Profiles
While impulse responses derived from integrated systems do not necessarily die out as the
forecast horizon increases, the effects of reduced–form shocks on the long–run relationships
are temporary. The persistence profiles of the four cointegrating vectors under the exact

























Figure 5.2: Persistence Profiles of the Cointegrating Vectors
The persistence profiles exhibit no over–shooting in either the exactly- or over–identified
case and die away to zero very rapidly, indicating no excess persistence of shocks and
demonstrating the equilibrium properties of the model. Structural stability testing based
on the determinental equation confirms the stability of the system under either specifica-
tion.
Impulse Responses Following an Interest Rate Shock
The principal interest of this chapter lies in identifying the effects of interest rate inno-
vations on the core endogenous variables. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 plot the generalised and
orthogonalised impulse response functions (GIRFs and OIRFs, respectively) following a
one standard deviation positive interest rate innovation.
Bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals are included in the figures to provide an indi-
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Figure 5.3: GIRF of a 1σ Shock to the Interest Rate on all Variables








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40





5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(j) y (percentage change)
Figure 5.4: OIRF of a 1σ Shock to the Interest Rate on all Variables
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cation of statistical significance13. However, the reliability of intervals computed in this
way may be questionable, certainly at longer horizons (c.f. Kilian, 1998; 1999)14. For this
reason, it must be emphasised that they are at most suggestive of the level of significance.
Hence, in some cases where the reported interval includes zero, the reader may tentatively
consider that a shift in the empirical distribution of the IRFs provides some evidence of
an effect that may be of interest.
The IRFs demonstrate that an increase in the interest rate of one standard deviation
depresses Tobin’s q, which presumably reflects a contraction of the stock market. This is
also reflected in a significant economic retrenchment at longer horizons, albeit preceded
by non–negligible positive impact effects on investment and output. The figures suggest
that this initial phase of overshooting lasts for up to one year following the interest rate
shock, although no significant decrease in investment is observed at longer horizons. This
suggests that the contractionary effect on the economy arises through other channels, the
most obvious of which is the negative stock market wealth effect.
The figures provide strong evidence that increases in the interest rate are associated
with a simultaneous increase in the real cost of servicing real debt for up to 6 quarters
and a longer–term reduction in the internal funds of firms. This combination reduces
the ability of firms to remain solvent in the face of further liquidity shocks. Given the
use of aggregate data, one cannot draw strong inferences regarding the microeconomic
consequences for individual firms and sectors. However, the divergence between the fi-
nancial inflows and outflows of firms at the aggregate level will be reflected in a shift in
the financing spectrum toward the increasingly unstable Ponzi end. While the impulse re-
sponses are derived from a reduced–form model, rendering structural inference impossible,
the results nevertheless provide strong support for Minsky’s contention that the interest
rate implement of monetary policy may be destabilising. This is the case because while
an interest rate shock need not be a monetary policy shock, the operating procedures of
modern central banks ensure that a monetary policy shock is always an interest rate shock
(certainly when the interest rate under consideration is the Federal funds rate).
Interestingly, the interest rate is seen to have little effect on either wage inflation
or price level inflation beyond the observation of a mild and insignificant price puzzle.
13These intervals are based on the non–parametric method described in the Appendix and allow for
parameter uncertainty. Of the 5000 replications, convergence was achieved in 3192 cases, resulting in a
convergence rate of 63.84%. Initial testing indicates that the convergence rate may exceed 77% when the
maximum number of iterations used in the computation of the ML estimates is increased from 1000 to
5000 but the observed four–fold increase in computational time renders this approach impractical as the
number of bootstrap replications becomes large.
14Alternative methods of computing confidence intervals for impulse response functions, including that
proposed by Kilian, are unproven in large system models such as that developed here.
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While it could be argued that this is an artefact of the cost–push inflation specifica-
tion, the result suggests that inflation–targeting monetary policy may be ineffective (c.f.
Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Angeriz and Arestis, 2006).
Impulse Responses Following an Inflation Shock
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present GIRFs and OIRFs for all variables in response to a positive
inflation shock. Such a shock may come about as the result of changes in inflation expec-
tations or as the result of a variety of supply shocks, for example. What is particularly
interesting about the figures is that the inflationary shock has a profound negative effect
on the real cost of debt–service on impact and that this effect lasts for approximately three
quarters. This reduction in the burden of debt reflects the inflationary erosion of the loan
principle. However, what is remarkable is the fact that this negative effect is relatively
short–lived when compared to the persistence of the inflationary pressure which remains
non–zero across the entire horizon. This suggests that firms may take advantage of high
inflation environments to increase their leverage in the expectation of continuing inflation.
With the exception of the cost of debt–service, the inflationary shock has no other
significant effects at the 90% level15. This would suggest that monetary policy has not
responded to inflation in a systematic manner over the sample period. This result is not
surprising given the relatively long sample period that includes a number of different policy
regimes pursued by the Fed.
Impulse Responses Following a Shock to the Valuation Ratio
Figure 5.7 presents the responses of the variables to a positive shock to the valuation
ratio16. Such a shock may reflect an episode of irrational exuberance, in which equity
values become inflated relative to the replacement cost–of–capital assets.
The shock is associated with a significant lagged increase in realised output, starting
after three quarters and lasting for approximately five quarters. Furthermore, this eco-
nomic stimulus is accompanied by a large, although apparently insignificant, increase in
investment spending which can be attributed to two principle phenomena. Firstly, the
increase in the valuation ratio is likely to reflect an increasingly bullish sentiment in the
broader economy, which acts as a stimulant to investment as expectations grow increas-
ingly optimistic. Secondly, in a bull market, firms find it easier and cheaper to borrow
15The empirical distribution of many of the IRFs does however shift, which could be interpreted as
suggestive of some latent effect. For example, the empirical distribution of interest rate IRFs shifts upward,
placing more of the probability mass above zero at every horizon.
16Note that the OIRFs are identical to the GIRFs in this case due to the variable ordering and are,
therefore, not reported separately.






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40





5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40





5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40







5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(j) y (percentage change)
Figure 5.5: GIRF of a 1σ Shock to Inflation on all Variables
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Figure 5.6: OIRF of a 1σ Shock to Inflation on all Variables
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Figure 5.7: GIRF/OIRF of a 1σ Shock to Tobin’s q on all Variables
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on the financial markets, easing their resource constraints (see Section 2.3.2 on the broad
credit channel). This effect undoubtedly contributes to the negligible impact of the shock
on the debt–servicing cost in all but the very short–run. Interestingly, the shock exerts a
modest negative impact effect on internal funds.
No significant effect is recorded on wage and price level inflation, indicating that asset
price inflation is not passed through to retail prices. This suggests that measures of core
inflation do not adequately reflect conditions in financial markets. Hence, contrary to the
assertion of many monetary economists and central bankers alike, core inflation seems
to be an insufficient summary statistic for economy–wide inflationary pressure. In this
case, one could argue that monetary policy may be improved by paying greater attention
to asset market sentiment (see Svensson, 2000, for a similar discussion about extending
the range of variables in the reaction function). In the contemporary era of widespread
financial turmoil and distress, such arguments may prove more persuasive than in the
past.
Impulse Responses Following an Investment Shock
A positive investment shock provides a significant economic stimulus which is evident in
a number of the impulse responses presented in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. Firstly, increased
investment spending induces a significant increase in aggregate output which lasts for four
quarters before dying away. A similar response pattern is observed for potential output,
although the effect is statistically insignificant after all but the first quarter.
As would be expected, the investment boom is associated with substantial increases
in the real cost of debt–servicing lasting for almost two years, and with similar increases
in the central bank base rate. This interest rate response to an investment shock would
suggest a concern with inflationary pressure. While the investment shock does seem to
exert a positive influence on inflation, it proves statistically insignificant.
Interestingly, the investment boom is associated with a marginally insignificant decline
in the valuation ratio. Given Kilian’s reservations over the accuracy of the reported critical
values, one must remain open to the possibility that this effect is non–negligible. This
would suggest that an investment boom is associated with a reduction in Tobin’s q. Such
a result is intuitively reasonable when one recalls that a real investment boom in this model
is associated with an increase in the value of fixed capital installed but not necessarily with
a stock–market boom. In this case, the denominator of Tobin’s q will increase while the
numerator remains relatively unchanged, resulting in the observed decline.
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Figure 5.8: GIRF of a 1σ Shock to Investment on all Variables
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Figure 5.9: OIRF of a 1σ Shock to Investment on all Variables
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5.4.4 Forecasting
Table 5.5 presents various analytical statistics indicating that the in–sample forecasting
performance of the model is reasonably good. The model correctly predicts 71.3% of di-
rectional changes and achieves a Kuipers score of 0.423, indicating that the number of
correct predictions significantly exceeds the number of erroneous predictions17. Further-
more, the predictive failure test of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) reports a value of
3.777, significantly exceeding the 1% critical value of the standard normal density. Hence,
one may conclude that the model exhibits promising in–sample forecasting performance,




Table 5.5: In–Sample Forecasting Performance
Figure 5.10 presents four–quarter moving average central forecasts of the levels of the
interest rate, wage and price inflation, and the growth rates of the remaining variables18.
As is well known, the degree of confidence that one should place in such forecasts decreases
with the forecast horizon. In general, one would expect that attempting to forecast further
than four to six quarters ahead based on a simple model of the type deployed here would be
unwise. Longer horizons are provided in the diagrams simply to demonstrate the tendency
of the central forecasts to converge on the observed historical average in the long–run.
The model predicts that the sharp increases in the price of oil that characterise the
end of the sample used in estimation will gradually recede until 2008q4 whereupon more
normal price growth will resume (panel (a)). Interestingly, however, the model predicts no
overshooting, suggesting that the price of oil will not fall substantially from its quarterly
peak price. Similar views were regularly proffered at the time reflecting the belief that oil
price inflation had been driven largely by realised and expected increases in demand from
emerging economies, most notably China and India. However, in reality oil prices have
fallen markedly from their peak. Hence, although the model correctly identifies the end of
the recent bout of oil price inflation, it fails to adequately capture the transitory nature
of the shock.
Panels (b) to (j) suggest that the time path of the remaining variables will be relatively
17The Kuipers score is defined H − F where H is the hit rate and F the false alarm rate. Therefore, a
random walk model would be expected to generate an average Kuipers score of precisely zero in repeated
trials, while a positive value reflects more ‘hits’ than ‘misses’.
18The figures include 90% confidence intervals computed by non–parametric simulation allowing for
future uncertainty. 5000 iterations were employed. Details of the computational procedure may be found
in the Appendix. The relevant computer code is included in the enclosed CD.
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Figure 5.10: 4 Quarter Moving Average Central Forecasts of all Variables
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stable in the longer–term following substantial volatility in the short–run. Recalling that
the reliability of such forecasts over anything but a short timeframe is questionable, the
analysis offered below focuses largely on this initial volatile period.
Panel (c) predicts a mild reduction in Tobin’s q. Given that q is the ratio of market
value to the replacement cost of capital, a reduction in its level may be brought about
either by a contraction in the stock market or by an increase in the capital stock. Given
that investment growth is predicted to decelerate relatively markedly in the short–run
(panel (i)), one may be reasonably confident that the decline in q can be attributed to
predicted losses in the stock markets.
The deceleration of investment growth noted above is associated with short–run tur-
bulence in the rate of growth of debt–servicing costs (panel (g)), internal funds (panel (h))
and output (panel (j)). The model predicts that the internal funds of firms will shrink
substantially at a rate of 7% per annum in the short–run before the growth rate gradu-
ally recovers after four quarters. At the same time, the debt–servicing costs of firms are
forecast to shrink at an annual rate reaching 25% in 2008q3. Taken together, these effects
provide little evidence of financial fragility, as the rate of growth of internal funds exceeds
that of debt–servicing costs in all but the very short–run. The forecasts do, however,
suggest that the short–term outlook for firms may be rather bleak.
The predicted reduction in the real debt–servicing obligations of firms could be at-
tributed to any of three phenomena; a reduction in the interest rate, an increase in the
rate of inflation, or a reduction in the amount of borrowing. Panel (f) forecasts relative
constancy of the base rate, which should translate into similar constancy of the lending
rates faced by borrowers, at least if one assumes that the mark–up charged by commercial
banks remains relatively constant. Similarly, panel (e) forecasts only minor inflationary
pressure. Hence, it seems that the predicted fall in debt–servicing costs is rooted in reduced
borrowing/lending, an observation which is consistent with our subsequent experience of
the financial crisis.
The forecasts reveal one final point of interest. Panel (d) indicates substantial upward
pressure on productivity–adjusted wages. Despite the specification of a long–run cost–
push inflationary process, the effect on price level inflation is muted, if it is present at all.
For this reason, the central bank base rate is forecast to remain remarkably stable despite
the substantial economic upheavals documented above.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the forecasts derived from the model
present a rather more optimistic picture than actually came to pass. However, that the
forecasts identified signs of weakness in various sectors of the economy using a dataset
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covering just the first quarter of the subprime crisis is a credit to the model.
5.5 Implications for Monetary Policy
The principal finding that the interest rate may be destabilising when used as an implement
of monetary policy raises a number of issues for policymakers. Firstly, are there any viable
alternative interest rate rules which could alleviate these destabilising influences without
fundamentally undermining the dual mandate of price stability and sustainable growth?
Secondly, are there any alternative tools at the disposal of policymakers which could be
employed in asset market management, and would such intervention be desirable?
The general view of central bankers toward smoothing asset market cycles is eloquently
captured by ex–Chairman Greenspan (2002, ¶17) as follows:
[N]othing short of a sharp increase in short–term rates that engenders a sig-
nificant economic retrenchment is sufficient to check a nascent bubble. The
notion that a well–timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to
prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we...need
to focus on policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease
the transition to the next expansion.
This view represents an asymmetric policy stance (Posen, 2006; Roubini, 2006). Nu-
merous reasons underlie the reluctance of central bankers to intervene in asset markets,
ranging from a dogmatic acceptance of the tenets of the efficient markets model to the
purportedly insuperable difficulties in identifying bubbles ex ante. However, an energetic
debate has developed in the literature over the possibility of a more proactive role for mon-
etary policy, a position which is rapidly gaining ground in the current turbulent economic
environment19.
5.5.1 Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
There exists a general (although by no means universal) consensus among economists that
asset price terms should not enter the interest rate rule because inflation and the output
gap are sufficient summary statistics (c.f. Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; 2001 and Posen,
2006). Four main reasons underlie this popular view. Firstly, the so–called Schwartz
Hypothesis (Schwartz, 1988; 1998) that price level instability begets financial instability20
19Indeed, many commentators in the financial press have blamed the credit crisis on the easy money
policies of the Greenspan Fed (c.f. Roach, 2007).
20Schwartz argues that instability of the price level (particularly disinflation) may cause financial insta-
bility. She stresses that it may exacerbate the problems associated with informational asymmetries and
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is typically offered as a justification for the narrow focus of monetary policy on price level
stabilisation. Secondly, the ‘targets–and–instruments’ approach originated by Tinbergen
(1952) has been embraced by the new consensus and used to strengthen this defense of IT
policies on the grounds that the number of targets should be at most equal to the number of
instruments. Thirdly, many commentators highlight the difficulties in identifying bubbles,
let alone forecasting them. Fourthly, it is often argued that the cost–benefit analysis of
bubble–pricking interest rate policies is unfavourable due to the collateral damage that
would be inflicted on non–bubble sectors of the economy (c.f. Posen, 2006; Nickell, 2005).
Moreover, should the central bank mistake asset price inflation based on productivity gains
with a bubble, then the enaction of bubble–pricking measures is likely to stifle a genuine
economic boom and may even instigate a depression (Bernanke, 2002; 2003).
A substantial and growing minority has dissented from this view. They argue, firstly,
that the Schwarz Hypothesis has recently been violated by the existence of bubbles dur-
ing prolonged periods of low and stable inflation (e.g. the dotcom bubble and the growth
phase of the current housing bubble). Such an observation is, however, entirely consistent
with the Minskyan position, which stresses that prolonged periods of stability are likely to
lower the financial safety margins of economic agents and may, thereby, contribute to asset
market cyclicality. Secondly, speculative excesses are distributionally sub–optimal, divert-
ing investment from productive to speculative ends. Thirdly, in the event of a large price
correction, the solvency of financial institutions may be compromised due to the increased
incidence of default on collateralised borrowing in a situation of widespread negative eq-
uity (Schwartz, 2002). Fourth, there is little reason to believe that the identification of
asset price misalignments poses more significant problems than those encountered in the
estimation of many other variables used in policymaking, including potential output and
the equilibrium exchange rate (c.f. Cecchetti et al., 2000; Roubini, 2006, pp. 92-3).
If it is perceived that the overheating of certain key markets is likely to precipitate
costly medium- to long–term equilibrium corrections, it may be desirable for the central
bank to raise the interest rate, missing its short–term inflation target in order to avert
longer–term instability and distress (c.f. Goodhart, 1996). Underlying this approach is the
introduce greater uncertainty in the lending process, especially as regards the evaluation of the expected
returns to debt–funded investment projects. Bordo and Wheelock (1998, esp. pp. 44-5) note that although
Schwartz does not explicitly model the linkage between price instability and financial instability, her work
is compatible with various theories of financial distress including the monetary misperceptions approach
of Lucas (1972, 1973) and the financial fragility/debt–deflation theory associated originally with Fisher
(1933a, 1933b) and, more recently, with Minsky (1977) among others. The authors also note that un-
certainty over future inflation may result in the application of additional ‘inflation risk premiums’ to the
lending rate thereby increasing the cost–of–capital (p. 42). Moreover, to the extent that uncertainty over
the future path of the price level hampers attempts by lenders to distinguish good loan prospects from
bad, a lemons premium in the sense of Akerlof (1970) may be added to the interest rate, further depressing
equilibrium investment.
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proposition that it may be desirable to conduct monetary policy based on a multi–faceted
mandate given an appropriate hierarchical structure of goals. Such a hierarchy may define
different policy regimes reflecting the most pressing concern facing the economy at a given
point in time.
Authors in the counter–consensus field have tended to adopt one of three positions,
the first of which holds that asset market conditions should enter the central bank ob-
jective function directly, i.e. that asset prices should be targeted by monetary policy (see
Roubini and the references therein). Filardo (2004) develops a simple linear stochastic
control model of an economy in which asset price bubbles are a non–trivial state variable.
Importantly, his model assumes a causal role for asset price bubbles but not for the funda-
mental component of asset prices. In this framework, he shows that an optimal policy rule
should include a bubble term if the monetary authority can distinguish between bubbles
and fundamentals and, perhaps more significantly, that it should include asset prices if
the bank cannot reliably separate the various components. Furthermore, Filardo proposes
that the central bank’s choice of whether or not to react to asset price bubbles should be
framed in terms of minimising the expected loss from each respective policy in a Bayesian
framework. Quite simply, given an assumed structure of the paradigm/model uncertainty,
one can calculate the expected loss associated with each policy and pursue that which
minimises this loss.
The second position is that the central bank could target a level of inflation based
on a newly defined inflation metric incorporating various asset price indices, appropri-
ately weighted (Alchian and Klein, 1973; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000; Goodhart, 2001).
Goodhart, 2001, stresses that house price inflation should be given a larger weight in a
‘proper’ inflation measure due to the fact that housing represents a considerable propor-
tion of the household asset portfolio and is a significant determinant of consumer spending.
A similar observation is made by Cecchetti et al. (2000).
The final approach, associated with Cecchetti et al. (2000), is that policymakers should
consider but not target asset prices. While this approach represents a compromise between
the dominant view and asset–price targeting, it is difficult to imagine how policy could re-
act to asset prices without actively targeting them and while maintaining its transparency
(see Allsopp, 2002 for a similar view). However, an intuitive way of approaching this issue
is to think of the monetary policy decision in terms of constrained optimisation. In such
a framework, the central bank is free to pursue anti–inflationary monetary policy as long
as it does not risk precipitating a crash in the financial markets insodoing. If it is felt that
further interest rate rises may contribute to unacceptable levels of financial fragility, then
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the central bank must desist. This idea simply reflects the fact that the primary responsi-
bility of the central bank is, and (in many cases) always has been, to ensure the stability
of the financial system. Hence, the academic view of IT policies may be overly simplistic
in the sense that it does not acknowledge the existence of such constraints despite the fact
that such issues are presumably discussed during the deliberations of the relevant policy
committees.
The typical objection to the inclusion of asset prices in the objective function is that the
manipulation of the interest rate to prick bubbles is likely to cause unacceptable collateral
damage21. References to the ‘blunt tool’ (Bernanke, 2006) or ‘blunderbuss’ (Palley, 2006)
of interest rate policy are commonplace. Furthermore, the empirical results adduced in
this chapter suggest that the use of the interest rate as a means of checking the growth
of perceived bubbles is potentially destabilising and, therefore, ill–advised. Such concerns
have triggered the development of an innovative literature focusing on alternative policy
instruments.
5.5.2 An Alternative to the Interest Rate
Even if one accepts the controversial theoretical case for asset–price–targeting interest
rate policies, the political will required for their implementation would most likely be
lacking. However, the narrow focus of the NCM on the interest rate implement diverts at-
tention from available alternatives, including (possibly heterogeneous) capital and margin
requirements and more direct prudential measures.
Palley (2004) proposes an alternative means by which central banks can smooth as-
set market cycles, which relies on their ability to set heterogeneous reserve requirements.
However, in contrast to the existing model of reserve requirements, Palley proposes that re-
serves should be held against the assets of financial institutions rather than their liabilities.
He distinguishes between systems of asset–based and liability–based reserve requirements
(ABRR and LBRR, respectively) as follows (p. 50):
[i]n a LBRR system, reserve requirements affect the relative rates paid on
liabilities and have no effect on loan rates [while under] an ABRR system, they
21An excellent example of this view is Nickell (2005). He shows that, even when asset market fluctuations
can be identified with certainty, “the relatively long lags in the monetary transmission mechanism make
the appropriate response to asset price misalignments very hard to calibrate” (p. 11). Nickell estimates
the interest rate innovation required to smooth the recent housing boom in the UK at 300 basis points
maintained for 13 quarters based on the Bank of England macroeconomic model. Even under the highly
favourable assumptions that the short–term nature of the rate rise is known to the public and that expected
inflation remains fixed at 2%, Nickell demonstrates that the policy would reduce GDP by more than 0.5%
and inflation by 1% causing the MPC to undershoot its target (p. 18). In the more plausible case that
these strong assumptions were not met, the impact would be magnified.
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have no effect on the rates paid on liabilities, and instead affect the relative
rates charged on loans.
In a conventional LBRR system, financial institutions are required to hold reserves in
proportion to the volume of deposits on their books. Changes in relative reserve ratios
change the relative cost associated with different types of deposits. Financial institutions
will then pass these costs on to depositors in the form of lower returns. By contrast,
manipulating the reserve ratios in an ABRR system changes the value of reserve assets
that a financial institution must hold against different classes of asset. Such changes will
then, presumably, be passed on to borrowers, directly changing the cost–of–capital.
An ABRR system has a number of appealing features. Firstly, a central bank act-
ing in this way could directly intervene in markets that it considers overheated without
recourse to the interest rate. Palley (2004, pp. 47-51) provides a simple algebraic for-
malisation of this principle. Hence, ABRR allows policymakers to target specific markets
without inflicting the type of collateral damage that would be associated with an interest
rate innovation. Secondly, in an environment with n classes of asset subject to reserve
requirements, the monetary authority would gain an additional n− 1 policy instruments,
thereby relaxing the constraints imposed by Tinbergen’s (1952) targets–and–instruments
framework (Palley, 2004; 2006). Thirdly, Schwartz (2002) stresses that the use of quantity
constraints to curtail unsafe lending in excessively bullish markets directly protects the
portfolios of financial institutions from large corrections in the value of collateral assets22.
This safeguarding of the liquidity of financial institutions is achieved without relying on
the promise of lender of last resort interventions, which Minsky famously argued serve to
reduce risk premia, thereby actively contributing to financial fragility (c.f. Minsky, 1986b,
p. 64 and also Wray, 2001, p. 6). Fourthly, Palley argues that the stabilisation properties
of ABRR are superior to those of LBRR on the grounds that reserves are made available
as borrowers default, thereby counter–cyclically providing liquidity to banks when they
find it most difficult to raise it in the market23.
Beyond the direct effects on the composition of lending working through cost mech-
anisms, changes in capital requirements brought about by the central bank are likely to
have strong signalling effects. Historical experience suggests that signals emanating from
22Schwartz advocates a similar approach to Palley, stressing that the central bank should engage in
the active management of reserve requirements in order to ensure that the balance sheets of financial
institutions are not compromised in the event of a substantial equilibrium correction in the price of collateral
assets. With an uncomfortable sense of prescience, Schwartz stresses that it is the role of the central bank
to ensure that taxpayers’ money is not used to reinforce the balance sheets of failing financial institutions
where it can be avoided by judicious pre–emptive action (p. 2).
23Palley argues that further benefits associated with ABRR include their contribution to public finances
through increased seigniorage revenue, and their more direct influence over non–bank financial institutions.
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central banks exert a profound and fast–acting effect on market participants. Probably the
best recent example is the so–called ‘irrational exuberance’ speech by Alan Greenspan on
December 5, 1996. In his address to the American Enterprise Institute, Greenspan won-
dered whether “irrational exuberance [had] unduly escalated asset values” and warned
that “we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the
interactions of asset markets and the economy” (Greenspan, 1996). In response to this
mild note of concern, markets around the world faltered, losing as much as 2% overnight.
Although the effect was short–lived, it is likely that a stronger signal would have a more
significant impact. Once a central bank has established the credibility of this new policy
implement then it is likely that a cautionary announcement would be sufficient to cool
markets appropriately, reducing the frequency of policy interventions.
5.5.3 A Simple ABRR Rule
Consider an economy with n distinct classes of asset, hi, each associated with a price
level phi . The rate of inflation of the price of asset i is defined in the usual manner as
πhi,t = ∆pi,t/pi,t−1. Focusing solely on lending for simplicity, the institution of an ABRR
system relies on the assumption that the central bank can identify loans associated with
each asset class (i.e. there are n classes of loans, Li). The approach discussed below could
be readily extended to the more general case in which other types of asset held by financial
institutions are also subject to heterogeneous reserve requirements.
In an ABRR system, banks and other financial institutions are induced to hold non
interest–bearing reserves against their outstanding loans in the proportion αi,t. The to-
tal quantity of reserves associated with asset i is αi,tLi,t. In the simplest case, assuming
for now that the central bank base rate is exogenously fixed at the level r¯, the oppor-
tunity cost of this reserve holding is r¯αi,tLi,t. In order to cover their operating costs
and the risk of default, and to generate an operating profit, financial institutions will
add a mark–up, mi, to their costs
24. Hence, the interest rate on class i lending will be
equal to (1 +mi) (1 + αi,t) r¯, which reduces to the familiar case of (1 +mi) r¯ if the reserve
requirement on asset i is zero. This leads to a simple rule of the form:
πhi,t − ψi,t = (1 +mi) (1 + αi,t) r¯ (5.24)
24Note that it is assumed that the mark–up may differ between different loan classes. This reflects
different operating costs faced by the bank, as well as different probabilities of default. In general, there
is little reason to believe that the mark–up is time–invariant: it would be relatively straightforward to
accommodate a time–varying mark–up although it would not change the principle insights gained from
the analysis.
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where ψi,t represents a ‘fair’ or sustainable return on investments in the ith asset class. It
should be clear that ψi,t is essentially an asset price inflation target. Recalling that r¯ is
determined exogenously, the policy instrument in this setting is the reserve requirement,
αi,t. The principle is that the reserve requirement should be set in such a way as to equate
the excess return on an investment with the cost of borrowing. The adjustment made to
the return is not necessarily intended simply to compensate for the risk of the investment
but also provides for a fair return on an investment25.
In the more general case in which the base rate is determined by a simple inflation–
targeting interest rate rule, one may write:
πhi,t − ψi,t = (1 +mi) (1 + αi,t) rt (5.25)
rt = β0 + β1 (πt − π
∗) (5.26)
It is clear that, in this case, should the value of αi,t remain unchanged while the base
rate is increased due to rising inflationary pressure, the cost of class i borrowing will
increase. Assuming that the inflationary pressure was not rooted in wealth effects arising
from inflation of the price of asset i, the cost of borrowing will come to exceed the adjusted
return, depressing investment in that asset. Should the central bank wish to avoid this
effect, it must decrease the reserve requirement αi,t in proportion to the increase in the
base rate, ∆rt. By contrast, if the inflationary pressure was thought to have been caused
by inflation of the price of asset i, the correct response on the part of the central bank
would be to increase αi,t to equalise the cost of class i borrowing and the adjusted return
on class i investments, while leaving the base rate unchanged. In such a setting, the source
of inflationary pressure would be of paramount importance in the determination of the
appropriate policy response and the interplay of reserve requirements and the base rate
as implements of monetary policy becomes clear.
In practice, the fair rate of return on an asset would probably be defined as an accept-
able range rather than a point target, giving the central bank a degree of discretion in its
actions. In general, the wider the range, the greater the discretion of the policymaker. In
such a setting, the central bank need not vary the n–vector of reserve requirements, α,
in response to changes in the base rate to maintain precise parity between the left- and
right–hand–sides of equation 5.25 at all times. Rather, it would be charged with ensur-
25Clearly, there is a minimum interest rate below which banks will not lend irrespective of the values of
πhi,t, ψi,t and αi,t. In particular, if π
h
i,t < ψi,t the interest rate on lending will not become negative; banks
will simply refuse to lend.
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ing that individual markets do not become dangerously overheated, as would be reflected
in the appearance of a significant imbalance between the adjusted return on asset i and
the associated cost of borrowing. This reflects the assumption that small imbalances be-
tween the adjusted rate of return and the cost of borrowing are not unduly harmful, and
represents an acknowledgement of the fact that monetary policymaking is not an exact
science.
In order to operate such a system, the central bank must be able to estimate the mark–
up vector, m, and to associate loans on the balance sheets of financial institutions with
the relevant asset classes. The position of the central bank at the heart of the financial
system provides it with a natural advantage in gathering information pertaining to these
parameters and in estimating their values. Furthermore, the central bank must estimate
an appropriate target level of inflation for each asset class. While Schwartz (2002, p. 23)
stresses that the central bank “is not the arbiter of the correct level of asset prices”, it has
become clear in recent months that markets left unfettered and free may be rather self–
destructive. The task of estimating an appropriate vector of asset price inflation targets
would be conceptually similar to the identification of current price level inflation targets.
It seems prudent to define the upper bound of the acceptable range with reference to the
historical experience of previous bubbles. If, for example, house price inflation in excess
of 5% per annum has been associated with bubbles in the past, then it may be considered
that the relevant reserve requirement should be increased when house price growth exceeds
this threshold. Such judgments are not pursued here but are left to expert analysis.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
The evidence adduced in this chapter suggests that the manipulation of the interest rate
by the central bank in order to achieve an inflation target is potentially destabilising.
Raising the interest rate reduces the internal funds of firms and simultaneously increases
their debt–burden, thereby undermining their ability to service their debts. Furthermore,
the results suggest that core inflation may be an insufficient summary statistic on which
to base monetary policy decisions, as it fails to properly reflect conditions in the asset
markets which, as we are all becoming increasingly aware, can have significant and long–
lasting real effects. In this sense, monetary policy may be improved by responding to a
range of asset market indicators as well as to traditional inflation measures and the output
gap.
The dominant position (certainly among practitioners) that asset bubbles should not
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be a concern of monetary policy during their expansion, but that policy should be eased
following a price correction, represents an asymmetric policy stance. Particularly to the
extent that easy money policies on the part of a central bank may inflate bubbles, it
seems likely that macroeconomic performance could be improved if the central bank were
to explicitly acknowledge its role in shaping the development of conditions in the financial
and asset markets.
By extension of this reasoning, it could be argued that the central bank should at-
tempt to manage the expansion of bubbles, thereby either reducing the fallout should the
bubble burst, or potentially averting the burst altogether (see Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, on
preemptive policies to deflate bubbles and Filardo, 2004, on their strategic management).
The contention that monetary policy should not respond to asset price misalignments
on the grounds that they are unobservable is undermined by the fact that many of the
variables already involved in policymaking are similarly unobservable (Cecchetti et al.,
2000). Moreover, Filardo (2004) has shown that even if the estimation of the extent of
market disequilibrium is not feasible then, under certain assumptions, it is optimal for the
monetary authority to respond to the level of asset prices. An alternative approach is to
acknowledge that conditions in financial markets may impose constraints on the monetary
policy decision. In this way, the monetary authority may pursue anti–inflationary inter-
est rate policies provided that they do not conflict with its fundamental responsibility to
maintain financial stability.
This leaves open the issue of how best to deal with sectoral asset price misalignments.
In the words of Chairman Bernanke, the interest rate implement is a ‘blunt tool’ which
has economy–wide effects. Considered in conjunction with the findings of this chapter, it
is unlikely that the interest rate is the appropriate tool with which to respond to sectoral
bubbles. Furthermore, the logic of Tinbergen’s (1952) targets–and–instruments approach
suggests that the use of a single policy implement to achieve multiple goals is not feasible
unless those goals are perfectly mutually consistent. There is no particular reason to think
that this would be the case in the context of asset price stabilisation; some markets may
be excessively bullish while others are performing poorly. The manipulation of capital
requirements by loan–type in the manner advocated by Palley (2004; 2006) represents an
alternative to interest rate policy in such situations. Furthermore, this combined approach
to monetary policymaking has the potential to reduce the volatility of the interest rate,
thereby reducing the likelihood of the emergence of widespread financial fragility.
Chapter 6
Monetary Policymaking in an
Open Economy
6.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a gradual shift in the operating regimes of many modern central
banks toward inflation–targeting, in which the monetary authority commits to set the
interest rate in such a way as to achieve a desired level of inflation (or more accurately
forecast inflation). Underlying this paradigm shift is the New Consensus macroeconomic
model, which stresses the need for a nominal anchor in the economy and focuses on
demand side explanations of inflation. The assumption that agents are Ricardian renders
fiscal policy impotent, leaving monetary policy as the only viable means of stabilising
macroeconomic fluctuations.
While the institutional arrangements surrounding IT strategies vary from country to
country, it is possible to identify a number of common elements. Probably the most
fundamental commonality is the choice of the targeted measure of inflation. In general,
most inflation targeters attempt to stabilise CPI or some variant thereof either below
a threshold or, more often, within a band. CPI measures the price of a representative
basket of goods and, as such, includes imported products and services. When expressed
in this way, it is clear that fluctuations in the exchange rate may pass through to the
rate of CPI inflation (this effect is evident in the six equation New Consensus model
discussed in Section 2.2). This leads to two propositions. Firstly, particularly for a small
open economy, it is essential that models of monetary policy explicitly account for the
relationship between the interest rate, the exchange rate and the broader macroeconomy
(c.f. Svensson, 2000, especially p. 158, and also the Report of the House of Lords Select
Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England, which estimates
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that more than 60% of the inflation–damping effect of a 100 basis point interest rate hike
maintained for one year comes about through the exchange rate channel in the first year
(House of Lords, 1999, ¶4.34 and Table A)). Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, by
targeting an inflation metric that incorporates imported goods, the monetary authority
implicitly responds to the exchange rate to some degree.
Despite the importance of open economy effects in the monetary policy decision pro-
cess, much of the existing literature on inflation–targeting employs a closed economy
framework. Prominent examples of closed economy models include Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), Bernanke et al. (1999), Clarida et al. (1999; 2000), McCallum (2001) and Meyer
(2001a). As well as omitting arguably the single most important channel of monetary
policy transmission in the short–run, such models cannot illuminate the interaction be-
tween monetary policy and the government budget deficit, the current account and the
capital account. In the case of the small and highly open UK economy, these effects are of
paramount importance, particularly given the large budget deficit operated by the Labour
Government in recent years.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the performance of a variety of inflation–
targeting policies in the context of a stock–flow consistent (SFC) open economy model.
The model is an extension of the advanced open economy framework of Godley and Lavoie
(2006, ch. 12) which models two interdependent economies with financial and trade rela-
tions. The addition of a simple conflicting claims process to the Godley–Lavoie framework
introduces persistent inflation, providing a basis for the analysis of inflation–targeting
policies. Furthermore, the specification of the marginal propensities to consume out of
income and wealth as negative functions of the real interest rate introduces cyclicality,
motivating the use of stabilisation policy. Using this framework, a number of candidate
stabilisation regimes are compared to the benchmark case of non–intervention, including
simple procyclical inflation–targeting, interest rate leadership and combinations involving
countercyclical fiscal policy.
Each closure of the model is subjected to three different shocks and the adjustment
path and subsequent trajectory of each economy is mapped. The three scenarios involve
a step decrease in UK exports, an increase in UK real wage pressure and an expansionary
income tax cut in the US. Each of these shocks works through the model in a different way,
testing the ability of each candidate policy rule to cope with heterogeneous disturbances.
The results suggest that the source of inflationary pressure is of fundamental importance in
identifying the correct response. Moreover, the simulations indicate that the combination
of fiscal and monetary policy measures yields superior stabilising performance compared
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to simple monetary policy rules (c.f. Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000; 2006; 2008). The
model also provides evidence of the indeterminacy of the effects of the exchange rate
channel of monetary transmission identified by Arestis and Sawyer (2004), although with
the added complication that the means by which the government chooses to fund its deficit
is important in determining the path of the exchange rate.
The chapter progresses in five sections. Section 6.2 outlines the underlying accounting
structure and presents the model equations in detail. Section 6.3 investigates the stabili-
sation performance of each candidate IT policy in the wake of the three shocks mentioned
above. Section 6.4 draws out a number of policy implications, while Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Inflation–Targeting in an Open Economy SFC Model
The stock–flow consistent approach to macroeconomic modelling originated in the 1960’s
jointly at Yale, under the leadership of James Tobin, and at Cambridge, where it was
associated with Wynne Godley. SFC modelling is based on a rigorous treatment of the
interlinkages between the various sectors of the economy. An SFC model is built on a
formal double–entry accounting structure from which accounting identities are derived.
In such a system, there is a counterparty to all transactions and the origin and destination
of all flows are made explicit. The advantage of such a rigorous approach is that it ensures
that, at all times, the model describes “a logically coherent world” (Godley and Lavoie
2006, p. 11). Simply put, ensuring continuous stock–flow consistency results in a model
that is built on solid foundations.
SFC modelling provides considerably richer insights than traditional equilibrium–based
approaches to modelling due to its inherent dynamics; flows are simply changes in the value
of stocks through time (i.e. xt +∆xt,t+1 = xt+1). In constructing and simulating an SFC
model, one’s primary interest is not the steady state of the model but rather the traverse
between (steady) states. Furthermore, the completeness of the accounting framework
illuminates the sequence of events that comprise this traverse, lifting the lid of the famous
‘black box’. Indeed, the clarity with which SFC modelling presents the inter–sectoral and
international flows of funds renders it an unusually powerful tool for the analysis of open
economic models.
The advantage of model–based simulation compared to estimation is that it “guaran-
tees us an Olympian knowledge of the true structure that is generating the observations”
(Brainard and Tobin, 1968, p. 99). Given the often contradictory nature of empirical
research into exchange rate determination, and the regularity with which supposedly
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inviolable identities are rejected by empirical testing (see, for example, the survey of
Froot and Thaler, 1990), this is an enviable property of the model which lends courage to
my conviction that it is the appropriate strategy to pursue in the current context.
One must not lose sight of the fact that the results of model–based simulations are
generally somewhat sensitive to the parameterisation of the model and, to a lesser degree,
to the choice of initial conditions. As with any modelling exercise, the output is only as
reliable as the input. Godley and Lavoie approach the issue of parameterisation by the
use of ‘stock–flow norms’ similar in spirit to Kaldorian stylised facts and normal ratios.
This is the approach followed throughout this chapter.
The model developed here is a modified and extended version of Godley and Lavoie’s
(2006) advanced open economy model. Equations defining the real wage aspirations of
workers and a simple partial adjustment process for nominal wages are added to the
basic model to introduce inflationary forces. Furthermore, the marginal propensities to
consume out of disposable income and wealth are endogenised as negative functions of the
real interest rate in order to generate cyclical behaviour in the aftermath of a shock. Using
this framework, simple procyclical inflation targeting (IT) and leader–follower interest rate
rules are investigated both in isolation and in conjunction with countercyclical fiscal policy.
The model remains simple in a number of ways. The commercial banking sector is
omitted in the interests of tractability, firms do not invest either in fixed capital goods
or inventory accumulation, the model abstracts from growth and all business profits are
assumed to be immediately distributed to households. Despite these simplifying assump-
tions, the model still contains more than one hundred equations.
6.2.1 Notational Conventions
Following Godley and Lavoie, the two countries in the model are identified using $ and
£ symbols and, occasionally, with reference to ‘the Fed’ or ‘the Bank of England’, for
example. It should be noted, however, that the model has not been calibrated to these
countries and that the terminology is used simply for comparability with the existing work
in the field. The following notational conventions are used throughout this chapter:
i. A superscript ‘$’ or ‘£’ denotes the country of issuance of an asset;
ii. A subscript ‘$’ or ‘£’ denotes the country where an asset is held;
iii. A subscript ‘d’ denotes demand. In the case of foreign assets, demand is denominated
in the currency of the demanding country;
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iv. A subscript ‘s’ denotes supply. In the case of international assets, supply is denom-
inated in the currency of the issuing country;
v. Capital letters denote nominal values, lower case and Greek letters signify real quan-
tities and parameters, respectively;
vi. A subscript ‘e’ denotes an expected value;
vii. ‘xr$’ is the Sterling value of the Dollar. $1 = £xr$ and xr£ = 1/xr$; and
viii. ‘∆’ is the backward difference operator and a ‘d’ prefix indicates a proportional rate




The terminology used in the model should be relatively self–explanatory. A glossary
of all the variables and parameters contained in the model may be found in the Appendix.
6.2.2 The Balance Sheet and Transactions–Flow Matrices
The accounting framework underpinning the model is described by Tables 6.1 and 6.2
which present the balance sheet and transactions–flow matrices, respectively. One should
note that the model consists of two distinct economies, each of which is comprised of four
sectors: households, firms, government and an independent central bank. The financial
assets in the model are UK and US government bills, which are internationally traded, and
high–powered money which is only used by domestic agents. Gold appears on the balance
sheet of the central bank as a remnant of the Bretton Woods era in the Godley and Lavoie
model but is included here to provide a means by which the model may be easily modified
to represent a situation in which the international asset held by the central banks is not
a liability of either government. Although this line of enquiry is not pursued here, it
remains a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. The government is assumed
to derive income both from levying income taxes on its subjects and from appropriating
the operating profits of the national central bank. This is not, however, intended to
suggest that the independence of the central bank is incomplete. It is merely a convenient
simplification of the modelling.
In any stock–flow consistent model, all rows and columns in the transactions–flow
matrix must simultaneously sum to zero to ensure that the accounting underlying the
model is consistent. Similarly, all columns in the balance sheet matrix must sum to zero,
although rows defining stocks of physical assets (gold in this case) need not. However,
while the sum of the row entitled ‘gold’ in the balance sheet matrix is non–zero, the
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Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.2: Transactions–Flow Matrix
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‘balance’. This indicates that the stock of gold held by the two central banks is equal
to the sum of the net worth of households, governments and the UK central bank. This
ensures that the matrix as a whole is balanced.
Following Godley and Lavoie, it is assumed that the UK central bank holds US trea-
sury bills for settlement purposes but that the US central bank does not hold UK bills.
Furthermore, given that the price of gold is assumed to be fixed in Dollar terms, its price
in Pounds may fluctuate as a result of exchange rate movements. Hence, the UK central
bank may accrue capital gains or losses and may, therefore, have non–zero net wealth1.
By contrast, the US central bank must, at all times, have precisely zero net wealth in
this model. Finally, it should be stressed that uses of funds appear with a negative sign
in the transactions–flow matrix even though the agent may be accumulating assets. Al-
though households are accumulating financial assets when they buy bonds, it must not be
forgotten that they are expending funds in order to make the purchase.
6.2.3 Firms’ Equations
The following equations define the UK firm sector:
Y £ = C£ +G£ +X£ − IM£ (6.1)
y£ = s£ − im£ (6.2)
N£ = y£/pr£ (6.3)










s£ = c£ + g£ + x£ (6.7)
S£ = p£s · s
£ (6.8)
Equations 6.1 and 6.2 define nominal and real output with recourse to the familiar
national accounts identity. Equation 6.3 defines the level of employment in the economy
as the ratio of output to the productivity of labour. The nominal wage bill is defined by
equation 6.4 as the product of the nominal wage and employment. Similarly, equation
6.5 defines the unit costs faced by firms as the sum of the wage bill and nominal imports
divided by real sales. Note that the denominator in this case is real sales and not real
1Note that capital gains are not transactions (i.e. there is no counterparty) and so they do not appear
in the transactions–flow matrix.
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output as the latter excludes imports. Furthermore, the reader should note that the capital
stock does not enter into the model and so labour is the sole input in the productive
process. The sales price is determined as a simple mark–up (φ£) over unit costs (equation
6.6). Equations 6.7 and 6.8 express real and nominal sales once again using the national
accounts identity.
Similarly for the US one may write:
Y $ = C$ +G$ +X$ − IM$ (6.9)
y$ = s$ − im$ (6.10)
N$ = y$/pr$ (6.11)










s$ = c$ + g$ + x$ (6.15)
S$ = p$s · s
$ (6.16)
6.2.4 Household Equations
The following equations define income, wealth and the consumption decision for UK house-
holds:
Y D£r = Y







$ − T£ (6.17)
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v£ = V £/p£ds (6.21)

















C£ = c£ · p£ds (6.24)
176 CHAPTER 6. MONETARY POLICYMAKING IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
Equation 6.17 defines the regular disposable income of UK households as GDP plus
interest income less tax on regular income. The Haig–Simons (Haig, 1921; Simons, 1938)
definition of disposable income adjusts regular disposable income to take account of capital
gains arising through exchange rate fluctuations (equation 6.18). Equation 6.19 notes
that nominal wealth accumulates when nominal Haig–Simons disposable income exceeds
nominal consumption. A simple re–arrangement of the equation reveals that the change
in nominal wealth is equal to the sum of the net accumulation of financial assets (NAFA)
and capital gains (CG).
Real Haig–Simons disposable income is defined by equation 6.20 in a manner which
adjusts appropriately for the erosion of the purchasing power of money which comes about
through inflation, and the obvious ramifications that this has for the purchasing power
of the stock of household wealth. Equation 6.21 defines real wealth as nominal wealth
deflated by the domestic price level (which is discussed later). Equation 6.22 states that
the household consumption decision is based on real magnitudes as opposed to nominal
magnitudes. This implies that households are aware of the inflationary erosion of pur-
chasing and do not suffer from money–illusion. The consumption function takes expected
real Haig–Simons disposable income as one of its arguments; this is described by a simple
adaptive expectations equation of the form of equation 6.23. The nominal value of con-
sumption is then retrieved by simply multiplying real consumption by the domestic price
level. As usual, equivalent expressions may be constructed for the US economy as follows:
Y D$r = Y
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v$ = V $/p$ds (6.29)

















C$ = c$ · p$ds (6.32)
The α parameters in the consumption function represent the marginal propensities to
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consume out of disposable income and wealth. Godley and Lavoie treat these propensities
as exogenous throughout their modelling. However, given that the focus of this chapter is
on monetary policy, it seems preferable to endogenise these parameters, specifying them as
functions the real interest rate2. In this way, an interest rate hike may reduce consumption
and thereby aggregate activity. In the case of the marginal propensity to consume out of
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$ · α$1U (6.34)
z1£ = 1 iff α£1 < α
£
1L (6.35)
z1$ = 1 iff α$1 < α
$
1L (6.36)
z2£ = 1 iff α£1 > α
£
1U (6.37)











The µα1 parameters measure the strength of the response to the changes in the real
interest rate and the z1 and z2 series ensure that the value of the marginal propensity
to consume does not move outside the band defined by α1L and α1U for each country.
Equations 6.39 and 6.40 offer the standard definition of the real interest rate. A tilde
symbol denotes the value taken by a variable in the initial steady state, reflecting the
assumption that this initial state is the equilibrium targeted by stabilisation policies (this
is discussed in more depth later). Equivalently, the marginal propensity to consume out



























+ z3$ · α$2L + z4
$ · α$2U (6.42)
z3£ = 1 iff α£2 < α
£
2L (6.43)
z3$ = 1 iff α$2 < α
$
2L (6.44)
2An early discussion of the effect of the interest rate on consumption propensities was provided by
Milton Friedman (1957) in relation to the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
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z4£ = 1 iff α£2 > α
£
2U (6.45)
z4$ = 1 iff α$2 > α
$
2U (6.46)
6.2.5 Household Portfolio Equations
The portfolio decisions of households are modelled following the principles laid out by
Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969). They formalised the notion that a household
cannot increase the proportion of its wealth that is held in any one asset class without
reducing its relative holdings of other asset classes. That is to say that the proportions
of household wealth allocated to each asset class must sum to unity. In the interest of
simplicity, the portfolio equations are constructed using nominal rates of return as opposed
to real rates. It follows that the results will be equivalent in either case as the differential
between nominal rates of return is equal to that between equivalent real rates. Consider
the approximate real rate of return on two different assets, defined as the appropriate
nominal rates less the rate of inflation which is common in both cases: r1 = i1 − π and
r2 = i2 − π. It follows that r1 − r2 = (i1 − π)− (i2 − π) = i1 − π − i2 + π = i1 − i2.
Equations 6.47, 6.48 and 6.49A represent the portfolio equations for UK households,
where the transactions demand for money has been omitted in the interests of simplicity.
However, in a setting in which expectations are prone to frustration, there must be a
buffer asset to absorb the resulting fluctuations without violating the accounting frame-
work. Following Godley and Lavoie, it is assumed that cash holdings perform this role
and so equation 6.49 is used rather than equation 6.49A. The ‘A’ suffix indicates that this
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Focusing once again on the three standard portfolio equations (6.47, 6.48 and 6.49A),
the Brainard–Tobin constraints are most easily visualised if the system is re–written in
matrix form as follows:






















 · V £
The vertical adding up constraints imply that
∑
i λi0 = 1 and
∑
i λij = 0 for i, j =
1, 2, 3. The symmetry constraints associated with Friedman (1978) imply that λ12 = λ21,
λ13 = λ31 and λ23 = λ32. However, because the nominal rate of return on cash holdings
is zero, the last two of these conditions are obsolete.
Taken together, Tobin’s vertical constraints and Friedman’s symmetry constraints im-
ply a set of horizontal adding up constraints, as noted by Godley (1996):
λ11 = − (λ12 + λ13) ; λ22 = − (λ21 + λ23) ; λ33 = − (λ31 + λ32)
The logic underpinning the portfolio equations requires that the coefficient on the own
rate of return in each equation is positive while those on the rates of return associated
with other assets are negative. Hence, in the 3× 3 matrix of λ’s, only the prime diagonal
values are positive.
The nominal rate of return on US bills is equal to the nominal interest rate plus the
expected change in the exchange rate over the relevant timeframe, dxr$e . Godley and
Lavoie (pp. 459-60) assume that dxr$e = dxr
£
e = 0, which implies that investors expect the
exchange rate to remain unchanged. Alternatively, one could impose uncovered interest
parity, although its aforementioned unsatisfactory empirical performance, coupled with
various theoretical concerns (see Godley and Lavoie, pp. 459-60, for more detail), cautions
against this approach.
Similarly, the portfolio decisions of US households are modelled according to equations
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6.2.6 Government Equations
Equation 6.53 defines nominal tax revenues accruing to the UK Government as a propor-
tion, θ£, of regular household income. Nominal government spending is the product of the
price level and real government spending, which is assumed to be determined exogenously
in this simple closure of the model (equations 6.54 and 6.55). The public sector borrow-
ing requirement (PSBR) is defined by equation 6.56 as the sum of nominal government
expenditures and the cost of servicing existing public debt. Equation 6.57 states that bills
are issued in the amount required to cover the PSBR after accounting for government
revenues derived from tax receipts and the profits of the central bank.
T£ = θ£ ·
(










g£ = g£ (6.54)
G£ = p£ds · g
£ (6.55)















The US Government may be described similarly as follows:
T $ = θ$ ·
(










g$ = g$ (6.59)
G$ = p$ds · g
$ (6.60)
















Inflationary pressure is introduced into the model as a conflicting claims process in which
workers enter nominal wage negotiations with a target real wage in mind. In the UK econ-
omy, the target real wage is defined by equation 6.63 as a function of labour productivity
and the employment rate (i.e. a measure of the size of the ‘reserve army’ of unemployed
labour). The nominal wage then adjusts toward the targeted real wage at the rate Ω£3
(equation 6.64). Equation 6.65 offers the standard definition of the rate of sales price
inflation, although this includes the price of exported goods. In order to define an appro-
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priate domestic price index, it is necessary to remove exports. Equations 6.66 and 6.67
define the nominal value and real quantity of domestic sales, respectively, while equation
6.68 defines the domestic sales deflator. It is then a simple matter to define the rate of
inflation of domestic sales. Godley and Lavoie argue that the price of domestic sales is
approximately equivalent to CPI inflation (p. 455). This is particularly important in the
current application, as it suggests that it is πds rather than πs that should be the target
of monetary policy.
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DS£ = S£ −X£ (6.66)









The corresponding equations for the US economy are:
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DS$ = S$ −X$ (6.73)









6.2.8 Trade and the Balance of Payments
The treatment of trade in the model follows directly from that of Godley and Lavoie
(pp. 453-5). They carefully formulate equations 6.77 and 6.78 defining the UK price of
imports and exports (respectively), providing three thought experiments which justify the
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restrictions imposed on the parameter values νi and υi. Real imports and exports of the
UK economy are defined by equations 6.79 and 6.80, which stress the role of relative prices
and income. These four equations are log–linearised for convenience. Finally, equations













































































The remaining trade equations follow by the symmetrical nature of trading in a two–
country system. The price of UK exports is the price of US imports, the quantity of
US exports must be equal to the quantity of UK imports and so on. These symmetry









x$ = im£ (6.85)
im$ = x£ (6.86)
X£ = x£ · p£x (6.87)
X$ = x$ · p$x (6.88)
IM£ = im£ · p£m (6.89)
IM$ = im$ · p$m (6.90)
Having developed an understanding of the nature of the trade relationships between
the two economies, it is useful to define the current and capital account balance in each
case. Equation 6.91 represents the UK current account balance, including net exports and
net interest income but omitting capital gains arising due to exchange rate fluctuations.
Equation 6.92 is the capital account balance including the official settlement accounts
and, as such, is equal in magnitude to the current account (i.e. they sum to zero). In
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a two country model where the international settlement asset is a financial liability of
one government, the balance of payments, when constructed in this way, will always be
precisely equal to zero. Equation 6.93 defines the capital account balance of the UK
economy excluding the official settlement accounts, KA2£, and is likely to be of greater
interest than KA1£.
CA£ = X£ − IM£ + r$−1 ·B
$
£s−1 · xr














$ +∆au£ · p£g
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(6.92)




The equivalent definitions for the US economy are:
CA$ = X$ − IM$ + r£−1 ·B
£
$s−1 · xr























6.2.9 Central Bank Equations
































r£ = r£ (6.103)
Equations 6.97 and 6.98 note that high powered money and bills are supplied to house-
holds on demand, in a manner consistent with horizontalist models of the money supply
process (c.f. Moore, 1988). Equation 6.99 states that domestic treasury bills are supplied
to the UK central bank in a similar fashion.
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The balance sheet equations for the respective central banks differ because the UK
central bank is assumed to hold US treasury bills for settlement purposes, while no such
holding of foreign bills appears on the balance sheet of the US central bank. In a flexible
exchange rate system, the value of these bills may change in accordance with exchange
rate fluctuations, opening up the possibility of capital gains and losses for the UK central
bank. Hence, in a flexible exchange rate regime, the balance sheet of the UK central bank
can only be evaluated in differences as opposed to levels (equation 6.100). The last term
in this equation refers to the change in the stock of gold. Following Godley and Lavoie, it
is assumed that no gold changes hands at present but it is included in the model to permit
further experimentation with the use of gold as a settlement asset rather than US T–bills.
The price of gold, at present, is assumed to be exogenously fixed in US dollars, although
the UK price can still fluctuate as a result of exchange rate movements (equation 6.101).
Equation 6.102 defines the operating profit of the UK central bank, which consists of its
interest income on both domestic and foreign bill holdings. Furthermore, it is assumed that
these profits are transferred in their entirety to the government (hence their appearance
in the PSBR in equation 6.56). Finally, equation 6.103 states that the rate of interest
on Treasury bills is set exogenously as the policy implement of the central bank. Hence,
in this model money is endogenous and the central bank manipulates an interest rate to
achieve its stabilisation goals.






















r$ = r$ (6.110)
Note that the US central bank does not hold foreign bills for settlement purposes and
that the price of gold is fixed in Dollar terms. For this reason, there is no possibility of
capital gains accruing to the US central bank and so its balance sheet may be presented
in levels form (equation 6.107). Similarly, the profits of the US central bank are simply
equal to the interest income it derives from its holdings of domestic bills.
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The basic model is completed by a discussion of exchange rate determination. Equa-
tions 6.111 and 6.112 simply define the equivalence of the supply and demand for foreign
bill holdings measured in a common currency. The reader should recall that the demand
for a foreign asset is assumed to be measured in the domestic currency, while the supply
is denominated in the foreign currency. The supply of US bills to the UK central bank is
assumed to be exogenously determined (equation 6.113) while the supply of foreign bills




























xr$ = 1/xr£ (6.116)








The exchange rate xr£ is determined endogenously as the ratio of foreign bills supplied
to UK households to the demand for these bills (equation 6.115). Hence, the model
represents a flexible exchange rate system. The exchange rate xr$ is simply the reciprocal
of xr£ (equation 6.116) while the real exchange rate in each case is defined by equations










The basic structure of the model is complete; all that remains is to define the various
stabilisation policies under scrutiny. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature
of price–stabilising monetary policy in an open economy setting with flexible exchange
rates. This institutional structure closely approximates current economic arrangements in
3In all simulated scenarios, the redundant equation is satisfied to a high degree of precision throughout
the simulation period.
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many countries. To this end, a procyclical inflation targeting interest rate rule embodying
the so–called Taylor principle is added to the model and tested. For comparative purposes,
a modified version of the rule in which the UK central bank reacts to the interest rate
set by the Fed is also tested. Furthermore, both of these monetary policy frameworks are
tested in the presence of a countercyclical fiscal policy regime.
Procyclical Inflation–Targeting Monetary Policy
A simple inflation–targeting interest rate rule may be added to the model by endogenising
the bill rates r£ and r$ as follows:
r£ =
{


















where equations 6.103-IT and 6.110-IT replace equations 6.103 and 6.110. The use of the
initial steady state rate of inflation as the target reflects the notion that both economies
are initially in equilibrium with zero inflation gaps. Hence, the shocks simulated below
represent a perturbation which moves the system out of this equilibrium state. The z5
parameters ensure that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is respected:
z5£ = 1 iff r£ > 0 (6.119)
z5$ = 1 iff r$ > 0 (6.120)
More sophisticated models could incorporate a range of additional features including a
response to the output gap (thereby moving closer to the Taylor rule) or a simple interest
rate smoothing mechanism. Perhaps more importantly, one could develop forward–looking
rules in the spirit of Clarida et al. (1998; 1999; 2000). However, the simple specification
presented here captures the core principles of an inflation targeting regime and will be
sufficient to provide some interesting insights. This is model ‘IT’.
Leader–Follower Interest Rate Setting
An extensive literature has grown around the observation that combinations of interna-
tional interest rates are cointegrated over various horizons, which has led a number of
authors to suggest that global interest rates are converging (see Devine, 1997, for a criti-
6.2. INFLATION–TARGETING IN AN OPEN ECONOMY SFC MODEL 187
cal survey). Regional convergence has been attributed to the emergence of leader–follower
relationships among central banks. Examples of this approach include the so–called Ger-
man Dominance Hypothesis that was widely discussed during the European Monetary
System (examples include Goodhart, 1990, pp. 478-9, and Laopodis, 2001) and the notion
of US leadership (c.f. Pain and Thomas, 1997). Indeed, interest rate differentials are often
mentioned in the financial press: a recent example imploring the Bank of England to cut
interest rates following the Fed’s example is provided by Wolf (2008). It is straightforward
to model a system in which the UK central bank responds to the US interest rate decision

























where the parameter ζ determines the degree to which the UK interest rate is set with
regard to domestic inflationary pressures relative to foreign interest rates.
Countercyclical Fiscal Policy
In order to smooth domestic price inflation, the Government could engage in counter–
cyclical fiscal policy (see Setterfield, 2007, for a similar approach). A very simple version
of this strategy representing countercyclical anti–inflationary government spending policy
can be modelled by replacing equations 6.54 and 6.59 with the following:
g£ = g£−1 − ς
£
1 · z6
£ + ς£2 · z7
£ (6.54-CFP)
g$ = g$−1 − ς
$
1 · z6
$ + ς$2 · z7
$ (6.59-CFP)
The inflation target in this case is defined as a band as opposed to the point target that
was used in the monetary policy rules. The following four equations define the indicator
variables z6 and z7 for each country. These take the value of one if the upper or lower
limit of the band is exceeded (respectively) and zero otherwise4.
4For simplicity, it is assumed that the inflation target band is common to both countries although this
assumption could easily be relaxed.
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z6£ = 1 iff π£ds−1 > π
£U
ds (6.121)
z7£ = 1 iff π£ds−1 < π
£L
ds (6.122)
z6$ = 1 iff π$ds−1 > π
$U
ds (6.123)
z7$ = 1 iff π$ds−1 < π
$L
ds (6.124)
The intuition behind these equations is simple. If inflation exceeds the upper bound
of the acceptable region, the government reduces its spending in order to reduce demand.
Similarly, if inflation falls below the lower limit, the government increases its spending to
stimulate the economy5.
The use of a band target rather than a point target in the case of the fiscal policy rule
is motivated by the feasibility of the policy concerned. A point target would imply the
operation of a simple automatic stabiliser, whereby government spending or net transfers
are adjusted in response to every slight movement of inflation about the targeted level.
The operation of such a system would be infeasibly complex, and the resulting volatility of
government spending would undoubtedly meet with fierce political resistance. Even if such
opposition could be overcome, it is unlikely that government spending could be varied in
precisely the increment required for stabilisation. By contrast, the band target proposed
here may be thought of as representing a system of pseudo–discretionary intervention, in
which the fiscal authority reigns in spending in the presence of inflationary pressure, and
expands its spending to stimulate the economy when inflation is low.
It should be clear, however, that by specifying an active role for government spending,
the model is not rendered devoid of automatic stabilisers. Indeed, it is in the nature of
proportionate income taxation that it is distinctly procyclical. The combination of this
tax regime with the anti–inflationary spending policy described above would be associated
with a countercyclical budget deficit consistent with Minsky’s (1982; 1986b) view of Big
Government. It is, however, inconsistent with the fiscal austerity embodied in the Stability
and Growth Pact, and imposed on many state governments in the US in the form of
balanced budget requirements.
The complementarities between fiscal and monetary policies may be analysed using
combinations of the CFP and IT/LF closures of the model. The combination of CFP
with autonomous IT provides model ‘CFPIT’, while when used in conjunction with the
leader–follower rule, the CFP equations yield model ‘CFPLF’.
5Of course, the lower bound of real government expenditure is also zero but this lower bound is never
approached in any of the simulations undertaken in this chapter, so its imposition is not necessary.
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6.3 Simulation Results
Godley and Lavoie (2006, pp. 466-7) run their simulations from the starting point of a full
stationary state in which the current and capital accounts are balanced, as is the govern-
ment budget in each country. Such a strategy is not possible in the current context due to
the introduction of persistent inflationary forces which ensure that the nominal government
deficit is positive when real government debt is unchanging (c.f. Godley and Cripps, 1983,
pp. 244-5; Godley and Lavoie, 2006, p. 369)6. For this reason, the simulations presented
here start from a steady state in which real wealth is constant (i.e. ∆v£ = ∆v$ = 0).
The following experiments are conducted for each of the candidate stabilisation policies
discussed above:
i. a step decrease in real exports from the UK (an explicitly open economy shock);
ii. an increase in the autonomous component of the target real wage in the UK (a cost
shock); and
iii. an expansionary decrease in the rate of US income tax (a demand shock);
In all cases, the model is solved over the timeframe 1950-2050 and the shock occurs in
the year 19607. As with the Godley–Lavoie models, these years simply provide an index
of time and should not be interpreted literally; it would be equally valid to refer to periods
1 to 101.
6.3.1 A Step Decrease in Real Exports from the UK
The first experiment involves a reduction of the parameter ǫ0 in equation 6.79 from -2.1 to
-2.2, resulting in a step decrease in UK real exports. Figure 6.1 presents the effect of this
shock under each policy stance on four core variables: inflation relative to the target band
defined by the fiscal authority, real GDP and the nominal and real Sterling exchange rates.
In order to bring forth the key mechanisms involved in the traverse between steady states
(many of which are common to all experiments) the discussion of the first experiment is
considerably more detailed than the remaining two.
The leftmost column of Figure 6.1 (i.e. panels (a), (f) and (k)) reports the situation
under the benchmark case of no policy intervention. The reduction in UK exports causes
an initial fall in real output which is associated with deflation and growing current account
6Godley and Lavoie’s chapter 12 models do provide for inflation arising through changes in the price
of traded goods brought about by exchange rate movements, although the observed rate of inflation is
considerably smaller than that considered here and generally returns to zero relatively swiftly.
7The computer code used to perform these simulations is provided on the enclosed CD.
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and budget deficits in the UK8. In order to fund its deficit, the UK government increases
its issuance of bills, exerting downward pressure on Sterling and leading to both nominal
and real depreciation. The immediate effect of the fall in UK real exports on the US
economy is a brief decline in inflation resulting from the sharp fall in nominal imports
which enter firms’ mark–up pricing rules. This effect is, however, rapidly dominated by
the demand–pull inflationary pressure arising from the sharp increase in real activity. In
the medium–term, the prevailing trends in each country reverse: US real output falls
below its initial level and the economy experiences mild deflation, while both real GDP
and inflation in the UK are slightly higher than their starting levels. This reversal is
brought about by the gradual depreciation of the pound and a worsening of the terms of
trade, resulting in an improvement in the UK trade account in the medium–term but a
deterioration of the US trade account. Similar results are achieved by Godley and Lavoie
using their open economy model (pp. 479-81).
The cyclicality characterising the economic response to the shock under the benchmark
case of non–intervention results from the endogeneity of the marginal propensities to
consume out of income and wealth. The mechanism generating the cycles may be described
as follows. Increased inflation resulting from an initial shock reduces the real rate of
interest, stimulating consumption. This, in turn, erodes real wealth, reducing consumption
and inflation. In time, real wealth recovers and consumption increases again. This process
continues with decreasing amplitude throughout the simulation period. In the remaining
two experiments, the effect is considerably more pronounced. The existence of such cyclical
behaviour in the model renders it highly suitable for testing stabilisation policies.
It should be noted that relative purchasing power parity (PPP) holds to a high degree
of precision in the steady state. It is, however, disturbed by the shock to UK exports







The implication is that persistent inflation differentials lead to continuous changes in
the nominal exchange rate, as can be seen in Figure 6.1 (and, indeed, in the other three
experiments). However, the real exchange rate, rxr£, defined by equation 6.117, adjusts
gradually before settling at a new, lower, steady state value.
8Note that budget deficit, current and capital account figures are not reported here in the interest of
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(o) Exchange rate (CFPLF)
Figure 6.1: The Effect of a Decrease in ǫ0 on Selected Indicators
Rows 1 & 2: the solid line represents the UK and the heavy dashed line the US. Row 3: the solid line is the nominal exchange rate, xr£, while the dashed line is the real rate,
rxr£.
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The second column (panels (b), (g) and (l)) presents the situation under procyclical
inflation–targeting interest rate policy. Here, the initial deflationary pressure in the US,
owing to the fall in nominal imports, causes the Fed to cut the interest rate, with the Bank
of England doing likewise but to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, the current account surplus
enjoyed by the US in the short–run, and the associated increase in real GDP, provokes in-
flation, leading the Fed to reverse its position and raise the interest rate. The maintenance
of low interest rates by the Bank of England in the short–run reduces the interest income
of households in both countries, reducing consumption and restraining demand, leading to
disinflationary and even deflationary pressure. This erratic and uncoordinated sequence
of interest rate innovations causes considerable exchange rate volatility and results in
moderately high frequency cyclical behaviour in the short- to medium–term. After this
initial period of fluctuation, the negative impact of higher interest rates on the marginal
propensity to consume is dominated by two effects. Firstly, higher interest rates are as-
sociated with increased interest income received by households on their bond holdings.
This could be called a rentier effect (see Lavoie, 1995, and Smithin, 1996). Secondly, the
policy regime has resulted in a substantial nominal depreciation of Sterling (larger than in
the benchmark case) as higher interest rates in the UK have led to a dramatic expansion
of the government debt, increasing the supply of UK bills overseas and depressing their
price.
The figures presented in the third column (panels (c), (h) and (m)) are derived under
the leader–follower closure, where the Bank of England responds to the Fed’s interest rate
decisions in real time. In response to initial deflationary pressure, the Fed lowers the
interest rate, stimulating demand through the effect on consumption. The sharp increase
in real activity associated with the current account surplus causes rapid demand–driven
inflation, although the effect is relatively short–lived. During this time, the Bank of
England has been setting its interest rate partly to combat domestic deflation and partly
in response to the US decision (the weighting parameter, ζ, in equation 6.103-LF is set
at 0.5). This results in a degree of indecision. In the medium–term, the rentier channel
and the Sterling depreciation dominate the contractionary effect of higher interest rates
on consumption, resulting in gradually increasing inflation in both countries. However,
the trend is noticeably slower than in the IT closure of the model because Sterling has
not depreciated as substantially, owing to the maintenance of lower interest rates and the
resulting slower expansion of the government debt.
The fourth column (panels (d), (i) and (n)) presents the results of combined inflation–
targeting interest rate policy and countercyclical fiscal policy, which results in relatively
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good stabilisation performance (note that the bands drawn in the top row of Figure 6.1
only actually refer to the fiscal policy rule as monetary policy is conducted in relation to
a point target). In response to initial deflationary pressure in the UK, the government
embarks on a series of expansionary spending increases, stimulating demand and resulting
in a large increase in the budget deficit. By contrast the US government cuts its spending
in response to excessive inflation, cooling the economy and resulting in a budget surplus.
The UK budget deficit is funded by the issuance of government bills which brings about a
second round stimulus to real activity through the rentier channel. Alongside these fiscal
interventions, the central banks of both countries have been manipulating their interest
rates in accordance with the Taylor principle. This combination of policies maintains
inflation within the range deemed acceptable by the fiscal authorities and also achieves
reasonable stabilisation of real output. Similarly, the Pound does not fall as markedly as in
the preceding scenarios, with the nominal exchange rate gradually stabilising throughout
the simulation period.
Finally, the fifth column (panels (e), (j) and (o)) relates to the combination of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy and US interest rate leadership. In such a setting, both governments
are ready to reduce their spending when inflation exceeds the upper bound, while the
Bank of England will consider the Fed’s interest rate decision before setting its own. This
policy mix again succeeds in stabilising the rate of inflation within the range targeted by
the fiscal authority, although with slightly less success than the previous case. Real output
is declining in both countries in the long–run due to the combination of fiscal austerity
and the Bank of England’s adherence to its US–centric interest rate rule. It is interesting
to note that the Sterling exchange rate reaches a plateau in this case and then starts to re-
cover very slightly. One apparent advantage of leader–follower interest rate setting is that
the reduced interest rate differential leads to greater stability of the exchange rate. This
is certainly an argument that would be familiar to proponents of the European Monetary
Union.
6.3.2 An Increase in the UK Target Real Wage
The second experiment introduces a cost shock in the UK economy, as the autonomous
component of the UK real wage target, Ω£0 , increases from -0.1 to 0. In the benchmark
case, the mark–up pricing rules operated by firms result in marked inflationary pressure
in the UK which is passed through, to a lesser degree, to the US economy. High rates
of inflation initiate the familiar cyclical pattern, although its amplitude is considerably
greater than in the previous experiment reflecting the larger scale of the shock. Once
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again, the amplitude of the cycles decreases through time, suggesting that the model is
converging toward a steady state in which real activity in the UK is considerably lower
than in the initial steady state, while the level of US real GDP is comparable9. The growth
of the UK budget deficit leads to an increased supply of UK bills abroad, depressing the
nominal exchange rate.
In the case of procyclical IT, the initial inflationary shock causes the UK central
bank to raise the interest rate markedly. This is followed by a mild bout of deflation
in the US, associated with falling interest rates. This combination leads to a strong
appreciation of Sterling in the short–run. However, after some initial cooling effect, the
higher interest rates in the UK prove inflationary, with the price level increases passing
through to the US economy relatively rapidly. The negative effect of higher interest rates
on the consumption propensities is apparently outweighed by the rentier effect and the
very large Sterling depreciation resulting from the increased issuance of bills necessitated
by the growing budget deficit. This is most likely caused by the fact that the initial
rate hike is so large in the UK: it is possible that the introduction of policy inertia may
yield substantially different results in this case. The ever increasing rate of inflation
leads the central banks in both countries to raise their interest rates ad infinitum, further
reinforcing the expansionary effect arising through the rentier channel and leading to the
rapid expansion of real GDP, exponential growth of the government budget deficit and
a very sharp depreciation of the Pound. The emergence of an exponential growth path
indicates that IT cannot be maintained in this case.
Column three presents the case of US interest rate leadership, which yields very similar
results to the standard IT closure in this case, albeit slightly attenuated. Even though
the initial shock in the UK proves deflationary in the US, the very large interest rate hike
introduced by the domestic portion of the Bank of England’s reaction function outweighs
the negative influence coming from the Fed. The resulting interest rate differential is
associated with the rapid expansion of the UK government debt, leading to a profound
nominal depreciation of Sterling (although admittedly a negligible effect on the real rate).
This combination results in a strong expansionary influence on both economies arising
through the rentier and exchange rate channels. The point that comes across most strongly
in this case is that foreign monetary policy decisions can be transmitted rapidly and
forcefully to the domestic economy.
9The frequency of the cycles is determined by the µ parameters in equations 6.33, 6.34, 6.41 and 6.42,
defining the consumption propensities in each economy. Beyond a threshold, the imposition of larger values
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(o) Exchange rate (CFPLF)
Figure 6.2: The Effect of an Increase in Ω£0 on Selected Indicators
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The fourth column reports the results of the CFPIT closure, which again succeeds
in stabilising inflation after an initial period of marked overshooting. The cost of this
stabilisation is that the reduction in UK government spending leads to a deep contraction
of UK real activity in the short–run and to a long–run reduction of approximately 7% in UK
real GDP. The Sterling exchange rate overshoots strongly following the shock due to the
large rate rise enacted by the central bank. Following this initial turbulence, the nominal
exchange rate settles to roughly its initial level in the long run, although the real exchange
rate has appreciated by approximately 10%. In a setting of combined monetary and fiscal
policy, the effect of anti–inflationary fiscal and monetary innovations on the exchange rate
reinforce one–another to some extent. When inflation is high, the government reduces its
spending which, ceteris paribus, reduces the budget deficit and the supply of bills, causing
an appreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, when the rate of inflation is high, the
central bank raises the interest rate, causing the currency to appreciate. As long as the
policies act in a consistent manner, then this can result in rapid and relatively effective
stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate, as is observed here.
The final column shows the results of the CFPLF closure. Stabilisation in this case
is highly effective, with a true steady state being reached after only 25 periods. This
remarkable performance results from the reduced volatility of the exchange rate in a setting
in which the Bank of England responds to the interest rate decision of the Fed.
6.3.3 An Expansionary US Income Tax Cut
The third experiment involves an expansionary cut in the rate of income tax in the US,
associated with a decrease in the parameter θ$ in equation 6.58 from 0.20 to 0.19. In the
absence of policy intervention, the increased disposable income of US households results
in permanently higher domestic inflation and real GDP in the US. The effect is passed
through to the UK to a limited extent due to the increased demand for its exports. The
tax cut causes a budget deficit in the US, and the resulting increase in the supply of
US financial instruments causes a strong nominal appreciation of Sterling, although the
real exchange rate remains largely stable. Once again, strong cyclicality results from the
endogenous response of consumption and, indirectly, wealth to inflation.
In the case of simple IT, the initial inflationary pressure causes both the Fed and
the Bank of England to raise their interest rates. This action succeeds in constraining
consumption growth although, after inflation and output return to their initial values,
they overshoot and decline. Interest rate cuts at this point fail to stimulate demand as the
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Figure 6.3: The Effect of an Expansionary Decrease in θ$ on Selected Indicators
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The appreciation of the Pound is particularly marked in this case due to the combina-
tion of a substantial US government budget deficit coupled with a more modest, but still
large, UK surplus.
US leadership achieves reasonably rapid stabilisation of inflation but at a very high
level in the US. In the new steady state, the reduction in the consumption propensity
brought about by the higher interest rates is balanced by the increased income accruing
to households through their asset holdings. The maintenance of a high interest rate in the
US results in rapid growth of the government budget deficit which exerts strong downward
pressure on the Dollar (indeed, the Dollar depreciates significantly despite the fact that
US interest rates are much higher than those in the UK).
Countercyclical fiscal policy in conjunction with autonomous inflation targeting pro-
vides rapid inflation stabilisation in both countries. However, once again, this combination
of policies does not result in a steady state but rather in gradual swings which are even-
tually corrected by fiscal policy intervention. By contrast, when the simple IT rule is
replaced by the leader–follower strategy, a new steady state is reached in which US output
and inflation are higher than their starting values, while the UK economy settles back
to a level comparable to its initial state. The Dollar depreciation in both closures using
fiscal policy is considerably less marked than in the other regimes, reflecting the reduced
variability of the budget deficits in each country.
6.4 Implications for Monetary Policy
While the model developed here is simplistic in a number of ways, it nevertheless pro-
vides a range of interesting insights into the dilemmas facing policymakers charged with
domestic stabilisation in a world characterised by both financial and real linkages. Closed
economy models cannot address issues regarding the effect of stabilisation policies on the
budget deficit, the balance of payments or the exchange rate, among other things. Further-
more, closed economy models cannot illuminate the transmission of shocks internationally,
whether exogenous, or the result of overseas policy interventions. Similarly, the model may
be considered more generally applicable than the majority of open economy models which
assume that the country under scrutiny is small and, therefore, that it cannot influence
events in the world economy. The modelling of mutually interdependent economies in a
fully consistent manner provides a considerably richer analysis.
The stabilisation performance of autonomous inflation targeting regimes proved unin-
spiring in the three experiments conducted above. This result is consistent with the work
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of Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Angeriz and Arestis (2006), who doubt that inflation tar-
geting has had any notable impact on the rate of inflation or its variance, arguing instead
that IT policies have typically been adopted once an economy has already entered an era of
lower, more stable inflation. Alternatively, this result may be reconciled with the existing
empirical literature supporting the efficacy of IT policies if one believes that much of this
research has failed to adequately control for the influence of automatic stabilisers and dis-
cretionary fiscal interventions. In order to properly account for these influences, empirical
analyses would, at a minimum, have to include terms capturing changes in the average
and marginal tax rates faced by economic agents, the composition of the tax and benefit
systems, the level and composition of net government transfers, and public expectations
of future fiscal policy interventions. I am not aware of any studies that have attempted
such an analysis.
In general, the maintenance of a smaller interest rate differential under the leader–
follower closure resulted in superior stabilisation of output and inflation than autonomous
IT. However, the leader–follower rule does not generally succeed in stabilising inflation
and output. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that such arrangements work
well for either the dominant country or the follower, except to the extent that the follower
central bank may be able to import some of the credibility of its dominant counterpart.
Other than this, the criticisms of one–size–fits–all policies that have surrounded European
arrangements apply.
The improvement associated with the use of an LF policy as opposed to IT serves to
underline the importance of the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission in an
open economy setting. However, the operation of this channel is not entirely straightfor-
ward (Arestis and Sawyer, 2004). Consider an anti–inflationary rate hike by the Bank of
England. Immediately following the policy intervention, increased demand for UK bills
causes an appreciation of the exchange rate, as one might expect. However, the increased
cost of servicing existing government debt leads to a growing budget deficit, which is as-
sumed here to be funded by the issuance of yet more bills. The increased supply of UK
government liabilities then causes the Pound to depreciate. Hence, it is by no means clear
that the effect of an interest rate hike acting through the exchange rate channel is con-
tractionary, certainly in countries with significant export industries. Moreover, it follows
that the means by which the government chooses to fund the resulting budget deficit can
have a profound impact on monetary policy transmission. It is now possible to elaborate
on the two mechanisms presented in Section 2.3.6. Following Arestis and Sawyer (2004),
the following schemata were propounded (the symbols have been updated for consistency
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with the current notation):




↓−→ Y £ ↓
r£ ↑−→ xr£ ↑−→ p£m ↓−→ Y
£ ↑
where the same is true for the US economy. While these mechanisms remain valid in
general terms, the linkage between higher interest rates and a nominal appreciation is
dependent on the means by which the government chooses to fund its budget deficit. In
the model presented here, the deficit is funded by the increased issuance of bills which
may actually lead to a nominal depreciation as follows:
r£ ↑−→ xr£ & PSBR£ ↑−→ B£s ↑−→ xr
£ ↓
Hence, it follows that the overall effect of an interest rate hike operating through the
exchange rate channel is highly complex and time–varying. This challenges the na¨ıve
assumption that raising the interest rate will necessarily lead to a nominal appreciation
in anything but the short–run10.
While the discussion so far has focused on the open economy, it should be noted that it
is not clear that the stabilisation performance of simple interest rate rules would improve
even in a closed economy model. In their closed economy growth model, which contains
a well developed banking sector, Godley and Lavoie (pp. 417-22) demonstrate that mon-
etary policy aimed at the maintenance of a constant real interest rate in the presence of
expansionary fiscal policy generates wild fluctuations as the initial contractionary effect
of higher interest rates comes to be dominated by the rentier effect identified above. Sim-
ilarly, they find that, should the central bank attempt to neutralise the fiscal stimulus, it
will be compelled to raise interest rates exponentially.
Moving away from the important issue of whether procyclical IT policies would be
stabilising in a model with commercial banks (a question that I hope to address in future
work), one effect that is particularly apparent in the experiments conducted herein is the
rentier channel of monetary transmission. Quite simply, by raising the interest rate, the
central bank imposes more onerous debt–servicing obligations on the government, resulting
in a tendency toward a growing budget deficit (or a dwindling surplus). At the same time
10Of course, the government could choose to fund its deficit by raising taxes instead of increasing its
borrowing. However, this would, in all likelihood, largely negate the stabilising influence of countercyclical
spending policies and may even prove destabilising. Hence, the use of both taxation and spending as part
of a coherent fiscal package must be approached with care.
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that the government issuance of bills increases, the income of the rentier class that holds
such financial assets is increasing, leading either to higher consumption, or to more rapid
wealth accumulation. In either case, the effect is expansionary. Depending on the relative
importance of this group within society, the rentier effect could be quite profound. In the
simulations performed here, the rentier channel often dominates the effect of interest rates
on the consumption propensities, leading to an expansionary influence of higher interest
rates. While this result may be overturned with different parameterisations and choices of
initial conditions, it nevertheless cautions that one should not na¨ıvely assume that raising
the interest rate will always prove contractionary.
In general, it follows that procyclical inflation targeting monetary policy can only sta-
bilise inflation if the moderating effect that it exerts through increasing the cost–of–capital,
for example, outweighs this expansionary effect brought about through the rentier channel
and, in some cases, through its complex interaction with the exchange rate. The degree to
which such policy succeeds will depend on the relative importance of savers/investors and
borrowers in the economy, and on the degree to which economic activity is export–oriented.
The most resonant result to come from the modelling undertaken above is that the
combination of a simple countercyclical fiscal policy rule with either of the candidate
monetary policy rules yields greatly improved stabilisation performance. This effect is
not achieved when countercyclical fiscal policy is employed in isolation: this results in
very large, high frequency cycles (not reported). Hence, a combined monetary and fiscal
approach is required to stabilise the model. This result stands in stark contrast to the New
Consensus position, but is consistent with the revival of Keynesian fiscal activism that has
been brought about by the ongoing credit crisis. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
Post Keynesian emphasis on active fiscal policy (see, for example, Arestis and Sawyer,
2006) and with the work of Chadha and Nolan (2004) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000;
2006; 2008). In light of these results, the assumption of Ricardian agents that underlies
the NCM’s dismissal of fiscal policy must be revisited as a matter of urgency if models in
that tradition are to provide meaningful economic insights.
The strength of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool comes, in part, from the status
of government spending and taxation as substantial components of GDP, which has the
implication that a reduction in government spending is immediately contractionary, at
least in the short–run. Further second round effects are brought about through the effect
on the portfolio choices of domestic and foreign agents. Of course, the effectiveness of
fiscal policy must be viewed not only as a reason to actively engage in countercyclical
fiscal policy, but also as a warning against its careless and ill–conceived use.
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6.5 Concluding Remarks
The estimation of empirical exchange rate models is widely regarded as one of the more
challenging aspects of modern applied economics (see Cheung et al., 2005, and Engel,
2006). The results of such exercises are often weak in a statistical sense and contradictory.
This chapter has pursued an alternative modelling strategy built around a rigorous double–
entry accounting framework and a simple set of behavioural equations. The principle
advantage of this approach is that it provides a powerful tool for counterfactual analysis
which ensures that the most simple of accounting rules are respected at all times. From this
strong foundation, one can be confident of uncovering interesting effects and relationships
through experimentation with, and development of, the model.
Simulations of various scenarios using the stock–flow consistent model developed herein
provide little support for the notion that autonomous rule–based inflation targeting mon-
etary policy is stabilising. Of course, these results must be interpreted with care as the
model does not contain a commercial banking sector and, therefore, omits an important
mechanism through which monetary policy may influence the macroeconomy. However,
the results stress that the interaction between the interest rate and the exchange rate is
complex, and that it cannot be taken for granted that a monetary tightening is contrac-
tionary in all cases. Indeed, the existence of a rentier channel of monetary policy whereby
higher interest rates provide an economic stimulus further complicates the picture.
The principle conclusion of the modelling herein is that a combination of monetary
and fiscal policy is required to stabilise the economy. Neither policy on its own was found
to be successful in any of the three experiments. This stands in contrast to a substantial
empirical literature in support of the stabilising properties of IT policies. However, the
validity of many of these studies may be called into question as they have typically failed
to control for the effect of automatic stabilisers. It is quite possible that much of the
economic stability that has been attributed to enlightened monetary policy since the mid
1990’s was, in fact, due to the countercyclicality of the budget deficit arising passively by
these means.
That the CFPLF strategy tends to outperform the other candidate policy regimes
reflects the unintentional influence that autonomous IT exerts over the exchange rate. This
result begs the question of whether rules that explicitly take account of the exchange rate
may yield preferable outcomes. More generally, it is quite possible that inflation–targeting,
whether pursued through monetary or fiscal means, is not an optimal stabilisation policy11.
11This chapter has simply investigated the feasibility of inflation–targeting through monetary and fiscal
means but has not addressed the desirability of such policies.
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These results have profound implications for the New Consensus macroeconomic model
which adheres to the notion of Ricardian equivalence. Current events in the world economy
have demonstrated with unusual clarity that governments around the world believe that
fiscal policy can have significant real effects. If modern macroeconomics is to remain
useful, it must acknowledge this fact with all haste.
The modelling undertaken here has been necessarily selective and is, therefore, open
to further development in a number of areas. Opportunities for further work can be
broadly divided into two categories: those that develop the model itself and those that
develop the modelling strategy. Among the former, the development of a model including
a banking sector providing both commercial and household loans should be considered a
priority, alongside the modelling of realistic forward–looking policy rules. The resulting
model would be highly sophisticated and could be used to supplement the DSGE models
so popular with contemporary central banks for the purposes of policy appraisal.
In terms of the latter, as with any model–based simulation, the price that one pays for
the ‘Olympian knowledge’ of the data generating process referred to by Brainard and Tobin
(1968) is that the simulation results may be rather dependent on the parameterisation of
the model (and, to a lesser degree, the initial conditions). The use of Bayesian techniques
provides a means by which to explicitly account for such parameter and model uncer-
tainties. Simulating various permutations of the model subject to the Occam principle
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem and averaging the outcomes appropri-
ately could improve the robustness of the results. Examples of such techniques include
Raftery, Givens, and Zeh (1995) and Poole and Raftery (2000)12. Clearly, the opportuni-
ties for further research into the field are many and varied.
12Raftery et al.’s (1995)initial work on Bayesian synthesis for the International Whaling Commission was
subject to the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox regarding the sensitivity of the results to reparameterisations of
the model, deriving from conditioning on a null set. Subsequent work on Bayesian melding addresses this
issue.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks and Policy
Prescriptions
7.1 Summary
The central contention of this thesis has been that monetary policy must adapt to condi-
tions in the domestic, and indeed global, economy. While the New Consensus model has
been a reliable workhorse during the recent era of low and stable inflation, its suitability in
a setting of high and volatile inflation remains unclear. Indeed, Charles Goodhart (2007,
p. 13) has characterised it as a “fair weather” model, incapable of dealing with the current
financial crisis. As the events of the post–Greenspan era have shown, when inflationary
pressure arises through cost channels and asset markets slump, a simple focus on inflation
targeting seems somewhat myopic. Recent months have seen many central banks missing
their targets and a return to old fashioned Keynesian fiscal stimuli as governments around
the world grapple with the threat of imminent (or, in many cases, ongoing) recession.
This thesis set out to investigate three challenges facing monetary policymakers in
the twenty–first century and to identify any required evolution of the policy framework.
These challenges included accelerating innovation in the payments system, the growing
frequency and severity of asset market cycles, and the increasing openness of the global
economy. The common threads that link these three are the increasing sophistication of
ICT in use in everyday life and the ineluctable process of globalisation. Developments
in ICT have made contactless electronic payments a reality and have the potential to
revolutionise both retail and wholesale payments systems. Similarly, the development
of sophisticated trading platforms and models, combined with the increasing ease and
speed with which information can be accessed, has reduced transactions costs and led
to a substantial deepening of financial markets around the world. Finally, the process
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of globalisation fuelled by the ICT revolution has reduced the significance of national
boundaries and physical separation. The last few decades have seen the development of
an increasingly complex web of social, political and economic interactions which has been
accompanied by a striking increase in capital mobility and the near universal removal or
reduction of capital controls. Simply put, the modern world is a considerably smaller place
than it once was.
In order to place the thesis in context, Chapter 2 undertook a thorough review of the
currently dominant New Keynesian monetary policy model and the underlying transmis-
sion mechanism between interest rate policy, aggregate demand and inflation. In general
terms, the three challenges identified in this thesis can be discussed in relation to the
channels of monetary transmission. Concerns have been raised over the potential for e–
money to disrupt the link between central bank reserves and market interest rates. The
Minskyan Financial Fragility Hypothesis is essentially a belief that the credit channels
may be very strong and potentially destabilising. Finally, the ongoing globalisation of the
world economy is placing more emphasis on the exchange rate channel in the process of
monetary transmission.
In addition to reviewing the New Keynesian monetary policy literature, Chapter 2
identified a number of significant lacunae in this dominant framework. In particular, the
chapter struck a cautionary note about the desirability of inflation–targeting monetary
policy, stressing that price stability should only be pursued if it does not conflict with
the attainment of full employment and rapid, sustainable economic growth. Furthermore,
a number of concerns were raised over the neglect of the supply side and the assumed
long–run neutrality of money. Similarly, the assumption of Ricardian households and
the resulting ineffectiveness of fiscal policy was challenged. Finally, the narrow focus of
the New Keynesian literature on the interest rate as the sole implement of stabilisation
policy was traced back to the work of Poole (1970) and a range of alternative instruments
were identified. This critical appraisal highlighted various weaknesses in the dominant
paradigm, many of which proved relevant in developing a thorough understanding of the
challenges faced by modern central banks in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 investigated the contention that the uptake of electronic monies could un-
dermine the ability of the central bank to conduct effective monetary policy. Two extreme
and relatively high profile scenarios have been discussed in the literature: firstly, that e–
money may completely displace central bank money and, secondly, that e–money schemes
may come to offer settlement with finality. The first represents a challenge to the central
bank’s monopoly over the issuance of currency while the second challenges its monopoly
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over the provision of settlement facilities. However, following Palley (2001a) in his analy-
sis of traditional US–style policy arrangements (i.e. before the commencement of interest
payments on deposits on October 9th, 2008), it was argued that a substitution away from
central bank money by households and non–bank firms would actually simplify the task of
the central bank (Woodford, 2000; 2001a). By contrast, the development of private settle-
ment facilities would pose a serious challenge to central banks operating in this manner.
In such a system, the central bank relies on the existence of a small but highly inelastic
demand for settlement balances arising from the settlement needs of commercial banks.
In its absence, and assuming that the non–bank demand for currency is perfectly interest
inelastic, it follows that the linkage between reserves and interest rates would cease to
operate. However, as both Palley and Woodford (2000; 2001a) were quick to point out, a
Lombard system, such as that used by the Bank of Canada, would remain effective after
some minor modifications. Hence, if e–settlement systems were to develop, the central
bank could continue to operate monetary policy by simply paying interest on deposits.
Many have already argued in favour of this to remove what is seen as a de facto tax on
banks.
These extreme scenarios diverted attention from a number of less fanciful effects of e–
money developments. These include the possibility of bank runs, circumventive innovation,
misreporting of macroeconomic statistics, systemic risks, social exclusion and the erosion of
privacy. However, it was argued that the extent to which these effects will prove significant
depends on the degree to which the new technology is adopted.
Using data from the CPSS surveys, the adoption of e–money in the Euro Area was
found to be significantly less advanced than in Singapore, with evidence of pronounced
regional disparities between member states. To date, e–money has made only minor
inroads into the retail payments infrastructure, and its growth seems to be moderating.
In order to evaluate the medium–term prospects of e–money technologies, a range of
forecasting models were deployed on a previously unexploited European dataset. The
preferred Bayesian average model indicated that e–money usage will continue to grow at
a moderate rate in the Euro Area as a whole but that the probability of a significant shift
toward increased electronification is unlikely in the medium–term. Indeed, the sigmoid
adoption hypothesis analysed using a Gompertz specification suggested that e–money
usage has almost reached its apogee. However, such modelling relies on the assumed
constancy of the technology. Therefore, while it may be the case that e–money products
as we know them now have little growth potential, it does not follow that further innovation
will not revolutionise the industry, providing it with a fresh impetus.
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Given that the high profile threats have been largely defeated in the literature and that
the growth prospects for the new technology seem only moderate, regulators must guard
against complacency. On the one hand, regulation must seek to maintain the security and
stability of the financial system. On the other, if one believes that the electronification of
the payments system may be associated with substantial efficiency gains, then regulators
may seek to promote innovation, particularly where they are concerned not just with
systemic security but with the maintenance of a well–functioning financial system. The
issue of balancing these two goals was the focus of Chapter 4, which compared and critically
analysed the European, American and Singaporean regulatory frameworks before laying
down some principles of an optimal regulatory strategy.
Comparison of the regulatory frameworks of the three key players revealed substantial
differences in their respective approaches to the new technology. Despite being arguably
the most important market, the US has enacted deeply inadequate regulation that fails
to provide appropriate incentives for innovation, while unnecessarily impeding the rollout
of nationwide schemes. By contrast, the European framework is extensive but has been
criticised from some quarters for stifling innovation. Finally, the Singaporean system is
somewhat underdeveloped at present but has an air of anticipation about it in the run–up
to the state–issuance of electronic legal tender and the adoption of common technological
standards for e–purse systems.
Comparing the regulatory approaches of each country in this way revealed a number
of deficiencies in each framework which an optimal strategy would seek to address. The
introduction of a common framework across states, the adoption of passporting provisions
and the revision of the scale–invariant security provisions are necessary in the US. The Eu-
ropean system could benefit from liberalisation of the regulation surrounding small ELMIs,
and from the relaxation of laws restricting the payment of interest on outstanding stored
value. Finally, the Singaporean system requires greater formalism and the introduction of
better defined risk–bearing regulations less reliant on commercial banks.
The chapter continued by proposing some core characteristics of an optimal regula-
tory structure. Among the most important recommendations are the need for harmonised
regulation and a unified technological environment across national boundaries, the impo-
sition of stringent asset backing requirements of the type imposed on commercial banks,
the necessity to maintain redeemability and exchange rate parity and the legalisation of
formal interest payments on outstanding balances. Furthermore, the chapter presented
a case for legalising the extension of credit in the form of e–money by registered credit
institutions. It was argued that this would extend the range of goods and services which
7.1. SUMMARY 209
may be purchased on credit and would also reduce the risks of circumventive innovation in
this direction. At a pragmatic level, it seems preferable to formalise such activities rather
than to encourage firms to engage in them outside the spirit of the law.
In the longer–term, regulatory reform is inevitable. The efficacy of any system of
regulation decreases with age as various methods of avoidance and evasion are discovered.
Two key issues were identified as long–run challenges to e–money regulation. Firstly, the
potential development of fractional reserve systems and, alongside this, the desirability
of extending the lender of last resort facility to e–money issuers should they be deemed
systemically important.
Chapter 5 investigated the Minskyan proposition that active interest rate policy may
be destabilising. The FFH asserts that anti–inflationary interest rate hikes will weaken
the balance sheets of firms by increasing their debt–servicing obligations while simulta-
neously increasing the costs associated with the prudential retention of earnings. The
combination of these effects reduces the ability of firms’ to service their debts, resulting
in increased financial fragility and a general shift from hedge to speculative and Ponzi
financing structures.
With reference to the discussion of the transmission mechanism in Chapter 2, the
Minskyan scheme can be thought of as a situation in which the interest rate and bank
lending channels are very strong and potentially destabilising. More specifically, the
FFH is associated with a countercyclical external financing premium in the sense of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a result with particular resonance at the present time. How-
ever, despite its contemporary relevance, relatively little applied research effort has been
devoted to the FFH. A small literature has grown around simulated and chaotic models
in the Minskyan tradition although there is a notable lack of empirical evidence. Chapter
5 attempted to address this lacuna by deploying a sophisticated CVARX model estimated
subject to an over–identifying long–run structure embodying many of Minsky’s key propo-
sitions.
The analysis of impulse response functions following a positive interest rate shock
demonstrated that elevated interest rates would increase the debt–servicing obligations of
firms while simultaneously decreasing their internal funds. While the observed dynamic
adjustment is consistent with Minsky’s key proposition that monetary policy may be
destabilising, it is not possible to interpret the interest rate shock as a monetary policy
shock without imposing a contemporaneous identifying structure. However, the results
nevertheless provide strong support for the Minskyan position, because while an interest
rate shock need not be a monetary policy shock, the reverse is not true: a monetary policy
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shock is always an interest rate shock (at least where the interest rate considered is the
Federal funds rate). Furthermore, the results revealed no evidence of a significant effect
of the interest rate on inflation, an observation potentially consistent with the work of
Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Angeriz and Arestis (2006) which suggests that IT policies
may be ineffective. However, this result should be treated with care due to the long
estimation sample during which the Federal Reserve has pursued a number of different
policy regimes (formal IT not being among them).
The analysis of a positive shock to the valuation ratio provided insights into the macroe-
conomic consequences of irrational exuberance. Of particular interest was the finding that
such an asset market surge does not pass through to price level inflation, indicating that
inflation–targeting monetary policy will not respond to asset market conditions even indi-
rectly. This contradicts the popular claim that the inflation gap captures all information
relevant to the policy decision1. Given the strong influence of monetary policy over the
stock market and the latter’s influence over the rate of fixed capital formation, it seems
likely that monetary policy may be improved by responding to a range of asset market
indicators as well as to traditional inflation measures and the output gap. Furthermore, if
one accepts the linkage between interest rates, investment and productive capacity, then
it follows that monetary policy may be non–neutral in the long–run in the sense that
hysteretic effects may be significant. Such considerations must also feed into the policy
rule.
Interesting results were also derived from inflation and investment shocks. Firstly,
there is evidence that suggests that firms may take advantage of inflationary environments
to increase their leverage, on the assumption that the inflationary shock will persist.
Similarly, while the shock to Tobin’s q could be considered a nominal investment shock in
a sense, the response to a real investment shock yielded quite different results indicating a
strong monetary tightening in response to increased inflationary pressure. Moreover, there
is some evidence that the investment shock raises potential output, further questioning
the assumed long–run neutrality of money.
These results raise a number of issues for monetary policymakers. Firstly, the asym-
metry inherent within modern policy arrangements is likely to foster the expansion of
bubbles. Indeed, many in the financial press have been quick to blame the easy money
policies of the Greenspan Fed for the inflation of the US asset and housing bubbles (c.f.
Roach, 2007). It is likely that macroeconomic performance could be improved if the cen-
tral bank were to explicitly acknowledge its role in shaping conditions in the asset markets.
1It is possible that the output gap would reflect the shock but a growing body of literature has argued
for its omission from the policy rule (Christiano and Gust, 1999).
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By extension of this reasoning, it could be argued that the central bank should attempt
to manage the expansion of bubbles, thereby either reducing the fallout should the bubble
burst, or potentially averting the burst altogether.
The contention that monetary policy decisions should be made with regard to their
impact on asset markets does not, however, amount to suggesting that the central bank
should set the interest rate to achieve a targeted level or growth path of asset prices.
The interest rate can only be meaningfully used to achieve a single policy goal or multiple
perfectly consistent goals (Tinbergen, 1952). Furthermore, Chairman Bernanke (2006) has
acknowledged that the interest rate is a ‘blunt tool’ with wide–ranging effects, and that
the collateral damage associated with bubble–pricking strategies may be substantial (c.f.
Nickell, 2005). Hence, asset price terms should only be included in the reaction function
as constraints to the interest rate decision rather than formalised targets. To the extent
that monetary policymakers consider a wide range of indicators during their deliberations,
it is likely that such constraints are already applied to the interest rate decision to some
degree on an informal level.
The most fundamental responsibility of the central bank has always been to ensure the
stability of the financial system. One can imagine a hierarchy of goals such that the central
bank may target inflation as long as this does not endanger systemic stability. These goals
may be mutually consistent in fairweather periods (see Goodhart, 2007, for a similar view)
but the FFH suggests, at a minimum, that there are limits to the central bank’s freedom to
set the interest rate in an anti–inflationary manner. Should an inflation–targeting central
bank realise that the pursuit of its target is inconsistent with its responsibilities toward
the financial system, then it must always desist. The mandate of the Bank of England
provides a relevant example. Should the Bank fail to meet the target, the Governor is
obliged to write an open letter addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining
this failure. Thus, the MPC can opt to miss the target range if they believe that this
is in the best interests of the economy. While the New Keynesian literature recognises
constrained discretion, the link to the primary role of the central bank as guardian of the
financial system is seldom explicit.
The final conclusion arising from Chapter 5 challenges the widespread belief that the
interest rate is the sole implement of monetary policy. In light of Minsky’s FFH and the
objections outlined above, it is highly unlikely that the interest rate is the appropriate
tool with which to respond to sector–specific asset price misalignments. However, the
central bank has the ability to set differential reserve requirements on entries in commercial
banks’ balance sheets. The chapter concludes that an ABRR system (Palley, 2004; 2006)
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represents a feasible alternative to interest rate policy in the management of asset market
bubbles and that it may possess desirable systemic properties.
Chapter 6 addressed issues associated with monetary policymaking in an open econ-
omy. The vast majority of the literature in the field assumes a closed economy for sim-
plicity. However, given the importance of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy
and the significant interplay of the interest rate and the current and particularly capital
accounts, the results of such models may be called into question. However, the estima-
tion of empirical open economy models is notoriously difficult and typically involves the
imposition of identifying restrictions invoking uncovered interest rate parity despite the
damning lack of supporting empirical evidence documented by Froot and Thaler (1990),
among others. An alternative approach has been the simulation of open economy DSGE
models. These rely on the specification and solution of an optimisation problem for each
group of agents in the model in a rational expectations framework. However, their reliance
on strong behavioural assumptions is open to criticism: the degree to which the decisions
of Homo sapiens can be approximated by those of Homo economicus is unclear.
The modelling approach pursued in Chapter 6 does not invoke such strong assump-
tions and has the further advantage that it does not rely on the concept of the ‘small open
economy’ subject to global shocks but too small to cause them in its own right. Rather,
the chapter deploys a comprehensive two–country stock–flow consistent framework built
around a rigorous double–entry accounting framework and employing the minimum of be-
havioural assumptions. This approach provides a powerful tool for counterfactual analysis
that ensures that the most simple of accounting rules are respected at all times. As a
result of the consistency of stocks and flows, it is possible to track flows of funds through
the respective economies at the sectoral level, gaining profound insights into the mecha-
nisms by which shocks are transmitted. To the best of my knowledge, this represents the
first serious attempt at developing an SFC model with which to analyse open economy
stabilisation policy.
The model is a modified and extended version of the advanced open economy model
of Godley and Lavoie (2006, ch. 12). This basic framework was extended in three ways.
Firstly, the addition of a cost–push inflationary mechanism to the model introduced nom-
inal growth, providing the inflationary forces targeted by the central bank. Secondly, the
marginal propensities to consume out of disposable income and wealth were endogenised as
negative functions of the real interest rate, thereby introducing a simple interest rate chan-
nel into the model. Furthermore, this modification generated endogenous cycles following
an economic perturbation, motivating the use of stabilisation policy. Finally, four distinct
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closures were defined representing alternative approaches to economic stabilisation, each
of which was compared to the benchmark case of no stabilisation policy.
The model was used to analyse the performance of each stabilisation regime in the wake
of three economic shocks: a step decrease in UK real exports; an increase the autonomous
component of the UK target real wage equation; and an expansionary US income tax cut.
Each shock was found to work through the model differently, providing a thorough test of
the various closures of the model. A number of interesting conclusions arose from the sim-
ulations. Firstly, procyclical monetary policy in isolation proved incapable of stabilising
the economy, resulting in an explosive trajectory in all cases. Similarly, inflation–targeting
fiscal policy failed to stabilise the cyclicality of the model following a shock. The combina-
tion of inflation targeting monetary and fiscal policies (i.e. CFPIT and CFPLF) resulted
in good stabilisation in most cases, with the combination of fiscal policy and US leadership
yielding the best performance in general.
The apparent inability of monetary policy to stabilise the economy may, at first, seem
inconsistent with the facts of experience. The result is potentially consistent with the
aforementioned work on the ineffectiveness of IT policies. Equally, the result is consistent
with the view that IT policies may be effective but only in concert with countercyclical fis-
cal policy (c.f. Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000; 2006; 2008). It is very difficult to adequately
control for the effect of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal interventions, and it
is likely that much of the literature which tests IT rules has failed to adequately disen-
tangle the effects of monetary and fiscal policies. Hence, the New Keynesian neglect of
fiscal policy may be unwarranted. This result begs further research attention, particularly
in the current economic climate in which governments are increasingly turning to fiscal
stimulus packages to revitalise their economies.
The results also suggest that the choices made by the fiscal authorities will influence
the effect of monetary policy. In particular, the means by which the government chooses
to finance its deficit is of fundamental importance. The model assumes that the deficit is
funded through the issuance of bonds and this has profound implications for the exchange
rate. Indeed, a counter–inflationary interest rate hike was found to result in depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate in the medium- to long–term due to its effect on the budget
deficit, indicating that the exchange rate channel may be considerably more complex
than is often assumed (Arestis and Sawyer, 2004). These results reflect the fundamental
interdependence of monetary and fiscal policy decisions observed by Chadha and Nolan
(2004).
Finally, the results also demonstrate an effect that is often overlooked: by increasing
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the interest rate to combat inflation, the central bank increases the interest income of
those agents holding financial assets, providing an expansionary stimulus through a ‘ren-
tier channel’. With the chosen parameterisation, this channel proved rather strong and
was only reinforced by the government’s choice to fund its deficit through increased bill
issuance. In fact, taken together, these effects tended to dominate the interest rate channel
of monetary policy operating through the endogeneity of the savings propensities. These
results challenge the conventional wisdom that higher interest rates are always contrac-
tionary. Rather, the interest rate operates through a range of channels that are highly
complex and may act in opposite directions. The overall effect over any given timeframe
is fundamentally dependent on the parameterisation of the system.
The principle conclusion arising from Chapter 6 is that a combination of monetary and
fiscal policy is required to stabilise the economy. Neither policy proved successful in any
of the three experiments in isolation. This result has profound implications for the New
Consensus macroeconomic model which adheres to the notion of Ricardian equivalence.
Pragmatism favours the application of the famous ‘cat theory’ of Deng Xiaoping, which
would suggest that the most successful policy is that which should be pursued. If modern
macroeconomics is to remain useful, it must acknowledge the role of fiscal policy.
7.2 Key Policy Implications
The analysis presented in this thesis has a number of implications for monetary policy
and stabilisation policy in a more broadly defined sense. The most important of these are
grouped into four broad categories and briefly summarised below.
Regulatory Issues
i. The channel system of monetary policy possesses a number of appealing character-
istics relative to the traditional approach operated (until recently) by the US. It is
more resilient to evolutions of the payments system and has consistently achieved
lower volatility of the overnight rate (c.f. Brookes and Hampton, 2000, on this last
point). Hence, at a minimum, the Fed should continue paying interest on balances
after the resolution of the ongoing financial crisis, and should consider adopting the
channel system in the longer–term.
ii. Central banks should strive to adopt a uniform framework for the regulation of e–
money along the lines of that discussed in Chapter 4, with a particular emphasis
on common technological standards to facilitate interoperability and increase the
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effective liquidity of e–money. There may be a role for the BIS in providing a nexus
for cross–country cooperation.
Policy Implements
iii. Chapter 5 stressed that the central bank must acknowledge that its freedom to
pursue IT policies is constrained by its responsibility to ensure the stability of the
financial system. It must also strive to minimise interest rate volatility.
iv. ABRR could be used to cool overheated markets while bolstering the ability of
commercial banks to absorb losses associated with loan defaults in a setting of falling
collateral values. This may also tame inflation arising through asset market wealth
effects, leaving interest rate policy to deal with generalised inflationary pressures,
thereby reducing interest rate volatility.
v. In addition to ABRR, the central bank also has the ability to engage in direct pru-
dential and regulatory intervention and moral suasion in order to guide the lending
activities of banks.
vi. Points iii. to v. rely on the feasibility of the ex ante identification of bubbles. While
empirical tests perform disappointingly (c.f. Gurkaynak, 2005) there is scope for a
more pragmatic approach based on a range of indicators including Tobin’s q, the
house–price to earnings ratio, and the inflation rates and degree of leveraging in
various asset markets. The literature on financial conditions indices may be useful
in this regard (c.f. Mayes and Vire´n, 2001).
The Role of Fiscal Policy
vii. Chapter 6 revealed that fiscal policy may be a powerful tool of stabilisation policy.
The use of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal intervention is common in
practice and the academic literature must catch up if it is to remain useful in guiding
policy.
viii. Monetary and fiscal policies are interdependent and so coordination between the
government and central bank is essential if policies are to be mutually consistent.
Modelling Issues
ix. There exists an unexploited complementarity between choice–theoretic micro–founded
DSGE models and the wealth of detail provided by SFC models, particularly regard-
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ing the traverse between (steady) states. This combination could provide a powerful
framework around which to marshall one’s thoughts.
x. Closed economy models may be useful for studying particular economic effects but
they cannot be used to gain reliable insights into the operation of monetary policy
in general as they omit the most important channel of monetary transmission.
xi. The results of Chapter 6 suggest that modellers should be aware of the fact that an
interest rate hike can exert expansionary as well as contractionary effects and that
the operation of monetary policy is highly complex.
7.3 Opportunities for Continuing Research
Research, by its nature, is a domain in which knowledge typically progresses in many small
steps. Therefore, it seems fitting to close by identifying some interesting and potentially
fruitful paths for future work.
The work undertaken in Chapter 3 could be extended in two main ways. Firstly, the
development of a theoretical model of e–money demand would be an interesting exercise
and it may provide various insights into the appropriate regulatory response. Much of the
existing research on e–money demand employs the crude assumption that substitutions
will be complete either in all transactions up to a specified size, or for all denominations
of currency below a threshold. Shifting the focus on to the attributes of e–money may
prove fruitful.
Secondly, the forecasting exercises could be extended in a number of ways. Firstly, the
use of informative Bayesian priors in the computation of optimal weights may improve
forecasting performance. This approach was not pursued in Chapter 3, however, as it is
contingent on the assumption that the ‘true model’ is contained within the candidate set, a
condition which is unlikely to be fulfilled given the set of relatively na¨ıve candidate models
employed in estimation. Nevertheless, the inclusion of more sophisticated candidate mod-
els and the use of a more sophisticated averaging approach may yield some improvement
in forecasting performance.
The assessment of e–money regulation undertaken in Chapter 4 cannot be readily
extended for the group of countries considered. However, once the launch of SELT is
complete and CEPAS 2.0 has been adopted, a review of the key policy recommendations
may prove interesting. Furthermore, as e–money schemes develop and their usage becomes
more widespread, various additional regulatory issues may present themselves.
The Minskyan model developed in Chapter 5 opens a number of avenues for further
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research. Perhaps most interestingly, while the model delivers strong support for Minsky’s
contention that the interest rate implement may be destabilising, it does not address his
other key proposition; that stability is destabilising. Research into this area may yield
interesting results and may help to inform the direction of monetary policy into the future
and, in particular, following the current financial crisis.
In terms of extending the estimated model, the identification of structural shocks
by imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous matrix, A0, could yield interesting re-
sults and would strengthen the inferences that could be drawn regarding the destabilising
influence of specific monetary policy shocks as opposed to generic interest rate shocks.
Similarly, the imposition of tentative restrictions on the loading matrix, α˜, may sharpen
the forecasts derived from the model. On the subject of forecasting, it would be interesting
to see how the model would perform on an updated dataset including the current crisis,
although reliable data is unlikely to be available within the next two or three years.
Moving in a slightly different direction, the development of a Minskyan SFC model
including a well–developed banking sector, and possibly distinguishing between manu-
facturing firms which rely heavily on debt–financing of inventories and other, less debt–
dependent firms, may yield valuable insights into the current crisis. Such a model would
be able to provide deep insights into the linkages between monetary policy and financial
fragility and may help in defining a sustainable range over which interest rates may be
used to target inflation.
The open economy SFC model developed in Chapter 6 may be further developed in
three principle directions. Firstly, and most importantly, the inclusion of a banking sector
extending loans to firms, and possibly households, would introduce credit channels of mon-
etary policy into the model. Furthermore, the inclusion of equity markets would introduce
stock–market wealth effects into the model, resulting in an unusually well developed model
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. While the development of such a large
model would be highly challenging, its usefulness for policy analysis is self–evident.
The consideration of different fiscal regimes also represents an interesting avenue for
continuing research. In the present model, income tax operates as an automatic stabiliser
while government spending is used to target inflation. An interesting approach would be to
assume that government spending is designed to achieve full employment and to investigate
the common objection to such strategies concerning their inflationary bias. Similarly, there
is scope to test alternative means of funding the government budget deficit through, for
example, fiscal prudence associated with reduced future spending and increased taxation,
as opposed to the simple assumption of increased bond issuance employed herein.
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Finally, the application of Bayesian techniques to SFC models in general would reduce
their sensitivity to the initial conditions and the choice of parameterisation. An alter-
native approach popular within the DSGE literature is to calibrate the model to specific
economies using existing empirical literature and stylised facts. This approach could prove
useful in the discussion of policy at the national level.
In conclusion, the fact that this thesis has opened up so many avenues for interesting
and fruitful research reinforces my initial conviction that the topics covered have hitherto
received insufficient research attention. It is my profound hope that the work contained
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Data and Technical Appendix
Notes on Chapter 3
Comparative Graphical Analysis
The data used in the construction of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 comes from a variety of sources.
Data on e–money outstanding, notes and coins in circulation and transferable deposits was
retrieved from CPSS reports 54, 60, 74 and 82 country table 2 (CPSS, 2003; 2004; 2006;
2008). The Euro Area e–money series was unavailable prior to 2000 and was completed
using the year–end value from the ECB’s monthly e–monetary aggregate published in table
bsi emoney. Similarly, the data for notes and coins in circulation in the EU was retrieved
from Eurostat series ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.INX. Exchange rate data used to convert values
into US$ was retrieved from country table 1 and completed for the Euro Area using
Eurostat table ert bil eur a. GDP data used in construction of the magnitudes relative
to GDP was retrieved from Eurostat table daa10000 and from IFS series 57699B..ZF for
Singapore. Population data used in the calculation of per capita values was sourced from
Eurostat table demo ppavg for the Euro Area and CPSS Table 1 for Singapore.
The data used in Figures 3.6-3.10 was mostly retrieved from CPSS reports 54 (for 1997-
9), 74 (for 2000-1) and 82 (for 2002-6). Population data was retrieved from country table
1 in CPSS report 54 and comparative table 1 in CPSS reports 74 and 82. Where revision
anomalies were apparent, data from report number 66 (CPSS, 2005) was substituted in
some cases and extrapolation and interpolation were employed. The details of the data
sources and manipulations are recorded in Table A1. Note that, where values are reported
as ‘negligible’ by the CPSS, a value of zero is assumed.
Forecasting
The sources of the data used in the forecasting exercises and the transformation procedures
employed are recorded in Table A2. The complete dataset is included on the accompanying
CD, as are the Eviews macros used in estimation of all three models and the computation
of the accompanying bootstrap standard errors. Unit root testing (not reported) confirms
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Fig. CPSS Tables Used Notes
3.6 #54, Table C13 Italian credit transfer data for 2000 comes from #54
#74, Table C7a to smooth a revision anomaly. Dutch e–money data
#82, Table C7a for 1997 is extrapolated from the 5 year growth rate.
Figures are re–scaled to sum to 100.
3.7 #54, Table C14 Italian cheque data for 2000-3 comes from #66 and
#74, Table C9a from 2004-6 is extrapolated using #82 growth rates.
#82, Table C9a Singaporean cheque data for 2002 is from #74 and
from 2003-6 is extrapolated using #82 growth rates.
Figures are re–scaled to sum to 100.
3.8 #54, Tables CS6 & C8 Missing French debit card data is interpolated bet-
#74, Table C10 ween 2000 and 2004.
#82, Table C10
3.9 #54, Tables C5 & CS6 Belgian ATM data breaks in 2002. Data from #66
#74, Table C11b is used for 2002-3 and 2004-6 is extrapolated using
#82, Table C11b the growth rate observes after the break.
3.10 #54, Tables C6 & C8
#74, Table C11b
#82, Table C11b
Note: CS denotes a country–specific table in the CPSS report indicated while C denotes a compar-
ative table.
Table A1: Data Sources for Figures 3.6 - 3.10
Variable Description (Data Source) and Transformation Procedure
mhp Total e–money outstanding (ECB: bsi emoney) seasonally adjusted using
Census–X12 and divided by M2 (International Financial Statistics, IFS:
59MBUZW), also seasonally adjusted using X12. The resulting series is
indexed, HP filtered (λ = 14, 400) and logged.
c Currency in circulation (Eurostat: BSI.M.U2.N.C.L10.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E),
adjusted with X12 relative to adjusted M2. The resulting series is indexed
and logged.
d Demand deposits (IFS: 34B.UZW) adjusted using X21 relative to adjusted
M2. Demand deposit data is extrapolated for 2008m4&5 based on monthly
growth rates over the previous 12 months. The resulting series is indexed
and logged.
y Industrial production (Eurostat: STS.M.I4.Y.PROD.NS0020.4.000) de-
flated by HICP (Eurostat: ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.INX). The resulting series
is indexed and logged.
r 1 month Euribor (Eurostat: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.MM.EURIBOR1MD.LST).
The resulting series is logged.
q NASDAQ adjusted closing price (Yahoo! Finance) deflated by HICP. The
resulting series is logged.
z The mean of broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants (World De-
velopment Indicators, WDI: IT.NET.BBND.P2), internet users per 100
(WDI: IT.NET.USER.P2), mobile phone subscribers per 100 (WDI:
IT.CEL.SETS.P2) and PCs per 100 (WDI: IT.CMP.PCMP.P2). Series are
extrapolated using the average 5 year growth rate where necessary (99%
adoption of cellphones in 2008 is assumed to avoid it exceeding 100%) and
linearly interpolated. The resulting series is indexed and logged.
Table A2: Data Sources for Chapter 3 Forecasts
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that all variables are I(1) with the exception of z, which the tests indicate may be I(2).
However, it seems unlikely from a theoretical point of view that z should be I(2) so the
analysis proceeds on the assumption that it is I(1).
Notes on Chapter 5
Data Sources and Manipulations
The sources of the data used in the estimation of the Minskyan macroeconomic model and
the transformation procedures employed are recorded in Table A3. The abbreviations are
interpreted as follows:
(N)SA: (Not) seasonally–adjusted;
X12: Seasonally–adjusted using the US Census Bureau’s X12 method;
FRB: Federal Reserve Board of Governors;
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis;
NIPA: National Income and Product Accounts, provided by the BEA;
IFS: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics;
FoF: Flow of Funds Accounts (Release Z1);
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics; and
FRED: Federal Reserve Economic Data Service.
The complete dataset is included on the CD provided with this thesis and is accompa-
nied by all of the programmes used in its construction. Similarly, the Gauss code used to
estimate the model and to compute the bootstrap critical values and confidence intervals
is provided on the CD.
Note that in order to maintain the annual rate characteristics of the Federal funds


































Symbol Description Notes (data sources and series codes in parentheses)
yt Realised output The log of real GDP (NIPA: GDP Table 1.1.6 row 1, SA) converted into index form (2000Y=100).
y∗t Potential output Computed using the translog process described in the main text. The series is expressed as an index
relative to the realised value of output in the year 2000 and then logged.
rt Federal funds rate The log of the Federal funds rate (FRB: H15/H15/RIFSPFF N.M) converted from monthly to quarterly
frequency.
∆pt Inflation The logarithmic approximation of GDP deflator inflation (NIPA: GDP Table 1.1.4 row 1).
ft Internal Funds Book value of US internal funds of the nonfinancial corporate sector (FoF: FA1060000305.Q, SA),
deflated by the GDP deflator, indexed and logged.
qt Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of corporate equity (FoF: FL103164003.Q, NSA, X12) to the linearly
interpolated net corporate total fixed capital stock (NIPA: Fixed Assets Table 6.1), both deflated by
the GDP deflator. The resulting series is indexed and logged.
it Investment Corporate non–financial gross fixed capital investment (FRB: Z1/Z1/FA105019005.Q, SA) deflated by
the GDP deflator, indexed and logged.
dt Real debt–service
cost
Defined as the product of the bank prime loan rate (FRB: H15/H15/RIFSPBLP N.M) less the rate
of inflation, and the deflated stock of outstanding corporate credit market liabilities excluding equities
(FoF: FL384104005.Q, SA). The loans rate is converted from monthly to quarterly frequency and the
series indexed and logged.
∆wt −∆zt Productivity–adj.
wage inflation
A logarithmic approximation computed as 400 times the difference between the first difference of the
log of hourly compensation (BLS: PRS88003103, SA) and the log of hourly output (BLS: PRS88003093,
SA) for the non–financial corporate sector. The series is logged.
pot Oil price West Texas Intermediate spot oil price (FRED: OILPRICE, NSA, X12) converted from monthly to
quarterly frequency, indexed and logged.
Table A3: Data Sources and Manipulations for the Chapter 5 Model
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Data Used in the Computation of Potential Output
The sources of the data used in the computation of potential output are recorded in Table
A4. The production functions (both translog and Cobb–Douglas) are estimated using real
quantities that are not logarithically transformed or indexed.
Potential labour input (L∗) is variously defined as follows:






















where CLF is the civilian labour force (BLS: LNS11000000, SA), HMAX denotes max-
imum legal working hours before overtime (a value of 40 is assumed across the whole
sample), OVHHP is trend overtime hours calculated by HP filtering (λ = 1600), N¯ is the
estimated time–invariant NAIRU and Nt is the time–varying NAIRU.
N¯ is estimated from OLS regression of the change in the rate of inflation on a constant
and the rate of unemployment (BLS: LNS14000000, SA):





∴ ∆(∆pt) = −aN¯ + aUt + vt
where −aN¯ is the regression constant, Ut is unemployment and vt is a white noise error
process. N¯ is retrieved simply by taking the ratio of the constant term to the absolute
value of the estimated coefficient on unemployment, |a|. This yields N¯ = 5.896.
The time–varying NAIRU is estimated following Ball and Mankiw (2002). The authors







Given the value of |a| obtained from the estimation of N¯ above, the right hand side is

























Symbol Description Notes (data sources and series codes in parentheses)
Yt Realised output Quarterly GDP data in chained 2000 dollars (NIPA: GDP Table 1.1.6 row 1, SA). As a value–added
measure, there is no need to include material inputs in the production function.
Lt Realised labour in-
put
The product of civilian employment (BLS: LNS12000000, SA) and hours worked (the sum of regular
hours (BLS: CES0500000007, SA) and overtime in the manufacturing sector (BLS: CES3000000009,
SA)). Quarterly employment data are generated from monthly data.
L∗t Pot. labour input See below.
Kt Utilised capital in-
put
The product of total net capital stock (private and governmental; BEA: NIPA Fixed Asset Table 1.1,
row 2) and the utilisation rate (FRB: G17/CAPUTL/CAPUTL.B50001.S.Q). Quarterly capital stock
data is computed by linear interpolation. The series is deflated by the GDP deflator.
K∗t Pot. capital input Equal to the deflated total net capital stock.
t Technical progress A simple cumulative sum process, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1.
SL Labour cost–share Labour cost is defined as the sum of employee compensation (BEA: NIPA GDP Tables 6.2A-D, row
1), employer social security contributions (BEA: NIPA GDP Tables 6.10B-D, row 1) and pension and
insurance contributions (BEA: NIPA GDP Tables 6.11A-D, row 1). All series are deflated by the GDP
deflator. The labour share is computed as labour cost/(labour + capital cost).
SK Capital cost–share The capital cost is equal to the deflated total net capital stock multiplied by the real loan rate plus
deflated depreciation (NIPA: Fixed Asset Table 1.3, row 2). The capital share is computed as capital
cost/(labour + capital cost). Note that SL and SK sum to unity by construction.
Note: NIPA data referred to in this table is annual and is therefore linearly interpolated to generate quarterly series.
Table A4: Data Used in the Computation of Potential Output
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by HP filtering yielding an estimate of the time–varying NAIRU2.
Descriptive Statistics and Data Analysis
Table A5 presents basic descriptive statistics for the dataset. Many of the series are not
normally distributed, typically exhibiting a degree of positive (rightward) skewness and
excess kurtosis. A low Jarque–Bera probability indicates that the series is non–normal.
On this basis, normality is rejected for four series at the 1% significance level and a further
four at the 5% level (the various potential output measures account for three of these).
y r π πw I c
Mean 4.178 0.016 0.010 0.013 4.029 4.326
Median 4.187 0.014 0.008 0.012 4.023 4.331
Maximum 4.779 0.044 0.029 0.034 4.627 5.155
Minimum 3.564 0.002 0.002 -0.007 3.365 3.634
Std. Dev. 0.360 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.359 0.327
Skewness 0.006 1.005 1.077 0.164 -0.145 -0.221
Kurtosis 1.772 4.700 3.697 2.732 2.061 2.470
Jarque–Bera 10.297 47.360 35.031 1.229 6.592 3.255
Probability 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.541 0.037 0.196
Sum 685.119 2.576 1.593 2.083 660.799 709.505
Sum Sq. Dev. 21.097 0.010 0.005 0.008 20.964 17.479





Mean 3.100 3.714 4.446 4.262 4.262 4.278
Median 3.563 3.811 4.448 4.276 4.275 4.292
Maximum 4.680 4.713 5.503 4.892 4.896 4.908
Minimum -0.537 2.859 3.594 3.591 3.598 3.607
Std. Dev. 1.160 0.445 0.509 0.367 0.368 0.368
Skewness -1.075 0.036 0.072 -0.088 -0.070 -0.088
Kurtosis 3.381 2.102 2.179 1.910 1.893 1.909
Jarque–Bera 32.564 5.545 4.751 8.323 8.501 8.345
Probability 0.000 0.062 0.093 0.016 0.014 0.015
Sum 508.439 609.082 729.069 698.933 698.914 701.540
Sum Sq. Dev. 219.333 32.234 42.268 21.994 22.072 22.031
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics
A number of interesting observations may be made based on simple visual inspection of
the data plots3. Firstly, it is obvious from Figures A1 to A8 that most of the series exhibit
trending behaviour, some linearly (in particular output, potential output, investment and
2More sophisticated unobservable variable techniques (e.g. Kalman filtering) are gaining popularity in
the literature (Roeger, 2006, is a good example) although for our purposes the present method is sufficient.
3Shaded areas indicate recessions identified by NBER. See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html for fur-
ther details.
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cash–flow) and some stochastically (including inflation and the federal funds rate). The
increase in stock–prices in the latter part of the twentieth century is easily identifiable in
Figures A5 and A6. The fall in the stock market at the turn of the millennium is evident
across most of the figures.
Figures A1(a), (c) and (d) reveal that both realised and potential output have grown
relatively consistently since 1967. There are, however, several notable exceptions to this
observation, particularly around the OPEC oil shocks of 1973-4 and 1978-9 and the re-
cessionary episodes of 1980-2, 1990-1 and 2001-2. The growth path of GDP has become
considerably smoother since the mid–eighties, possibly reflecting increasingly enlightened
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Figure A1: Realised and Potential Output and the Implied Output Gap
The potential output series derived under the assumptions of a constant NAIRU (Y ∗1 ),
a time–varying NAIRU (Y ∗2 ) and zero unemployment (Y
∗
3 ) are remarkably similar and
all are very smooth. This smoothness is consistent with the fact that the capital stock
and labour force evolve relatively slowly owing to the long–term durable nature of in-
vestment goods and the relatively stable dynamics of population growth in the short-
to medium–term. Figure A1(b) plots the implied output gap Y − Y ∗ for each potential
output series. It is immediately apparent that the distinction between constant and time–
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varying NAIRU is inconsequential. Furthermore, the output gap based on the assumption
of zero unemployment is somewhat larger than those employing the NAIRU. This fol-
lows intuitively from the strict monotonicity of the production function which states that
f (θX) > f (X) ∀θ > 1. Close inspection of Figure A1(b) reveals that the pattern of the
output gap is relatively invariant to the definition of potential labour input4.
It is interesting to note that the implied output gaps are nonstationary when considered
across the sample 1967Q1–2006Q4. However, stationarity is only weakly rejected by the
ADF test and the rejection is highly sample–sensitive; when the sample length is reduced
to 1970Q1–2006Q4 the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in all cases. It seems likely
that the downward trend in potential output over the early part of the sample reflects the
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Figure A2: Level and First Difference of the Federal Funds Rate
Figure A2 shows that the federal funds rate has gradually declined over the sample
period and has become considerably less volatile. This reduced volatility has been dis-
cussed in the literature in terms of policy inertia and interest rate smoothing. This decline
in the level of the interest rate has been accompanied by a general decline in the level of
price and wage inflation in the economy, a phenomenon known as the ‘great moderation’
(Figure A3). As one would expect, prices and wages tend to move together in a procycli-
cal manner, indicating that recessionary environments tend to exert deflationary pressure
while expansions are characterised by accelerating inflation.
Real cash–flow grows approximately linearly throughout the sample period (Figure
A4). Interestingly, the volatility of internal funds increases markedly after 2001, roughly
coinciding with the US recession.
Figure A5 reveals that Tobin’s q exhibits a reasonably high degree of persistence before
reversal of the prevailing trend. The seventies saw a prolonged and deep decline in q which
4The potential output series computed using a Cobb–Douglas production function (not reported) are
very similar to those presented above, suggesting that the method is relatively robust to changes in speci-
fication.
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(d) First Difference of Wage Inflation
Figure A3: Level and First Difference of Inflation and Wage Inflation
only reversed in 1982 which marked the start of eighteen years of relatively persistent
growth of the ratio. The value of q has fallen since the millennium and seems to have
reached a relatively steady state since 2003. It is interesting to note that decreases in q
seem to lead recessions by approximately one year.
The value of q fluctuates relatively widely and is considerably more volatile than any
of the other series. This volatility seems to be largely driven by the stock market: major
downturns such as those of the 70’s, the 1980-2 recession, the 1987 crash and the 2001-2
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Figure A4: Level and First Difference of Internal Funds
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(b) First Difference of Tobin’s q
Figure A5: Level and First Difference of Tobin’s q
given the relative volatilities of stock market and capital stock data. Furthermore, it lends
credibility to the contention that the inclusion of q in the investment function provides a
mechanism whereby market sentiment can influence investment decisions.
Investment increases throughout most of the sample with a notable flattening after the
recession of the early 80’s which is often attributed to tight monetary policy combined with
lacklustre fiscal policy (Figure A6). Panel (b) reveals that investment is highly sensitive
to the business cycle, falling sharply in recessions. The acceleration of investment spend-
ing between 1992 and 2000 reflects the buoyant stock market situation which prevailed
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(b) First Difference of Investment
Figure A6: Level and First Difference of Investment
The real debt–service cost is defined as the product of outstanding real credit market
liabilities and the real prime loans rate (i.e. d = (RL − π) ·L/p where L denotes liabilities
and p the price level). Hence, it is possible for the series to take negative values. In these
instances the interest repayments on existing loans are less than the devaluation of the
real loan principal. It should be clear that this measure of debt–service cost reflects only
minimal servicing of existing debt (i.e. repayment only of interest, not the principal).
Figure A7(a) shows a marked increase in the burden of debt–service concentrated in
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(b) First Difference of Real Debt–Service Cost
Figure A7: Level and First Difference of Real Debt–Service Cost
the period 1975-82. During this period, high real interest rates exacerbated the burden
of existing debt. Until recently real interest rates have gradually fallen, a process which
reached a climax in 2001 with the so–called ‘Greenspan gambit’ (clearly visible in panels
a and b) . This easy money period induced firms to rely increasingly on debt–funding, to
such an extent that the real debt burden remained unchanged. Since 2004, the Federal
Reserve has steadily increased interest rates in order to keep inflation in check, a policy
which has resulted in the large spike at the end of the series. However, given the alarmingly
high indebtedness of firms and households alike, the Fed must act with care in the near
future to avoid substantial economic retrenchment (indeed, the current turbulence in the
global economy is inextricably linked to the sub–prime debt crisis, and the way that central
banks have responded and are continuing to respond is the subject of intense scrutiny).
Lastly, Figure A8 is a common sight in the empirical business cycle literature and
needs little introduction beyond noting the recent persistent increase in the price of oil
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(b) First Difference of Oil Price
Figure A8: Level and First Difference of the Oil Price
The results of ADF testing of the levels and first differences of the variables in the





























DF(0) -2.407 -3.074 -2.492 -3.084 -1.543 -3.429 a,s,h
ADF(1) -3.231 -2.576 -2.331 -2.588 -2.495 -3.310
ADF(2) -3.913 s,h -2.565 -2.437 -2.572 -3.262 a,s,h -2.982
ADF(3) -4.100 -2.792 a,s,h -2.838 a,s,h -2.795 a,s,h -3.176 -3.132
ADF(4) -4.401 a -2.769 -2.796 -2.773 -3.244 -2.475
d q po r π πw
DF(0) -4.954 a,h -2.063 a,s,h -1.827 a,s,h -2.597 s -3.175 -7.345
ADF(1) -3.813 -2.111 -1.770 -2.378 -2.357 -4.712
ADF(2) -3.237 s -2.120 -1.703 -2.003 -1.839 s -3.461
ADF(3) -2.332 -2.128 -1.849 -2.502 a,h -1.626 -2.591 s,h
ADF(4) -1.925 -2.122 -1.847 -2.307 -1.976 a,h -2.234 a





DF(0) -9.772 s -7.102 -7.157 -7.156 -7.528 -13.287 s,h
ADF(1) -6.732 a,h -4.909 -4.962 -4.936 -4.991 a,s,h -10.192
ADF(2) -5.955 -3.231 a,s,h -3.282 a,s,h -3.240 a,s,h -4.953 -7.757
ADF(3) -5.271 -3.268 -3.359 -3.269 -4.647 -7.992 a
ADF(4) -5.323 -3.480 -3.629 -3.482 -5.196 -6.555
∆d ∆q ∆po ∆r ∆π ∆πw
DF(0) -16.914 a,s,h -11.643 a,s,h -12.927 a,s,h -13.880 -16.741 -20.636
ADF(1) -12.149 -8.387 -9.289 -11.151 -12.699 s -14.918
ADF(2) -12.184 -6.877 -6.884 -6.744 -10.029 -12.936 s
ADF(3) -10.615 -6.010 -6.037 -6.488 -6.614 a,h -10.348 a,h
ADF(4) -7.327 -5.804 -6.332 -4.524 a,s,h -6.027 -8.727
In the levels case, the Augmented Dickey–Fuller regressions include four lagged first differences of the
dependent variable. An intercept and deterministic time trend are included in all cases except r, π and πw
where the trend is omitted. The lower 5% critical values are -2.880 and -3.439 for the intercept only and
intercept and trend cases respectively. In the case of differenced data, the ADF regressions again include
four lags and an intercept but no deterministic time trend in any case. The lower 5% critical value is -2.880.
Superscript ‘a’, ‘s’ and ‘h’ denote the ADF lag length selected by the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan–Quinn
Information Criteria, respectively.
Table A6: Unit Root Tests for Chapter 5 Data
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difference stationary I(1) processes with the exception of Y . This result is significantly at
variance with a vast body of empirical literature. However, it seems that it is a peculiarity
of the ADF test in this instance as the Phillips–Perron test finds Y to be non–stationary
at the 5% level (test statistic = -3.3654, 5% c.v. = -3.438). Furthermore, the ADF tests
using AIC or HQC for lag selection indicate that d is I(0) although the SIC selects two
lags and the test indicates that d is I(1). Given the strong theoretical reasons for thinking
that output and the cost of debt–service are I(1), it seems safe to proceed on this basis.
Long-Run Macroeconometric Modelling: A Review
The model is estimated following the long–run structural approach of Garratt et al. (2006,
hereafter GLPS). This flexible modelling strategy provides a method by which theoretically–
motivated restrictions can be imposed on the long–run structure of the model while the
short–run remains unrestricted. The over identifying structure may be empirically tested,
in effect testing the proposed economic theory. Furthermore, the GLPS methodology gen-
eralises the flexible cointegrating VAR approach to account for the presence of exogenous
I(1) variables. This section briefly and selectively reviews the GLPS approach, drawing
extensively on chapters three and six of their book Global and National Macroeconometric
Modelling: A Long–Run Structural Approach.
Unrestricted VAR and VARX
In his seminal presentation of vector autoregression (VAR), Sims (1980) treats all variables
as endogenous on the grounds that any endogenous/exogenous distinction is unwarranted
and spurious in a situation of true simultaneity. Indeed, Sims’ development of the VAR
approach was motivated by his rejection of the excessive reliance on tentative economic
theories which had characterised the traditional simultaneous equation modelling approach
developed by the Cowles Commission. In his new approach Sims would let the data speak
for itself.
The assumption that all variables are determined endogenously imposes many limita-
tions on the macroeconometrician. In the present context, there is little justification for
assuming endogeneity of potential output and still less for the global oil price. Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (2000) propose a general structural VAR which permits the distinction
between endogenously and exogenously determined variables which they term VARX. The
authors consider the partitioning of the m vector zt into the my vector, yt, of endogenous
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A0yt = A1yt−1 + . . .+Apyt−p +B0xt +B1xt−1 + . . .+Bpxt−p +Ddt + εt (A1)
where εt = (ε1t, ε2t, . . . , εmt) is an my × 1 vector of serially–uncorrelated mean–zero ran-
dom error processes distributed independently of xt with the positive definite variance–
covariance matrix Ω, dt is a q × 1 vector of deterministic components and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Dependent on the nature of the deterministic components in d, the system is stable when






The reduced form of equation A1 is retrieved by pre–multiplying all terms by A−10
such that:
yt = Φ1yt−1 + . . .+Φpyt−p +Ψ0xt +Ψ1xt−1 + . . .+Ψpxt−p +Υdt + et (A2)
where Φi = A
−1
0 Ai, Ψi = A
−1
0 Bi, Υ = A
−1
0 D and et = A
−1
0 ǫt is i.i.d. (0, Σ) where
Ω = A0ΣA
′
0. In this form the equation can be readily estimated by OLS although
the identification of the structural parameters based on the reduced–form parameters is
typically non–trivial in practical applications.
VECM: Estimation and Identification with Exogenous Variables
Before turning to the case of cointegrating VAR in the presence of exogenous I(1) variables
(CVARX) it is instructive to discuss the case in which Bi = Ψi = 0 ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , p,
i.e. when all variables are endogenous and the system collapses to a standard VAR(p).
Assuming that the vector dt comprises constant terms and linear time trends then, by use
of the Granger Representation Theorem, it is possible to recast the reduced–form VAR(p)
as a VECM(p− 1) as follows5:
∆yt = a+ bt−Πyt−1
p−1∑
i=1
Γiyt−i + vt (A3)
5The nature of the deterministic components included in VECM models has a number of important
implications which must be carefully considered during model specification. In particular, the inclusion of
linear deterministic trends in the first–differenced VAR model may be associated with quadratic trends in
levels where the model contains a unit root. See Pesaran et al. (2000) for a detailed discussion of these
issues, in which five cases are identified reflecting different restrictions placed on intercept and time trend
coefficients.
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and Γi = −
∑p
j=i+1Φj , Π and Γi are my ×my matrices
of unknown coefficients, a and b are my × 1 vectors of unknown coefficients and vt is an
my × 1 vector of serially uncorrelated reduced–form disturbances defined similarly to et
above. The condition |λ| ≥ 1 with regards to the determinental equation
|Imy −Φ1λ−Φ2λ
2 − . . .−Φpλ
p| = 0
precludes the possibility of I(2) variates.
Assuming that all of the my elements of the vector yt are difference stationary (I(1))
processes and that there exist r < my linear combinations of these series (β
′yt) which are
stationary (i.e. there are r cointegrating vectors) then the matrix Π has reduced–rank r
and may be decomposed into:
Π = αβ′ (A4)
where α is the my×r loading matrix of equilibrium–correction coefficients. It follows from
equation A3 that neither α nor β′ are uniquely identified by estimation of the matrix Π
as it is possible to define any invertible r × r matrix Q such that:









where αβ′ and α∗β
′
∗ are observationally indistinct. In order to retrieve the loading vector
α and cointegrating matrix β from estimates of Π requires the imposition of at least r2
restrictions on either the short–run or long–run relations embedded in the model. However,
given that long–run economic theory is generally considered significantly more robust
than that of the short–run it is natural to impose the r2 restrictions on the matrix β (r
restrictions of each of the r cointegrating vectors) to overcome the identification problem.
Normalising the vectors provides r restrictions leaving r2 − r restrictions that must be
imposed for exact identification.
In single equation models the analysis of cointegration is relatively straightforward.
This simple case was analysed by Engle and Granger (1987). Cointegration is defined as
the case in which there is at least one linear combination of two or more I(1) series which
is I(0). This led Engle and Granger to develop a residual–based unit root test of the null
of I(1) residuals against the one–sided alternative in which they are I(0). It follows that
if the regressors are cointegrated then the regression residuals must be I(0).
The Engle–Granger approach tests simply for the presence of cointegration. The prob-
lem of estimating the number and nature of the cointegrating vectors in system models was
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approached by Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995). Johansen advances a system maximum likeli-
hood method for testing hypotheses about the rank of the matrixΠ based on reduced–rank
regression. Johansen’s procedure involves testing the null hypothesis:
H0 : Rank (Π) = r, r = 0, 1, . . . ,my − 1
against either of two alternatives:
H1a : Rank (Π) = my
H1b : Rank (Π) = r + 1
where H1a indicates that Π is of full rank while H1b corresponds to the reduced–rank case
if r < my − 1. Johansen develops separate test statistics for each alternative hypothesis,
the trace (LRtrace) for testing H1a and the maximum eigenvalue statistic (LRmax) for H1b.





LRmax = −T ln (1− λr+1)
where λ1 > λ2 > . . . λm denote the ordered eigenvalues of:
C = S−111 S10S
−1






jt, i, j = 0, 1
and where r0t and r1t are the residual vectors resulting from the regression of ∆yt and yt−1
(respectively) on (∆yt−1,∆yt−2, . . . ,∆yt−p+1). The test statistics are asymptotically non–
standardly distributed so critical values generated by Monte Carlo iterations are reported
by Johansen (1995).
Having identified the rank r of the matrix Π (i.e. the number of cointegrating vectors
among the variables) it is now necessary to impose the additional r2−r exactly identifying
restrictions. This can be approached either empirically (c.f. Johansen, 1988, 1991, and
Phillips, 1991, for example) or using prior economic theory.
Pesaran and Shin (2002) propose a sophisticated theory–based identification scheme
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in which the long–run matrix β is subjected to k linear restrictions such that:
Rvec (β) = f (A6)
where R is a k ×myr matrix of known constants, f is a k × 1 vector of known constants
and vec (β) denotes the myr × 1 vectorisation of the long–run matrix β. This approach
to identification overcomes many of Sims’ criticisms of the Cowles Commission approach
given that it requires no endogenous/exogenous dichotomy and it does not impose any
restrictions on the short–run dynamics of the model.
Pesaran and Shin use Johansen’s concentrated log–likelihood function:







where AT = S11 −S10S
−1
00 S01 and BT = S11. ℓT is maximised subject to the restrictions














′ (Rθ − f)
}
where h (θ) = Rθ − f and λ is the k × 1 vector of Lagrange multipliers. Three cases
can be identified: k < r2 (under identified), k = r2 (exactly identified) and k > r2 (over
identified). The last two cases are of considerably greater interest than the first for obvious
reasons. The derivation of the ML estimator of β is highly complex, particularly in the
over identified case and may be found in Pesaran and Shin. A more applied discussion is
to be found in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997).
Pesaran and Shin develop a likelihood ratio test of the k − r2 over identifying restric-






such that RAθ = fA represents the r
2 just identifying restrictions and RBθ = fB denotes
the k − r2 over identifying restrictions. Hence the dimensions of the known matrices and












Defining θˆA and θˆB as the ML estimators of θ derived under the exactly and over
identifying restrictions (respectively) allows one to construct the likelihood ratio statistic:



















denote the maximised log–likelihood values subject to the
relevant set of restrictions6. The statistic follows an asymptotic χ2 distribution with
k − r2 degrees of freedom.
Once the cointegrating vectors have been estimated, the short–run parameters (α and
Γi) can be simply estimated by OLS regression of the following:
∆yt = a0 +αξt + Γ1∆yt−1 + . . .+ Γp−1∆yt−p+1 + vt (A7)
where ξt = β
′yt−1 − b0 − b1t
7 is an r × 1 vector of estimated long–run errors, that is to
say the deviations from the long–run equilibrium described by the cointegrating vectors.
By substituting for ξt it is possible to rewrite equation A7 in the form of equation A3 as
follows:




Γi∆yt−i + vt (A8)
where a = a0 + α (b0 − b1) and b = αb1. Once the dynamic VECM has been estimated
one can compute impulse responses and persistence profiles as normal, although one must
be aware that while impulses are transitory in the case of stationary variables and long–
run vectors they are not for integrated variables. In this case the impulse response should
asymptote to a non–zero value as the forecast horizon becomes sufficiently large.
VECM with Exogenous I(1) Variables
Recalling the partitioning of the m vector zt into the my and mx vectors yt and xt of
endogenous and exogenous variables (respectively) the modelling described above may be
readily extended to incorporate weakly exogenous I(1) variables (long–run forcing variables
in the terminology of Granger and Lin, 1995). In particular, given the general structural
VECM of the form:
A∆zt = a˜+ b˜t+ Π˜zt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γ˜i∆zt−i + ǫt (A9)
6Noting that the maximum value of the log–likelihood is independent of any invertible transformation





could be replaced with the ML estimator obtained subject to Johansen’s empirical restrictions.
7The inclusion of the r× 1 vectors of deterministic terms represents the most general case but they are
often set to zero in practice.
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and 0 denotes a null matrix. The my ×my and my ×mx matrices Ayy and Ayx represent
the contemporaneous effects of the endogenous and exogenous variables (respectively) on
the endogenous variables. The mx × my null matrix in the lower triangle of A obtains
from the exogeneity of xt and indicates that there can be no contemporaneous impacts of
the variables in yt on those in xt.
The matrix Π˜ defines how the long–run errors ξt feed back onto the system. Themy×m
submatrix Π˜y characterises how these errors feed back onto the endogenous variables while
the restriction that the lower mx ×m submatrix of Π˜ is a null matrix ensures that the
long–run errors do not feed back onto the variables in xt. The null matrices in A and
Π˜ together ensure the exogeneity of the variables in xt. Noting the definition of the
long–run reduced form errors, ξt = β
′zt−1, and recalling that the vector zt contains both
endogenous and exogenous variables, it follows that the exogenous variables can influence
the endogenous magnitudes in the long–run; that is to say they are long–run forcing for
the system.
Under the assumption of weak exogeneity in which the structural errors from the
first my and the remaining mx equations are joint–normally distributed such that ǫyt =
ΩyxΩ
−1
xx ǫxt + ηyt where Ω =
 Ωyy Ωyx
Ωxy Ωxx











Γ˜∗yi∆zt−i + ηyt (A11)
Axx∆xt = a˜x + b˜xt− Π˜xxxt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γ˜xi∆zt−i + ǫxt (A12)
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Ayx−ΩyxΩ
−1
xxAxx and where the vectors a˜ and b˜ and the matrix Γ˜yi are partitioned into
endogenous and exogenous sub–vectors and sub–matrices denoted by the subscripts y and
x, respectively. Based on their decomposition of equation A10 into the conditional VECM
for ∆yt (equation A11) and the marginal VAR for ∆xt (equation A12), GLPS write the
full system as:
A∗∆zt = a˜










 , Π˜ =
 Π˜yy Π˜yx
0 Π˜xx







 , Γ˜∗i =
 Γ˜∗yi
Γ˜xi




The reduced form of the system is achieved in the usual way by pre–multiplying all
terms by A∗−1. Identification, estimation and testing then proceed in the usual manner,
although care must be taken if imposing restrictions on the loading matrix to ensure their
compatibility with the structure outlined above.
Bootstrapping Procedures
Bootstrapping for Future Uncertainty
The non–parametric bootstrap method used to compute empirical forecast intervals is
explained here with reference to the Gompertz curve estimated in Section 3.6. Recall that
the Gompertz model is estimated in the following form:
ln (∆lnyt) = −γt+ ln (βe
γ − β) + ǫt (A14)
Equivalently, one may write the h–step ahead form recursively as:
lnŷT+h = lnŷT+h−1 + e
−γ(T+h)+ln(βeγ−β)+ǫT+h
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In this way, the h–step ahead level forecast can be expressed as a function of lnŷT and
the errors ǫT+1, ǫT+2, ..., ǫT+h. This h × 1 vector of errors is created by resampling the
T × 1 vector of estimated residuals ǫ with replacement. When this process is repeated B
times, confidence intervals may be recovered as the appropriate percentiles of the empirical
distribution of the forecasts.
Bootstrapping the LR Statistic
The likelihood ratio statistic testing the over–identifying restrictions is widely known to be
unreliable in finite samples (see GLPS, 2006, p. 140). The exact finite sample distribution
of the statistic may be investigated by bootstrapping as follows:
i. Estimate equations A11 and A12 subject to both the exact- or over–identifying




























t−i + Λ̂∆xt + u
(b)
t (A15)
This step relies on the assumption that the estimated model may be treated as the
data generating process (DGP). ∆xt is treated as fixed and the initial values of yt
are used to account for the observations lost due to the VAR lag structure.
iii. The T × my error matrix u
(b)
t may be generated either parametrically or non–
parametrically. The parametric method draws the residuals from a multivariate
i.i.d. distribution with the same covariance structure as the observed residuals (i.e.
compute u
(b)




, where P̂ is the lower–Choleski factor of the resid-
ual covariance matrix Σ̂yy associated with the conditional VEC estimation). The
non–parametric method involves whitening the estimated residuals ηyt by defining
ς = P̂−1η̂yt and then resampling from P̂ ςt. The computation carried out in Chapter
5 employs the non–parametric approach.
iv. For each of the B simulated samples generated in this way, compute the LR statistic
testing the over–identifying restrictions. Convergence failure is likely to occur in
some replications: the simplest way to overcome this problem is to discard these non–
converged estimates. In practice, convergence was not achieved in approximately
20% of the replications. The finite sample critical values are then recovered as the
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appropriate percentiles of the resulting empirical distribution. Bootstrapped critical
values for Johansen’s cointegration tests may be computed in the same way.
Bootstrapping the Impulse Response Functions
Confidence intervals for the impulse response functions (and persistence profiles?) are
computed by bootstrapping using the full system model (as opposed to just the conditional
VECM used for bootstrapping the LR statistic) in order to properly account for the
adjustment process characterising the exogenous variables (c.f. GLPS, pp. 136-7). The
computation proceeds as follows:
i. Estimate equations A11 and A12 subject to the over–identifying restrictions (un-
less one wishes to report impulse response functions based on the exactly identified
model);





































Note that the choice of either the reduced form or structural models is irrelevant
provided that one is consistent. In Chapter 5, the reduced form parameters were
used and this is the form presented here;
iii. The simulated errors ζ
(b)
t may be drawn either parametrically or non–parametrically
from the estimated residuals;
iv. For each replication, re–estimate the model and compute the impulse response func-
tions in the usual manner, discarding any non–convergent results;
v. Confidence intervals are retrieved from the resulting empirical distribution as de-
scribed above.
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A Note on the Interpolation Procedure
The interpolation procedure works on the assumption that the value reported for an annual
series is the end–of–year value and not the mean across the year. The process involves
simple linear interpolation whereby the change from year 1 to year 2 is assumed to have
occurred in a smooth linear fashion. Hence, the interpolated value for 2000q1 would be
equal to the annual value for 2000 plus one quarter of the difference between 2001 and
2000. In the interest of consistency, where data is converted from monthly to quarterly
frequency the end–of–quarter values (i.e. m3, m6, m9 and m12) are taken as the quarterly
values.
A Glossary of Notation in the Chapter 6 SFC Model
Parameters
α˜£1 Value of the UK mpc out of income in the initial steady state
α˜$1 Value of the US mpc out of income in the initial steady state
α£1L Lower bound of UK mpc out of income
α$1L Lower bound of US mpc out of income
α£1U Upper bound of UK mpc out of income
α$1U Upper bound of US mpc out of income
α˜£2 Value of the UK mpc out of wealth in the initial steady state
α˜$2 Value of the US mpc out of wealth in the initial steady state
α£2L Lower bound of UK mpc out of wealth
α$2L Lower bound of US mpc out of wealth
α£2U Upper bound of UK mpc out of wealth
α$2U Upper bound of US mpc out of wealth
ǫ0 Parameter in the UK real exports equation
ǫ1 Parameter in the UK real exports equation
ǫ2 Parameter in the UK real exports equation
λ10 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ11 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
continued overleaf...
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...continued from previous page
λ12 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ20 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ21 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ22 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ30 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ31 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
λ32 Parameter in the UK household portfolio equations
γ10 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ11 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ12 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ20 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ21 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ22 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ30 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ31 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
γ32 Parameter in the US household portfolio equations
µ0 Parameter in the UK real imports equation
µ1 Parameter in the UK real imports equation
µ2 Parameter in the UK real imports equation
µ£α1 Parameter determining the responsiveness of the UK mpc out of income
to the real interest rate
µ$α1 Parameter determining the responsiveness of the US mpc out of income
to the real interest rate
µ£α2 Parameter determining the responsiveness of the UK mpc out of wealth
to the real interest rate
µ$α2 Parameter determining the responsiveness of the US mpc out of wealth
to the real interest rate
ν0 Parameter in the UK import price equation
ν1 Parameter in the UK import price equation
ν2 Parameter in the UK import price equation
r˜r£ UK real interest rate in the initial steady state
r˜r$ US real interest rate in the initial steady state
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Ω£0 Parameter in the UK real wage target equation
Ω$0 Parameter in the US real wage target equation
Ω£1 Parameter in the UK real wage target equation
Ω$1 Parameter in the US real wage target equation
Ω£2 Parameter in the UK real wage target equation
Ω$2 Parameter in the US real wage target equation
Ω£3 Parameter determining the speed of wage adjustment in the UK
Ω$3 Parameter determining the speed of wage adjustment in the US
π˜£ds Initial steady state value of inflation in the UK
π˜$ds Initial steady state value of inflation in the US
π£Lds Lower bound of UK inflation target range (fiscal policy)
π$Lds Lower bound of US inflation target range (fiscal policy)
π£Uds Upper bound of UK inflation target range (fiscal policy)
π$Uds Upper bound of US inflation target range (fiscal policy)
̺£ Parameter determining the strength of the anti–inflationary response of
the Bank of England
̺$ Parameter determining the strength of the anti–inflationary response of
the Fed
ς£1 Parameter in the UK countercyclical fiscal policy rule
ς$1 Parameter in the US countercyclical fiscal policy rule
ς£2 Parameter in the UK countercyclical fiscal policy rule
ς$2 Parameter in the US countercyclical fiscal policy rule
ϑ£1 Parameter in the UK inflation–targeting interest rate rules
ϑ$1 Parameter in the US inflation–targeting interest rate rules
ϑ£2 Parameter in the UK inflation–targeting interest rate rules
ϑ$2 Parameter in the US inflation–targeting interest rate rules
υ0 Parameter in the UK export price equation
υ1 Parameter in the UK export price equation
υ2 Parameter in the UK export price equation
φ£ Price mark–up in the UK
φ$ Price mark–up in the US
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θ£ Income tax rate in the UK
θ$ Income tax rate in the US
ζ Parameter determining the degree of foreign influence over UK monetary
policy
Indicator Variables
z1£ Takes the value 1 when α£1 < α
£
1L
z1$ Takes the value 1 when α$1 < α
$
1L
z2£ Takes the value 1 when α£1 > α
£
1U
z2$ Takes the value 1 when α$1 > α
$
1U
z3£ Takes the value 1 when α£2 < α
£
2L
z3$ Takes the value 1 when α$2 < α
$
2L
z4£ Takes the value 1 when α£2 > α
£
2U
z4$ Takes the value 1 when α$2 > α
$
2U
z5£ Takes the value 1 when r£ > 0 to ensure the zero lower bound is re-
spected in the UK
z5$ Takes the value 1 when r$ > 0 to ensure the zero lower bound is respected
in the US
z6£ Takes the value 1 when π£ds−1 > π
£U
ds for use in the UK fiscal policy rule
z6$ Takes the value 1 when π$ds−1 > π
$U
ds for use in the US fiscal policy rule
z7£ Takes the value 1 when π£ds−1 < π
£L
ds for use in the UK fiscal policy rule
z7$ Takes the value 1 when π$ds−1 > π
$L
ds for use in the US fiscal policy rule
Exogenous Variables
au£ Gold held by the UK central bank
au$ Gold held by the US central bank
B$cb£s Supply of US bills to the UK central bank
dxr£e Expected Sterling exchange rate change
dxr$e Expected Dollar exchange rate change
g£ Real expenditure of the UK government†
g$ Real expenditure of the US government†
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N£fe Full employment level in the UK
N$fe Full employment level in the US
p$g Price of gold in US Dollars
pr£ UK labour productivity
pr$ US labour productivity
r£ Interest rate on UK bills♣
r$ Interest rate on US bills♣
Endogenous Variables
α£1 Marginal propensity to consume out of income in the UK
α$1 Marginal propensity to consume out of income in the US
α£2 Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth in the UK
α$2 Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth in the US
B£cb£d Demand for UK bills arising from the UK central bank
B£cb£s Supply of domestic bills to the UK central bank
B$cb£d Demand for US bills arising from the UK central bank
B$
cb$d Demand for US bills arising from the US central bank
B$
cb$s Supply of domestic bills to the US central bank
B£s Total supply of UK bills
B£
£d Demand for UK bills arising from UK households
B£
£s Supply of domestic bills to UK households
B$
£d Demand for US bills arising from UK households
B$
£d Supply of US bills to UK households
B$s Total supply of US bills
B£$d Demand for UK bills arising from US households
B£$s Supply of UK bills to US households
B$$d Demand for US bills arising from US households
B$$s Supply of domestic bills to US households
c£ Real consumption of UK households
c$ Real consumption of US households
CA£ Current account balance of the UK economy
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CA$ Current account balance of the US economy
CG£ Capital gains accruing to UK households
CG$ Capital gains accruing to US households
C£ Nominal consumption of UK households
C$ Nominal consumption of US households
ds£ Real domestic sales in the UK
ds$ Real domestic sales in the US
DS£ Nominal domestic sales in the UK
DS$ Nominal domestic sales in the US
F£cb Profits of the UK central bank
F $cb Profits of the US central bank
G£ Nominal expenditure of the UK government
G$ Nominal expenditure of the US government
H£d UK households demand for high powered money
H£s Supply of high powered money to UK households
H$d US households demand for high powered money
H$s Supply of high powered money to US households
im£ UK real imports
im$ US real imports
IM£ UK nominal imports
IM$ US nominal imports
KA1£ UK capital account balance including official settlement accounts
KA1$ US capital account balance including official settlement accounts
KA2£ UK capital account balance excluding official settlement accounts
KA2$ US capital account balance excluding official settlement accounts
N£ UK employment
N$ US employment
NAFA£ UK net acquisition of financial assets
NAFA$ US net acquisition of financial assets
ωT£ Real wage target of UK workers
ωT$ Real wage target of US workers
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p£ds UK domestic sales price
p$ds US domestic sales price
p£g Price of gold in Pounds
π£ds UK domestic price inflation
π$ds US domestic price inflation
π£s UK sales price inflation
π$s US sales price inflation
p£m Price of UK imports
p$m Price of US imports
p£s UK sales price
p$s US sales price
p£x Price of UK exports
p$x Price of US exports
p£y UK GDP deflator
p$y US GDP deflator
PSBR£ UK public sector borrowing requirement
PSBR$ US public sector borrowing requirement
rr£ UK real interest rate
rr$ US real interest rate
S£ Nominal value of UK sales
S$ Nominal value of US sales
T£ Nominal value of UK tax receipts
T $ Nominal value of US tax receipts
v£ Real wealth of UK households
v$ Real wealth of US households
V £ Nominal wealth of UK households
V $ Nominal wealth of US households
W£ Nominal wages in the UK
W $ Nominal wages in the US
WB£ UK wage bill
WB$ US wage bill
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x£ Real UK exports
x$ Real US exports
X£ Nominal UK exports
X$ Nominal US exports
xr£ Exchange rate converting Sterling magnitudes to US Dollars
xr$ Exchange rate converting Dollar magnitudes to Sterling
y£ Real UK output
y$ Real US output
Y £ Nominal UK output
Y $ Nominal US output
Y D£ Nominal disposable income of UK households
Y D$ Nominal disposable income of US households
yd£hs UK nominal Haig–Simons disposable income
yd$hs US nominal Haig–Simons disposable income
yd£hse Expected UK real Haig–Simons disposable income
yd$hse Expected US real Haig–Simons disposable income
† These variables are endogenous in models IT, LF, CFPIT and CFPLF.
♣ These variables are endogenous in models CFPIT and CFPLF.
Table A7: A Glossary of Notation in the Chapter 6 SFC Model
